CSP: I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so far as there is any "truth") to its being the predestined result to which sufficient inquiry would ultimately lead. (CP 5.494, EP 2:419; 1907)
I am taking a (probably brief) break here from my ongoing metaphysical musings to tackle an unsettled aspect of Peirce's semeiotic; specifically, his speculative grammar In a 1908 letter to Victoria Lady Welby, he spelled out the rule that governs which Sign classifications are viable in accordance with the "order of determination," the logical sequence of divisions; but he then proceeded to specify it only for the six Correlates, not for their four Relations.
CSP: It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if they were independent, only yield 28 classes; and if, as I strongly opine (not to say almost prove) there are four other trichotomies of signs of the same order of importance, instead of making 59,049 classes, these will only come to 66. (EP 2:481)
Unfortunately, once again, Peirce did not use his most common terms for the three Interpretants--Immediate, Dynamic, and Final. However, once again, Effective almost certainly corresponds to the Dynamic Interpretant as the feeling, exertion, or further Sign to which the Sign actually determines an interpreting Quasi-mind. In this case, the secondary literature reflects varying opinions regarding the other two Interpretants--do Destinate and Explicit correspond to Immediate and Final, respectively, or the other way around? I have been advocating the first option for some time now, mainly because it accords with the following definitions.
- Immediate Interpretant (Ii) - the range of possible feelings/actions/thoughts that the Sign may produce.
- Dynamic Interpretant (Id) - any actual feeling/action/thought that the Sign does produce.
- Final Interpretant (If) - the habit of feeling/action/thought that the Sign would produce.
In Peirce's semiotic terminology, determination is not strictly synonymous with causation, as the notion of determinism would imply. Instead, its meaning is more along the lines of constraint, delimitation, or simply making something more determinate. The actual is a subset of the possible, and the habitual only comes about by reiteration--either of the possible in the Inner World, or of the actual in the Outer World (CP 5.487, EP 2:413; 1907). Hence if these definitions and sequence are correct, it seems that the order of determination conveniently matches their temporal succession in any concrete instance of semiosis (Ii, Id, If).
As for the Relation trichotomies, both a 1904 letter from Peirce to Lady Welby (CP 8.338) and a careful a posteriori assessment by T. L. Short in his 2007 book, Peirce's Theory of Signs (pp. 248-256), indicate that the division into Presented/Urged/Submitted (later Suggestive/Imperative/Indicative) comes after the division into Rheme/Dicisign/Argument (later Seme/Pheme/Delome). However, Peirce unwaveringly associated the latter with the Sign's Relation to its Final Interpretant (S-If), which entails that S-If determines S-Id. In the past, I have proposed switching these assignments, since it seems more consistent to arrange the Relation trichotomies in the same sequence as their corresponding Correlate trichotomies; but as I have always acknowledged, this would be a clear deviation from Peirce.
Could it be that instead the Final Interpretant determines the Dynamic Interpretant, which determines the Immediate Interpretant? This would entail that the Destinate and Explicit Interpretants are the Final and Immediate Interpretants, respectively. After all, the terminology itself suggests such a correspondence--the Immediate Interpretant is "explicit" in the sense of being "revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself" (CP 4.536; 1906), because it is "represented or signified in the Sign" (CP 8.434, EP 2:482; 1908); and Peirce often associated that which is "destined" with that which is "final," even doing so specifically with respect to habits of conduct and the ideal outcome of inquiry as the "final opinion."
CSP: Now, just as conduct controlled by ethical reason tends toward fixing certain habits of conduct, the nature of which … does not depend upon any accidental circumstances, and in that sense, may be said to be destined; so, thought, controlled by a rational experimental logic, tends to the fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of which will be the same in the end … (CP 5.430, EP 2:342; 1905)
CSP: I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so far as there is any "truth") to its being the predestined result to which sufficient inquiry would ultimately lead. (CP 5.494, EP 2:419; 1907)
The next step will be to explore some implications of this alternative.
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