Dear Jon, Garys, list,
I am confused by your exact treatment. It appears to me that you have a clear and correct view but I don’t yet see it. Since it is determined, at least by you and Gary R, that you have a grasp of what Quasi-mind entails, please go a little bit further and say out loud the answer to this: *Is Quasi-mind the general standpoint of the spectator*? That is, if quasi-minds are either of the quasi-utterer and quasi-interpreter or somehow of both, then where, in accordance with your view, is the spectator? I feel as though an understanding of this question and answer can help me to be a better critical thinker; a better citizen of the world, even. Thanks and with best wishes, Jerry R On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 10:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F., List: > > GF: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs > in a Quasi-mind? > > > Gary R. and I now agree that a Quasi-mind is (in my words) "an *individual > *Sign that is also a *complex *of Signs," and (in his words) "something > like the prerequisite of all semiosis and communication." There is nothing > in EP 2:304 to indicate that "the ideal or perfect sign" is "an accretion > of Signs," although EP 2:545n25 does refer to "a *perfect *sign" as "the > aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries > with it." I am not quite ready to say anything further about the latter > passage just yet; I would prefer to cover a bit more semiotic and > metaphysical ground first. > > JAS: The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object > of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the > *entire > *effect that the Dynamic Object *itself *would have on the > Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906). > > > GF: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include) > attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate > Object sounds like a concept — as, for example, your concept of a woman > includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do you > think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept? > > > In the 1906 passage that I cited but did not quote, Peirce stated that a > Sign "is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to > enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly > it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that > quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself had > acted upon it." I have posited that this "respect" is precisely the > Immediate Object, and stated that determination "must always occur *with > respect to a character or quality*; i.e., a Form." Hence the Dynamic > Object determines the Sign with respect to *some*, but not *all*, of its > characters or qualities; and that *partial *combination of attributes is > the Immediate Object, the Form that the Sign communicates. Only the Sign > *itself*--not its Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that unites > Matter (denotation) and Form (signification) in its Interpretant > (determination). > > GF: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with > another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as a > correlate of a triadic relation? > > > Indeed, it would be better to substitute "Thing" for "Dynamic Object" when > discussing *dyadic *reaction; I only wanted to emphasize the direct > contrast with *triadic *Sign-action. In fact, I am drafting another post > to discuss what I see as the key distinctions among Things, Quasi-minds, > and Persons, continuing to utilize the Aristotelian terms for the > Categories that Peirce employed in his 1904 writings--Form (1ns), Matter > (2ns), and Entelechy (3ns). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 9:07 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary, Jon S, >> >> I’ve inserted a few questions below … >> >> Gary f >> >> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:[email protected]] >> >> *Sent:* 28-Feb-18 19:15 >> >> Jon, list, >> >> Summarizing Peirce's thought at EP 2.304, Jon wrote: >> >> EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is *identical*, in such >> identity as a Sign may have, with the *unity *of the very Matter denoted >> by it and the very Form signified by it, such that its Interpretant is *the >> Truth*. >> >> If this is so, then, since any given Sign or accretion of Signs in a >> Quasi-mind (say on a sheet of assertion) can only signify specific aspects >> or facets of the Object (ITS Object, mind you) as a certain, shall we say, >> "selected assemblage" of characters (its Form), it would seem to me that a >> perfect Sign remains an Ideal, that even the perfect Sign can only >> asymptotically approach the Truth that it means to represent. >> >> Q: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs in >> a Quasi-mind? >> >> So, in sum, the Object can never be *completely* represented even by a >> perfect Sign, and even if, as Jon wrote: >> >> The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object of >> the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the >> *entire *effect that the Dynamic Object *itself *would have on the >> Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906). >> >> Q: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include) >> attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate >> Object sounds like a *concept* — as, for example, your concept of a >> woman includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do >> you think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept? >> >> It seems to me that "reproducing the *entire* effect that the Dynamic >> Object itself would have on the Quasi-interpreter" is an impossibility. >> >> Yet, Jon, I'm not clear if this interpretation is consistent with this >> part of your conclusion: >> >> Therefore, a perfect Sign in *this* sense is one that achieves >> Entelechy, the complete unity of Matter and Form in its Interpretant. This >> is the final cause of all *triadic *semiosis, Truth as "the conformity >> of a representamen to its object--its object, ITS object, mind you" (CP >> 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906). >> >> Of course I completely agree with your concluding sentence. >> >> By contrast, *dyadic *action occurs when there is no mediating Sign; >> just two Dynamic Objects directly and reciprocally affecting each other >> (cf. EP 2:411; 1907). >> >> Q: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with >> another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as a >> correlate of a *triadic* relation? >> >> But here we are speaking of Science, while I believe that Art is--even if >> rarely--able to perfectly represent its Object, one which however, it >> retrospectively, so to speak, creates. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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