Jon S, Edwina, list,

For now, just some preliminary thoughts on Jon's several bullet points. In
response to Edwina, Jon wrote:

1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within
a continuous process.  That is why I find your tendency to use the term
"Sign" for the entire interaction of DO-[IO-R-II] problematic, and why I
hoped that when we jointly recognized the *internal *triad of [IO-R-II]
some months ago, we would thereafter conscientiously call *this *(and
*only *this) the Sign, while always acknowledging that there is no Sign
*without *a DO.


My view is that while such an individual thing as a crystal has been
created by some semiosic process, that the semiosis is (internally) more or
less complete once the crystal is formed, and this is so even as we can
analyze aspects of the three categories present in/as the crystal (these no
longer being semiotic, but rather, phenomenological categories).

John Deely, who introduced the idea of physiosemiosis, did not argue for a,
shall we say, vital 'process' of physiosemiosis once rocks and the like
have been formed: "Deely . . . notably in *Basics of Semiotics*, laid down
the argument that the action of signs extends even further than life, and
that semiosis as an influence of the future played a role in the shaping of
the physical universe prior to the advent of life, a role for which Deely
coined the term *physiosemiosis."*
*https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely>*

As suggested above, I think that it was Peirce's view that what Delly
termed "physiosemiosis" not only
"played a role in the shaping of the physical universe prior to the advent
of life" but has played one since and does so today, and not only in the
formation of crystals. But, again, in my view, once the crystal is formed
the (internal) semiosis ends (yes, it continues to have a relation to its
environment, and there will be atomic and sub-atomic activity necessarily
occurring, but I personally have yet to be convinced that such activity
constitutes a form of semiosis, while some physicists have argued that it
does).

Living organisms present a more difficult problem. The work of Stjernfelt
(esp. in *Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of
Dicisigns)*, not to mention the whole thrust of the science of Biosemiotics
holds not only that any living organism, but the organism in relation to
its environment (its Umwelt) is fully involved in complex semiosic
activity. I would tend to strongly agree.


2.  As I noted in my own reply to Gary, I instead view the DI of the child
(the utterer) as an *external Sign* for the mother (the interpreter), and
its DO is still the hot burner.


While I also view the DI of the child as an external Sign for her mother, I
do not see the DO as the hot burner. The mother, say, who was out of the
room for the moment of the accident, hearing her child's scream may not
connect the scream (the Sign) with the stove at all. So then what is the
DO? I think that rather than the hot burner (as Jon holds) that it's the
child herself.

3.  Your mind is indeed an individual manifestation of Mind; but again, I
suspect that Peirce used "Quasi-mind" to accommodate cases that most people
would not normally associate with "mind."


As I've posted now a couple of times, in my opinion the concept
"Quasi-sign" needs much further discussion, perhaps a thread of its own. I
would for now merely suggest that while it no doubt does "accommodate cases
that most people would not normally associate with "mind," that the concept
includes more ordinary cases as well.

4.  If to you "Form has [parameters] and laws and continuity," then you are
not referring to the same thing that Peirce called "Form" when he
contrasted it with Matter in NEM 4:292-300 and EP 2:303-304.


‚ÄčAt times in this discussion as to the meaning of 'Form', while there seems
to me that for Peirce 'Form' *is *1ns, Edwina's analysis of Form seems to
me more related to structure--the forms of the organization of related
elements in a material system, rather than the forms of the elements
themselves. In that physical system the organization would in many if not
all cases have "parameters, laws, and continuity."

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 8:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> 1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
> talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
> beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within
> a continuous process.  That is why I find your tendency to use the term
> "Sign" for the entire interaction of DO-[IO-R-II] problematic, and why I
> hoped that when we jointly recognized the *internal *triad of [IO-R-II]
> some months ago, we would thereafter conscientiously call *this *(and *only
> *this) the Sign, while always acknowledging that there is no Sign *without
> *a DO.
>
> 2.  As I noted in my own reply to Gary, I instead view the DI of the child
> (the utterer) as an *external Sign* for the mother (the interpreter), and
> its DO is still the hot burner.
>
> 3.  Your mind is indeed an individual manifestation of Mind; but again, I
> suspect that Peirce used "Quasi-mind" to accommodate cases that most people
> would not normally associate with "mind."
>
> 4.  If to you "Form has [parameters] and laws and continuity," then you
> are not referring to the same thing that Peirce called "Form" when he
> contrasted it with Matter in NEM 4:292-300 and EP 2:303-304.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 6:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R, list
>>
>> Thanks for your comments.
>>
>> 1] Yes, my point is that there is no such thing as an isolate sign. Even
>> a stone on a sandy beach is in interaction. It is Mind-as-Matter, and this
>> matter/mind is in interaction with the heat of the sun, with the cooling of
>> the night, with the water, with other stones. Any exisistence, i.e., a sign
>> unit MUST be in interaction or...it disappears.
>>
>> That's why I write the full semiosic action, which is a Sign [capital S]
>> as: DO-[IO-R-II]. AND - if this basic interaction does not move into a DI,
>> then, I'd wonder how long such an organism could survive. That is,
>> biologically, if the food input is not transformed into muscle and fat
>> [understood as the DI]...or if the child when told to pick up the
>> book...simply sits and stares in a catatonic state...
>>
>> So- yes, the DI is indeed a vital bridge to further semiosis.
>>
>> 2] Agreed, the child's DI, a cry of pain, becomes a DO for the mother,
>> who reacts to this DO ...
>>
>> 3] I'm having trouble with the quasi-mind. I don't get it. Perhaps it's
>> ego. Why isn't my mind - just an individual existence of Mind?
>>
>> 4] And I'm having trouble seeing Form as a mode of Firstness. Since, to
>> me, Form has perimeters and laws and continuity, it is therefore an
>> integral property of Mind -  and I can see it only in a mode of Thirdness.
>>
>> Now, whether these Forms are FIRST in operation in the universe, i.e., as
>> in a Platonic Universe, followed, Second, by their materialization  - is
>> quite another debate and such an order has nothing to do with the three
>> modal Categories.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>
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