Garys, List: Two quick clarifications.
1. My point about concepts is that they *are *Signs, specifically Symbols, while Immediate Objects are *parts *or *aspects *of Signs. Hence every concept *has *an Immediate Object, but no Immediate Object *is *(by itself) a concept. 2. The Interpretant *can *be itself a Sign, but *need *not be; it can *also *be a feeling or an exertion. Regards, Jon S. On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 11:41 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Gary f, Jon S, list, > > I haven't much more to offer beyond but what Jon has already written, so > I'll keep this brief. Gary f asked: > > Q: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs in > a Quasi-mind? > > I would make no such assumption. At the moment all I'm assuming is that > the perfect Sign (the nature of which I am not yet clear on) and a > Quasi-sign are *not* the same, and that whatever the perfect Sign turns > out to be that it does *not* mean that the Object can be completely > represented. > I'd suggested that it may represent some kind of asymptotic Ideal of > representation, while Jon's quoting Peirce to the effect that a perfect > Sign is "the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its > occurrence carries with it" makes me less certain of that initial > interpretation. I'd reiterate that what Jon and I do agree on is that a > Quasi-mind is a Sign which is a complex of Signs and, as I conjectured, > perhaps the prerequisite of all semiosis. > > Q: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include) > attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate > Object sounds like a *concept*— as, for example, your concept of a woman > includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do you > think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept? > > Jon and I agree, as he wrote, that "the Dynamic Object determines the Sign > with respect to *some*, but not *all*, of its characters or qualities; > and that *partial *combination of attributes is the Immediate Object, the > Form that the Sign communicates." I am less certain that I would > distinguish the IO from the R as completely as Jon seems to do in writing > "Only > the Sign *itself*--not its Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) > that unites Matter (denotation) and Form (signification) in its > Interpretant (determination)." This hard distinction of the IO from the R > and I seems to me to leave the "partial combination of attributes" floating > in some literally in-significate realm. Furthermore, the Interpretant is > itself a Sign, so too sharp a distinction in that direction is also, for > me, problematic. This discussion has gotten me rethinking just how > completely we ought distinguish IO-R-I except, perhaps, for the purposes of > certain rather abstract analyses since, at the moment, such hard > distinctions seem to me to break the continuity of semiosis. In short, the > Form which the Sign communicates seems to me not to be fully distinct from > it. > > Q: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with > another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as a > correlate of a *triadic* relation? > I agree with Jon that "it would be better to substitute 'Thing' for > 'Dynamic Object' when discussing dyadic reaction." > > I'm sure that both Jon and I would be interested in your response to our > answers to your questions, Gary. In particular I'm wondering what your > understanding of the nature of the Immediate Object is. > > Best, > > Gary R > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 11:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Gary F., List: >> >> GF: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs >> in a Quasi-mind? >> >> >> Gary R. and I now agree that a Quasi-mind is (in my words) "an *individual >> *Sign that is also a *complex *of Signs," and (in his words) "something >> like the prerequisite of all semiosis and communication." There is nothing >> in EP 2:304 to indicate that "the ideal or perfect sign" is "an accretion >> of Signs," although EP 2:545n25 does refer to "a *perfect *sign" as "the >> aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries >> with it." I am not quite ready to say anything further about the latter >> passage just yet; I would prefer to cover a bit more semiotic and >> metaphysical ground first. >> >> JAS: The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object >> of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the >> *entire >> *effect that the Dynamic Object *itself *would have on the >> Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906). >> >> >> GF: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include) >> attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate >> Object sounds like a concept — as, for example, your concept of a woman >> includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do you >> think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept? >> >> >> In the 1906 passage that I cited but did not quote, Peirce stated that a >> Sign "is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to >> enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly >> it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that >> quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself had >> acted upon it." I have posited that this "respect" is precisely the >> Immediate Object, and stated that determination "must always occur *with >> respect to a character or quality*; i.e., a Form." Hence the Dynamic >> Object determines the Sign with respect to *some*, but not *all*, of its >> characters or qualities; and that *partial *combination of attributes is >> the Immediate Object, the Form that the Sign communicates. Only the Sign >> *itself*--not its Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that >> unites Matter (denotation) and Form (signification) in its Interpretant >> (determination). >> >> GF: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with >> another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as a >> correlate of a triadic relation? >> >> >> Indeed, it would be better to substitute "Thing" for "Dynamic Object" >> when discussing *dyadic *reaction; I only wanted to emphasize the direct >> contrast with *triadic *Sign-action. In fact, I am drafting another >> post to discuss what I see as the key distinctions among Things, >> Quasi-minds, and Persons, continuing to utilize the Aristotelian terms for >> the Categories that Peirce employed in his 1904 writings--Form (1ns), >> Matter (2ns), and Entelechy (3ns). >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 9:07 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >> >>> Gary, Jon S, >>> >>> I’ve inserted a few questions below … >>> >>> Gary f >>> >>> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] >>> >>> *Sent:* 28-Feb-18 19:15 >>> >>> Jon, list, >>> >>> Summarizing Peirce's thought at EP 2.304, Jon wrote: >>> >>> EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is *identical*, in such >>> identity as a Sign may have, with the *unity *of the very Matter >>> denoted by it and the very Form signified by it, such that its Interpretant >>> is *the Truth*. >>> >>> If this is so, then, since any given Sign or accretion of Signs in a >>> Quasi-mind (say on a sheet of assertion) can only signify specific aspects >>> or facets of the Object (ITS Object, mind you) as a certain, shall we say, >>> "selected assemblage" of characters (its Form), it would seem to me that a >>> perfect Sign remains an Ideal, that even the perfect Sign can only >>> asymptotically approach the Truth that it means to represent. >>> >>> Q: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs >>> in a Quasi-mind? >>> >>> So, in sum, the Object can never be *completely* represented even by a >>> perfect Sign, and even if, as Jon wrote: >>> >>> The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object of >>> the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the >>> *entire *effect that the Dynamic Object *itself *would have on the >>> Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906). >>> >>> Q: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include) >>> attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate >>> Object sounds like a *concept* — as, for example, your concept of a >>> woman includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do >>> you think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept? >>> >>> It seems to me that "reproducing the *entire* effect that the Dynamic >>> Object itself would have on the Quasi-interpreter" is an impossibility. >>> >>> Yet, Jon, I'm not clear if this interpretation is consistent with this >>> part of your conclusion: >>> >>> Therefore, a perfect Sign in *this* sense is one that achieves >>> Entelechy, the complete unity of Matter and Form in its Interpretant. This >>> is the final cause of all *triadic *semiosis, Truth as "the conformity >>> of a representamen to its object--its object, ITS object, mind you" (CP >>> 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906). >>> >>> Of course I completely agree with your concluding sentence. >>> >>> By contrast, *dyadic *action occurs when there is no mediating Sign; >>> just two Dynamic Objects directly and reciprocally affecting each other >>> (cf. EP 2:411; 1907). >>> >>> Q: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with >>> another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as a >>> correlate of a *triadic* relation? >>> >>> But here we are speaking of Science, while I believe that Art is--even >>> if rarely--able to perfectly represent its Object, one which however, it >>> retrospectively, so to speak, creates. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>
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