I think the following is at least tangentially related to this discussion of truth.
In his diagrammatic logic Peirce posited the sheet of assertions as the fundamental ground of semiosis. He called the sheet of assertion TRUTH (in caps). It is represented by the unmarked space that is there prior to and in which cuts are inscribed, a cut being the representation of an assertion. Doesn't this imply that truth is prior to representation? And thus, while truth is the ground of representation, it is itself unrepresentable? I think so. And this is another way of saying, as Peirce, did, that truth cannot be known by means of signs. But this does not imply that it cannot be known. > On March 2, 2017 at 3:54 PM Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > > > > > On Mar 2, 2017, at 1:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > <jonalanschm...@gmail.com mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote: > > > > > > > > > CG: Yes, if there were a late quote along > > those lines that would have answered my question directly. I suspect though > > that is just someone assuming it’s merely regulative. > > > > > > > > > > How about this one, from Peirce's definition of "synechism" in > > Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1902)? > > > > > > > > > CSP: It would, therefore, be most contrary > > to his own principle for the synechist not to generalize from that which > > experience forces upon him, especially since it is only so far as facts can > > be generalized that they can be understood; and the very reality, in his > > way of looking at the matter, is nothing else than the way in which facts > > must ultimately come to be understood. There would be a contradiction here, > > if this ultimacy were looked upon as something to be absolutely realized; > > but the synechist cannot consistently so regard it. Synechism is not an > > ultimate and absolute metaphysical doctrine; it is a regulative principle > > of logic, prescribing what sort of hypothesis is fit to be entertained and > > examined. (CP 6.173) > > > > > > > > > > > That’s really close but not quite there. Note the last part which > > I highlighted. Logically it’s regulative in terms of what hypotheses can be > > examined. So it’s a way of casting off a hypothesis somewhat akin to the > > way the positivists dismissed many things as meaningless. So while > > synechism isn’t a metaphysical doctrine the question of truth and > > continuity can still entail metaphysical doctrines once those are examined > > as a hypothesis. > > His point is just that as a regulatory principle we have to assume that > things aren’t inexplicable. So we can’t assume my question is inexplicable. > But that doesn’t mean of course we have a metaphysical answer for my question. > > Now if we simply extend from the idea of continuity to metaphysics we’re > doing it wrong. However if we’re extending from modal realism to the question > of whether there is a real possibility of stability (i.e. something beyond > the regulative) I think we’re making a different sort of argument. Maybe I’m > wrong in that though. > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > >
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