Eric - I have a perhaps slightly different view of the topic than a
philosophical approach.
As an example - let's say there are 10 rabbits in my garden. A nominalist would
say - there are ten individual rabbits..a total of ten. A realist asks 'Is
there such a 'force' as 'rabbitness, which empowered the singular existence of
rabbits in the past and will empower them in the future into my garden?
The nominalist says: No such 'force'; just a collection of individual rabbits -
The individual things that you perceive all by yourself as an individual, is
what there is in the real world.
The realist says: Yes, there is such a force; it provides continuity-of-type.
It's 'instantiated' in each particular rabbit, but it's real, even if 'it'
doesn't exist all by itself in space and time; even if this force-of-continuity
only functions as instantiated in each rabbit.
Another example would be..beauty. Is there such a 'force' as beauty, or is the
attribute of beauty simply the subjective opinion of one individual looking at
an individual person/object.
The nominalist/conceptualist says: It's all individual. There is no
non-individual 'force'; it's what each person sees.
The realist says: No - there IS a real force that operates as
continuity-of-type; it is 'instantiated' in an individual existential
object..but still, that force is real.
I consider that Nominalism as a societal force began to develop in the 13th
century, the beginning of the 400 year long battle with the Church over the
control of knowledge. The Church rejected the rights of individual man to
reason, think, analyze; he was merely to accept the words of the church. Such a
control over knowledge greatly hampered technological development, for no
individual could question the dictates of the Church. So, disease was 'caused'
by your own sins or the witch on the hill...etc..
But in the 13th c, with its population increases and concomitant disease,
plagues, etc..technological change was vital. The era of DOUBT and questions BY
individuals began...bitterly fought by the Church. So - there's such as Abelard
with his 'dubitando'[ I doubt]; the great tale of Percival by Chretien de
Troyes which told of the devastation in the land wrought by a young man,
Percival because he did not question what was going on before his eyes;....and
other developments...which all began to assert the right of the individual to
evaluate and judge what was going on in the material world before him. This led
to Nominalism - and it played a huge role in enabling technological and
intellectual developments.
BUT - throwing out the baby with the bathwater - Nominalism also led to a
mechanical view of the world where this world is made up only of material
atomic entities bumping into each other; and to postmodern relativism where
subjective views were all valid, even if contradictory. So - with Peirce [and
others] we have acknowledged that continuity of type suggests a real force that
is articulated/instantiated in 'tokens' of that force. That, in my view, is
the nature of realism.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Eric Charles
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Sunday, January 29, 2017 1:34 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism
Jon,
With regards to the second point, on whether there might not be natural laws,
I was thinking about things like "Order of nature", in which Peirce points out
that: "If we could find out any general characteristic of the universe, any
mannerism in the ways of Nature, any law everywhere applicable and universally
valid, such a discovery would be of such singular assistance to us in all our
future reasoning, that it would deserve a place almost at the head of the
principles of logic. On the other hand, if it can be shown that there is
nothing of the sort to find out, but that every discoverable regularity is of
limited range, this again will be of logical importance."
In the remainder of that essay, and elsewhere, Peirce seems clearly to
believe that there are laws everywhere applicable and universally valid.
However, he also seems unwilling to completely discount the possibility that
when the indefinite community has conducted its infinite inquiry, it might be
the case that every discoverable regularity is, in fact, of limited range. Now,
one can, if one wants, define "laws of nature" as having whatever scope one
wants, but my intended point was that Peirce allows that universal laws - laws
of nature as classically conceived - might not exist.
With regards to the first point, regarding "real", you might have me.
However, I cannot be sure, because of my basic confusion regarding the
distinction in question. Of what might our infinite inquirers reach agreement,
which does not entail consequences? Peirce is (in no small part) trying to
explicate the world as the scientist sees it, and so the agreement he is
interested in is the agreement which results from inquiry, primarily
experimental inquiry. That is, he is interested in the result of myriad
investigations of the form "If I do X, to Y, what is the result?" As such, it
would seem that being "real" and having "effects" are inseparable, because we
cannot possibly reach agreement regarding things which do not have effects.
We can get at the problem similarly by going back to Peirce's assertion that
any two ideas with all the same consequences are the same idea. Let us posit
something that has no effects detectable under any circumstances, call it
"galblax". The concept of galblax that is real, and the concept of galblax that
is not-real have exactly the same implications, and so any attempt to
distinguishing the two concepts is incoherent. Only if the "stuff" in question
has an effects, is it coherent to inquire about it, and only if we can follow
the path of inquiry is it possible that a consensus be reached, which again
connects "real" with "having effects".
Note again that my intention is not to bring us into the weeds of the issues,
but to try to understand what (people think) "nominalism" and "realism" mean in
a pragmatist concept.
Best,
Eric
-----------
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey Statistician
U.S. Marine Corps
On Sat, Jan 28, 2017 at 6:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Eric, List:
Actually, Peirce's definition of "real" was being such as it is regardless
of what any person or finite group of people thinks about it. Taken to the
third (pragmatic) grade of clarity, the "real" is that which would be the
object of the "final opinion"--the consensus of an indefinite community after
infinite inquiry.
Where in Peirce's writings do you see him leaving open the possibility that
there might not be real laws of nature? The indispensable reality of 3ns
(abbreviation for Thirdness) was one of his bedrock principles, although his
fallibilism precluded him from holding it (or anything else) to be absolutely
certain. Maybe that is all you meant.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Sat, Jan 28, 2017 at 3:58 PM, Eric Charles
<eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote:
Jon,
Interesting! Dropping the answers in terms of the offending terms:
a.. Is there anything real that cannot, in principle, be known by
humans?
The pragmatist says "no", on account of that not being what the term
"real" means. Real things are just those things that have effects, and effects
are things that can, at least in principle, be detected/known. So a proper
contemplation of what our terms mean (i.e., taking the time to get our ideas
"clear") gives us the answer to that, without any need for metaphysical
assertions.
a.. Are there real laws of nature that govern existing things and
events?
Well, Perice leaves open the possibility that there might not be. He
implores us to latch onto any regularities we might think we see, and determine
the scope of those regularities, for the value they provide, while leaving open
the possibility that none might truly be "laws of nature" in the classic sense.
So in this sense he is optimistic regarding the realist assertion that laws of
nature exist and can be discovered, but is not asserting with certainty that
the effort to find them will work out.
Or so it seems to me......
Best,
Eric
-----------
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey Statistician
U.S. Marine Corps
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