Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

```Gary f, Jon S, list,

I haven't much more to offer beyond but what Jon has already written, so
I'll keep this brief. Gary f asked:```
```
Q: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs in a
Quasi-mind?

I would make no such assumption. At the moment all I'm assuming is that the
perfect Sign (the nature of which I am not yet clear on) and a Quasi-sign
are *not* the same, and that whatever the perfect Sign turns out to be that
it does *not* mean that the Object can be completely represented. I'd
suggested that it may represent some kind of asymptotic Ideal of
representation, while Jon's quoting Peirce to the effect that a perfect
Sign is "the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its
occurrence carries with it" makes me less certain of that initial
interpretation. I'd reiterate that what Jon and I do agree on is that a
Quasi-mind is a Sign which is a complex of Signs and, as I conjectured,
perhaps the prerequisite of all semiosis.

Q: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include)
attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate
Object sounds like a *concept*— as, for example, your concept of a woman
includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do you
think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept?

Jon and I agree, as he wrote, that "the Dynamic Object determines the Sign
with respect to *some*, but not *all*, of its characters or qualities; and
that *partial *combination of attributes is the Immediate Object, the Form
that the Sign communicates."  I am less certain that I would distinguish
the IO from the R as completely as Jon seems to do in writing "Only the
Sign *itself*--not its Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that
unites Matter (denotation) and Form (signification) in its Interpretant
(determination)." This hard distinction of the IO from the R and I seems to
me to leave the "partial combination of attributes" floating in some
literally in-significate realm. Furthermore, the Interpretant is itself a
Sign, so too sharp a distinction in that direction is also, for me,
problematic. This discussion has gotten me rethinking just how completely
we ought distinguish IO-R-I except, perhaps, for the purposes of certain
rather abstract analyses since, at the moment, such hard distinctions seem
to me to break the continuity of semiosis. In short, the Form which the
Sign communicates seems to me not to be fully distinct from it.

Q: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with
another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as a
I agree with Jon that "it would be better to substitute 'Thing' for
'Dynamic Object' when discussing dyadic reaction."

I'm sure that both Jon and I would be interested in your response to our
understanding of the nature of the Immediate Object is.

Best,

Gary R

​

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 11:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Gary F., List:
>
> GF:  Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs
> in a Quasi-mind?
>
>
> Gary R. and I now agree that a Quasi-mind is (in my words) "an *individual
> *Sign that is also a *complex *of Signs," and (in his words) "something
> like the prerequisite of all semiosis and communication."  There is nothing
> in EP 2:304 to indicate that "the ideal or perfect sign" is "an accretion
> of Signs," although EP 2:545n25 does refer to "a *perfect *sign" as "the
> aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries
> with it."  I am not quite ready to say anything further about the latter
> passage just yet; I would prefer to cover a bit more semiotic and
> metaphysical ground first.
>
> JAS:  The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object
> of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the
> *entire
> *effect that the Dynamic Object *itself *would have on the
> Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906).
>
>
> GF:  Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include)
> attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate
> Object sounds like a concept — as, for example, your concept of a woman
> includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do you
> think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept?
>
>
> In the 1906 passage that I cited but did not quote, Peirce stated that a
> Sign "is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to
> enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly
> it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that
> quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself had
> acted upon it."  I have posited that this "respect" is precisely the
> Immediate Object, and stated that determination "must always occur *with
> respect to a character or quality*; i.e., a Form."  Hence the Dynamic
> Object determines the Sign with respect to *some*, but not *all*, of its
> characters or qualities; and that *partial *combination of attributes is
> the Immediate Object, the Form that the Sign communicates.  Only the Sign
> *itself*--not its Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that unites
> Matter (denotation) and Form (signification) in its Interpretant
> (determination).
>
> GF:  By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with
> another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as a
> correlate of a triadic relation?
>
>
> Indeed, it would be better to substitute "Thing" for "Dynamic Object" when
> discussing *dyadic *reaction; I only wanted to emphasize the direct
> contrast with *triadic *Sign-action.  In fact, I am drafting another post
> to discuss what I see as the key distinctions among Things, Quasi-minds,
> and Persons, continuing to utilize the Aristotelian terms for the
> Categories that Peirce employed in his 1904 writings--Form (1ns), Matter
> (2ns), and Entelechy (3ns).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 9:07 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>
>> Gary, Jon S,
>>
>> I’ve inserted a few questions below …
>>
>> Gary f
>>
>> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
>>
>> *Sent:* 28-Feb-18 19:15
>>
>> Jon, list,
>>
>> Summarizing Peirce's thought at EP 2.304, Jon wrote:
>>
>> EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is *identical*, in such
>> identity as a Sign may have, with the *unity *of the very Matter denoted
>> by it and the very Form signified by it, such that its Interpretant is *the
>> Truth*.
>>
>> If this is so, then, since any given Sign or accretion of Signs in a
>> Quasi-mind (say on a sheet of assertion) can only signify specific aspects
>> or facets of the Object (ITS Object, mind you) as a certain, shall we say,
>> "selected assemblage" of characters (its Form), it would seem to me that a
>> perfect Sign remains an Ideal, that even the perfect Sign can only
>> asymptotically approach the Truth that it means to represent.
>>
>> Q: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs in
>> a Quasi-mind?
>>
>> So, in sum, the Object can never be *completely* represented even by a
>> perfect Sign, and even if, as Jon wrote:
>>
>> The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object of
>> the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the
>> *entire *effect that the Dynamic Object *itself *would have on the
>> Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906).
>>
>> Q: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include)
>> attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate
>> Object sounds like a *concept* — as, for example, your concept of a
>> woman includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do
>> you think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept?
>>
>> It seems to me that "reproducing the *entire* effect that the Dynamic
>> Object itself would have on the Quasi-interpreter" is an impossibility.
>>
>> Yet, Jon, I'm not clear if this interpretation is consistent with this
>>
>> Therefore, a perfect Sign in *this* sense is one that achieves
>> Entelechy, the complete unity of Matter and Form in its Interpretant.  This
>> is the final cause of all *triadic *semiosis, Truth as "the conformity
>> of a representamen to its object--its object, ITS object, mind you" (CP
>> 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906).
>>
>> Of course I completely agree with your concluding sentence.
>>
>> By contrast, *dyadic *action occurs when there is no mediating Sign;
>> just two Dynamic Objects directly and reciprocally affecting each other
>> (cf. EP 2:411; 1907).
>>
>> Q: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with
>> another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as a
>> correlate of a *triadic* relation?
>>
>> But here we are speaking of Science, while I believe that Art is--even if
>> rarely--able to perfectly represent its Object, one which however, it
>> retrospectively, so to speak, creates.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>
>
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