There must have been some misunderstanding of my post, if you could not find what I meant. Which is foud EP 2, 134-135.

Even if CSP states in his Harward Lectures (1903) "I have not succeeded any better than this: Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgement expressible in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentencehaving its apodosis in the imperative mood. " EP 2, 134-135

Now, this CSP gave in 1903, quite late. So we may certainly claim that he gives a so-called understatement in writing on having not succeeded any better than... And may infer that this formulation had been most critically inspected several times over a long period of his work. - This I take to be a stamp of approval.

The quote above points at "a corresponding practical maxim" (note: "imperative mood").

CSP continues with the Maxim of Pragmatism, as he originally stated it. "Consider what effects .... (etc)

So CSP first presents a later formulation of the principle, which, in relation to the earlier formulation (in the context of this particular lecture) may taken as a second (II). That is a later one. And in this very context the one taken up after it, is to taken as a first (I).

On which grounds? - On the grounds of simplest arithmetics and the very idea of ordinality. I, II, III.

In the Harward Lecture (1903) Peirce leaves this, and goes on with the theory and concept of probability. - Why?

To me the answer seems clear: Because a proper theory of probabality is absolutely needed in order to understand and put into scientific use both of the formulations.

I will come back to other responses in this thread as soon as possible. But, alas, I will be away for at least a couple of days.

This question by gnox seemed the most pressing one.

Also, I wish to think before I respond. Sometimes I give in to the temptation of a quich response.


Kirsti Määttänen kirjoitti 16.2.2018 20:04:

Jon A.S. gave five of Peirce’s formulations of the “pragmatic
maxim,” but I haven’t found the place in EP2 where “he gave a
final stamp of his approval by explicitly NAMING them AS The first and
The second formulation of The Pragmatic Maxim (in EP vol 2).” Can
you tell us where to find that? Otherwise, as Jon said, we can’t
tell which formulation is the “second,” or discuss how a third
might differ from it.

By the way, my book is not about Peirce; it’s about the
philosophical issues involving signs, and though it quotes Peirce
quite a lot, it’s about those semiotic issues rather than issues of
Peirce interpretation. I’ve had my say about those interpretive
issues elsewhere, such as peirce-l and a couple of papers, but not
very much in _Turning Signs_.

Gary f.

-----Original Message-----
From: []
Sent: 14-Feb-18 14:23
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims and mediation (Was Lowell

Gary f., list,

Your response presented as full an understanding of essential points
in my post as I could ever hope. Even more, I was greatly and happily

And yes, of course there are any formulations of the ideas conveyed by
the two short expressions he gave a final stamp of his approval by
explicitly NAMING them AS The first and The second formulation of The
Pragmatic Maxim (in EP vol 2). (Note the cardinals!)

He writes about them all the time, of course. In search of as good a
linguistic expression as he was ever able to come up with.

But, at a later date he takes up the First of these feeling a need for
a Second, which does not (in any way) contradict with accepting the
First, but taking it into a further stage, so to speak.

I have not read your book, Gary. I do not read about Peirce, have not
done so for centuries. Which, just as you write, gives much more
weight and value to us both.

PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at .

Reply via email to