List: Since there have been no comments on my revised summary of what Peirce wrote about Quasi-minds, I guess that we can move on to some related topics.
As Gary R. pointed out a while back, Peirce observed that there are "various meanings of the word 'Mind,' Logical, Metaphysical, and Psychological" (CP 4.550; 1906); and presumably the same is true of his concept of a Quasi-mind. Consequently, it is important to be clear about which one is in view, and I believe that so far we have been focusing primarily on its *logical *aspects. However, presumably there must be *real* Quasi-minds that play an indispensable role in any *concrete* instance of semiosis. This obviously takes us from logic into metaphysics. CSP: The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory … (EP 2:304; 1904) The following is my summary of a few passages that I think are especially helpful for sorting out the nature of *actual* Signs and Sign-action. Interestingly, they lead to a notion of "perfect sign" that (at least initially) seems different from what Peirce described in EP 2:545n25. - EP 2:304 (1904) - Every Sign *denotes *its Object (Matter/2ns), *signifies* characters or qualities (Form/1ns), and *determines* its Interpretant that unites them (Entelechy/3ns). - EP 2:544n22 (1906) - The Sign is *passive *in its relation to its Object, being determined by but not affecting it; and *active *in its relation to its Interpretant, determining but not being affected by it. - EP 2:410 (1907) - The Sign *mediates *between its Object and Interpretant; it is determined by the Object *relatively to the Interpretant*, and determines the Interpretant *in reference to the Object*. - EP 2:544n22 (1906) - The Sign *communicates *a Form, which has the being of the *predicate*, the truth of a conditional proposition; it is in the Dynamic Object *entitatively* and in the Sign (as its Immediate Object) *representatively*. - EP 2:307 (1904) - A pure *Icon *is perfect in respect to signification, but lacking in denotation; while a pure *Index* is perfect in respect to denotation, but lacking in signification. - EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is *identical*, in such identity as a Sign may have, with the *unity *of the very Matter denoted by it and the very Form signified by it, such that its Interpretant is *the Truth*. Again, "determines" in this context means "makes more determinate," and this must always occur *with respect to a character or quality*; i.e., a Form. The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the *entire *effect that the Dynamic Object *itself *would have on the Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906). Therefore, a perfect Sign in *this* sense is one that achieves Entelechy, the complete unity of Matter and Form in its Interpretant. This is the final cause of all *triadic* semiosis, Truth as "the conformity of a representamen to its object--its object, ITS object, mind you" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906). By contrast, *dyadic *action occurs when there is no mediating Sign; just two Dynamic Objects directly and reciprocally affecting each other (cf. EP 2:411; 1907). Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Feb 25, 2018 at 4:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > List: > > Per Gary R.'s suggestion, I set aside the concept of "perfect Sign" for a > little while to focus on the concept of "Quasi-mind." After going back > through the key quotes (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/ > arc/peirce-l/2018-02/msg00322.html), all of which are from 1906, here is > a revised summary. > > 1. Every Sign is a *determination *of a Quasi-mind, which is something > of the general nature of a Mind. > 1. The Quasi-mind is *itself *a Sign that is susceptible to > determination, but it is not logically necessary that it possess > *consciousness*. > 2. There are no *isolated *Signs, and multiple Signs connected such > that they can have *one *Interpretant are determinations of *one * > Quasi-mind. > 3. The determinations of a Quasi-mind become Immediate > Interpretants of all other Signs whose Dynamic Interpretants are > dynamically connected > 2. Every Sign requires *two *distinct Quasi-minds, a *Quasi-utterer* > and a *Quasi-interpreter*, which may be temporally successive versions > of the *same *Quasi-mind; as well as a *third *Quasi-mind that is > their overlap, the *Commens*. > 1. The essential ingredient of the Quasi-utterer is the (Dynamic) > Object, which determines the Sign *only *in the respect (Immediate > Object) that enables the Sign to act on the Quasi-interpreter as the > Object *itself > *would. > 2. The essential ingredient of the Quasi-interpreter is the > (Dynamic) Interpretant, which the Sign produces as a *singular *event > by determining the Quasi-interpreter to a feeling, to an exertion, > or to another Sign. > 3. The essential ingredient of the Commens is the Sign itself, > which *welds *the Quasi-utterer and Quasi-interpreter into *one > *Quasi-mind > that includes whatever they must *already *share for the Sign to > fulfill its function. > 4. When there is no *actual *Quasi-interpreter, the (Immediate) > Interpretant is the range of *possible *effects that the Sign > *would *produce, if it *were *to determine a Quasi-interpreter. > 5. When there *is *a Quasi-interpreter, the (Dynamic) Interpretant > is a state of activity, mingled with curiosity, that usually leads to > experimentation as the normal logical effect. > 3. In Existential Graphs, the Sheet of Assertion or Phemic Sheet is ... > 1. the *matter *that the Graph-instances are to determine, in which > the Graphist and Interpreter are *at one*. > 2. the *means *by which the Graphist and Interpreter *collaborate *in > composing a Pheme [or Dicisign] and in operating on this so as to > develop a > Delome [or Argument]. > 3. a Diagram of the logical Quasi-mind that is determined by all of > the Signs represented on it. > 4. a Diagram of the logical Universe and a Seme [or Rheme] of *the > Truth*, the widest Universe of Reality. > 5. a Pheme [or Dicisign] of the Commens, all that is tacitly taken > for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter from the outset of > their > discussion. > > Based on all of this, it seems to me that a Quasi-mind can be defined as > an *individual *Sign that is also a *complex *of Signs, which are > connected such that they are susceptible to determination by *another *Sign > to a *single *Interpretant. The additional Sign may be either a *natural *Sign > determined directly by a Dynamic Object that the Quasi-mind encounters, or > a *genuine *Sign determined by another Quasi-mind (perhaps its *past *self) > with which it becomes welded in that Sign. The resulting Interpretant > may be a *further *genuine Sign that determines yet another Quasi-mind > (perhaps its *future *self). > > Peirce's characteristic emphasis on continuity is evident here. The flow > of Signs within and between Quasi-minds is much like the flow of time > itself, which has no *discrete *instants--only *infinitesimal *moments > (cf. CP 7.653; 1903). That is why *any *analysis of concrete semiosis > must be *arbitrary *to some degree--designating one Sign within a process > of Sign-action is like marking one point on a line; in both cases, we are > introducing a *discontinuity *into that which is *continuous *in itself. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
