Jon, list, Summarizing Peirce's thought at EP 2.304, Jon wrote:
EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is *identical*, in such identity as a Sign may have, with the *unity *of the very Matter denoted by it and the very Form signified by it, such that its Interpretant is *the Truth*. If this is so, then, since any given Sign or accretion of Signs in a Quasi-mind (say on a sheet of assertion) can only signify specific aspects or facets of the Object (ITS Object, mind you) as a certain, shall we say, "selected assemblage" of characters (its Form), it would seem to me that a perfect Sign remains an Ideal, that even the perfect Sign can only asymptotically approach the Truth that it means to represent. So, in sum, the Object can never be *completely* represented even by a perfect Sign, and even if, as Jon wrote: The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the *entire *effect that the Dynamic Object *itself *would have on the Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906). It seems to me that "reproducing the *entire* effect that the Dynamic Object itself would have on the Quasi-interpreter" is an impossibility. Yet, Jon, I'm not clear if this interpretation is consistent with this part of your conclusion: Therefore, a perfect Sign in *this* sense is one that achieves Entelechy, the complete unity of Matter and Form in its Interpretant. This is the final cause of all *triadic *semiosis, Truth as "the conformity of a representamen to its object--its object, ITS object, mind you" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906). Of course I completely agree with your concluding sentence. By contrast, *dyadic *action occurs when there is no mediating Sign; just two Dynamic Objects directly and reciprocally affecting each other (cf. EP 2:411; 1907). But here we are speaking of Science, while I believe that Art is--even if rarely--able to perfectly represent its Object, one which however, it retrospectively, so to speak, creates. Best, Gary R - *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] > wrote: > List: > > Since there have been no comments on my revised summary of what Peirce > wrote about Quasi-minds, I guess that we can move on to some related topics. > > As Gary R. pointed out a while back, Peirce observed that there are > "various meanings of the word 'Mind,' Logical, Metaphysical, and > Psychological" (CP 4.550; 1906); and presumably the same is true of his > concept of a Quasi-mind. Consequently, it is important to be clear about > which one is in view, and I believe that so far we have been focusing > primarily on its *logical *aspects. However, presumably there must be > *real* Quasi-minds that play an indispensable role in any *concrete* > instance of semiosis. This obviously takes us from logic into > metaphysics. > > > > CSP: The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still > less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to > express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory … (EP 2:304; 1904) > > > > The following is my summary of a few passages that I think are especially > helpful for sorting out the nature of *actual* Signs and Sign-action. > Interestingly, > they lead to a notion of "perfect sign" that (at least initially) seems > different from what Peirce described in EP 2:545n25. > > - EP 2:304 (1904) - Every Sign *denotes *its Object (Matter/2ns), > *signifies* characters or qualities (Form/1ns), and *determines* its > Interpretant that unites them (Entelechy/3ns). > - EP 2:544n22 (1906) - The Sign is *passive *in its relation to its > Object, being determined by but not affecting it; and *active *in its > relation to its Interpretant, determining but not being affected by it. > - EP 2:410 (1907) - The Sign *mediates *between its Object and > Interpretant; it is determined by the Object *relatively to the > Interpretant*, and determines the Interpretant *in reference to the > Object*. > - EP 2:544n22 (1906) - The Sign *communicates *a Form, which has the > being of the *predicate*, the truth of a conditional proposition; it > is in the Dynamic Object *entitatively* and in the Sign (as its > Immediate Object) *representatively*. > - EP 2:307 (1904) - A pure *Icon *is perfect in respect to > signification, but lacking in denotation; while a pure *Index* is > perfect in respect to denotation, but lacking in signification. > - EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is *identical*, in such > identity as a Sign may have, with the *unity *of the very Matter > denoted by it and the very Form signified by it, such that its Interpretant > is *the Truth*. > > > > Again, "determines" in this context means "makes more determinate," and > this must always occur *with respect to a character or quality*; i.e., a > Form. The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object > of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the > *entire *effect that the Dynamic Object *itself *would have on the > Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906). > > > Therefore, a perfect Sign in *this* sense is one that achieves Entelechy, > the complete unity of Matter and Form in its Interpretant. This is > the final cause of all *triadic* semiosis, Truth as "the conformity of a > representamen to its object--its object, ITS object, mind you" (CP 5.554, > EP 2:380; 1906). By contrast, *dyadic *action occurs when there is no > mediating Sign; just two Dynamic Objects directly and reciprocally > affecting each other (cf. EP 2:411; 1907). > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > > > >
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