Jon S, List,
You're trying to develop an interpretation of the meaning of "perfect sign" as it is used in EP 2:545n25. The footnote refers to a passage in "The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences", where he talks about an ordinary conversation as "a wonderfully perfect kind of sign functioning." (EP, 2: 391). For starters, I looked at Peirce's definitions of "perfect" in the Century Dictionary in cases where it is used as an adjective. Here are four definitions that seem relevant: 1. brought to consummation, fully finished, completed in every part. 2. full; whole; entire; complete. 4. without blemish or defect; lacking in nothing; the best, highest, or most complete type; exact or unquestionable in every particular, e.g., perfect likeness, a perfect specimen 7. completely effective; satisfactory in every respect With those definitions in hand, let's consider the following passage from the PARTIAL SYNOPSIS OF A PROPOSED WORK IN LOGIC where he describes a relatively perfect process of signification: Transuasion in its obsistent aspect, or Mediation, will be shown to be subject to two degrees of degeneracy. Genuine mediation is the character of a Sign. A Sign is anything which is related to a Second thing, its Object, in respect to a Quality, in such a way as to bring a Third thing, its Interpretant, into relation to the same Object, and that in such a way as to bring a Fourth into relation to that Object in the same form, ad infinitum. If the series is broken off, the Sign, in so far, falls short of the perfect significant character. It is not necessary that the Interpretant should actually exist. A being in futuro will suffice. (CP 2.92) [my emphasis for the underlined phrase] For the purpose of getting clearer about how Peirce is using "perfect" as an adjective to modify "sign" and "sign functioning" in the "The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences", I recommend trying to interpret those uses in light of the way he is characterizing "perfect significant character" here. Note how central the idea is to the account of the genuine mediation of a sign as a process that is capable of being interpreted further--potentially without end. As we know, the validity of scientific reasoning hinges on such an assumption. Hope that helps. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, March 10, 2018 8:49 AM To: [email protected] Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited List: Having gotten a better handle on Peirce's concept of a Quasi-mind, we can now make another attempt at sorting out what he meant by "perfect sign" in EP 2:545n25. Here is a summary of what that text tells us about it. * It is the aggregate formed by a Sign and all the Signs that its occurrence carries with it, and involves the present existence of no other Sign except those that are its ingredients. * It is not in a statical condition, because it is an existent that acts; and whatever acts, changes. * Its every real ingredient is aging, its energy of action upon the Interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, and its outlines are becoming more indefinite. * It is perpetually being acted upon by its Object, receiving from it the accretions of new Signs that bring it fresh energy and kindle the energy that it already had, but which had lain dormant. * It constantly undergoes spontaneous changes that do not happen by its will, but are phenomena of growth. * It is a Quasi-mind and the Sheet of Assertion of Existential Graphs. The Perfect Sign involves the present existence (2ns) of only those Signs that comprise it, which are aging and wearing down; yet it continues receiving accretions of new Signs (3ns) from its Object and undergoing spontaneous changes (1ns). After further contemplation, I now believe that Peirce was describing the same thing here as in the passage about "the ideal sign" that I have mentioned previously, which he wrote a couple of years earlier. CSP: What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or entelechy, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe qua fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign. (EP 2:304; 1904) Contrary to my previous hypothesis, "Perfect Sign" is not synonymous with "Quasi-mind"; instead, it designates the Truth that corresponds to the Universe. As such, it also satisfies the last bullet above, since the Sheet of Assertion or Phemic Sheet is not only a Quasi-mind, but also "a Seme of The Truth, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality" (CP 4.553; 1906). Of course, this does not at all entail that a Quasi-mind and the Universe are the same thing. CSP: … one and the same construction may be, when regarded in two different ways, two altogether different diagrams; and that to which it testifies in the one capacity, it must not be considered as testifying to in the other capacity. For example, the Entire Existential Graph of a Phemic Sheet, in any state of it, is a Diagram of the logical Universe, as it is also a Diagram of a Quasi-mind; but it must not, on that account, be considered as testifying to the identity of those two. It is like a telescope eye piece which at one focus exhibits a star at which the instrument is pointed, and at another exhibits all the faults of the objective lens. (NEM 4:324; 1906) Any comments? I am guessing that these topics must simply not be of much interest, or people are just very busy these days, since I find it hard to believe that everyone agrees with everything I have been posting. :-) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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