Jon - no, a commonality, i.e., a general, is not a 'thing' in itself that is
'identically' instantiated. First, as I said about 'this force', that"
it's real, even if 'it' doesn't exist all by itself in space and time; even if
this force-of-continuity only functions as instantiated in each rabbit.
So, it can't be a 'thing' since it doesn't exist as itself in space and time. I
myself have no problem with understanding it as a force or even 'will', since
it does focus on the future.
Second, of course, the instantiations are not identical; that's the power of
semiosis, where Firstness functions to introduce novelty, and even, where 'the
real' is networked with other organisms/realities and thus, is influenced by
them.
Jerry - my, I didn't know that you consider all biosemioticians to be
nominalists. What's your evidence? Do you consider Jesper Hoffmeyer to be such?
Kalevi Kull? My reading of their works denies this. They are strong Peirceans
and focus on that level of non-individual general continuity. Your attempts to
confine Peirce to your discipline of chemistry, I think, narrow his work.
Edwina
Edwina.
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Eric Charles ; Peirce-L
Sent: Sunday, January 29, 2017 2:57 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism
Edwina, Eric, List:
I would not call it a "force," but I agree that the traditional debate is
about whether there is something real (hence "realism") that all rabbits have
in common to make them rabbits vs. "rabbits" merely being a name (hence
"nominalism") that we apply to many different individuals simply because we
happen to perceive them as having certain similarities. Even this way of
putting it arguably concedes too much to nominalism, because it implies that
the universal or general is a thing that is somehow identically instantiated in
multiple other things.
One of the aspects of Peirce's version of realism that I find especially
attractive is that he instead conceived of the general as a continuum, such
that its instantiations are not identical, even if they are only
infinitesimally different. No matter how similar any two actual rabbits may
seem to be, there is an inexhaustible range of potential rabbits that would be
intermediate between them.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 9:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Eric - I have a perhaps slightly different view of the topic than a
philosophical approach.
As an example - let's say there are 10 rabbits in my garden. A nominalist
would say - there are ten individual rabbits..a total of ten. A realist asks
'Is there such a 'force' as 'rabbitness, which empowered the singular existence
of rabbits in the past and will empower them in the future into my garden?
The nominalist says: No such 'force'; just a collection of individual
rabbits - The individual things that you perceive all by yourself as an
individual, is what there is in the real world.
The realist says: Yes, there is such a force; it provides
continuity-of-type. It's 'instantiated' in each particular rabbit, but it's
real, even if 'it' doesn't exist all by itself in space and time; even if this
force-of-continuity only functions as instantiated in each rabbit.
Another example would be..beauty. Is there such a 'force' as beauty, or is
the attribute of beauty simply the subjective opinion of one individual looking
at an individual person/object.
The nominalist/conceptualist says: It's all individual. There is no
non-individual 'force'; it's what each person sees.
The realist says: No - there IS a real force that operates as
continuity-of-type; it is 'instantiated' in an individual existential
object..but still, that force is real.
I consider that Nominalism as a societal force began to develop in the 13th
century, the beginning of the 400 year long battle with the Church over the
control of knowledge. The Church rejected the rights of individual man to
reason, think, analyze; he was merely to accept the words of the church. Such a
control over knowledge greatly hampered technological development, for no
individual could question the dictates of the Church. So, disease was 'caused'
by your own sins or the witch on the hill...etc..
But in the 13th c, with its population increases and concomitant disease,
plagues, etc..technological change was vital. The era of DOUBT and questions BY
individuals began...bitterly fought by the Church. So - there's such as Abelard
with his 'dubitando'[ I doubt]; the great tale of Percival by Chretien de
Troyes which told of the devastation in the land wrought by a young man,
Percival because he did not question what was going on before his eyes;....and
other developments...which all began to assert the right of the individual to
evaluate and judge what was going on in the material world before him. This led
to Nominalism - and it played a huge role in enabling technological and
intellectual developments.
BUT - throwing out the baby with the bathwater - Nominalism also led to a
mechanical view of the world where this world is made up only of material
atomic entities bumping into each other; and to postmodern relativism where
subjective views were all valid, even if contradictory. So - with Peirce [and
others] we have acknowledged that continuity of type suggests a real force that
is articulated/instantiated in 'tokens' of that force. That, in my view, is
the nature of realism.
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