Jeff: It looks like you sent this to me only, but intended to post it to the List, so I hope that you do not mind if I respond (briefly) on-List.
JD: In the definition of the sign, it appears that we have two kinds of determination: one type is dyadic in character, such as when correlate A determines correlate B; the other type is triadic in character, such as when correlate C determines D in accord with E, where E is a general rule that mediates between C and D. Does C=Object, D=Interpretant, and E=Sign? If so, in what sense is a Sign "a general rule"? Thanks for the link to those manuscripts, which are apparently from late 1908. I will take a look when I get a chance. Regards, Jon S. On Thu, Apr 5, 2018 at 4:15 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon S, Gary R, List, > > It seems clear, at least to me, that there must be some significant > differences between the kinds determination that hold between correlates in > dyadic or triadic relations that have the character of possibles, > existents or necessitants. Otherwise, we would not have a rule that "a > Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be > determined by nothing but a Necessitant." As such, I think it is > important to work out the analyses that Peirce developed in his account of > determination. In the definition of the sign, it appears that we have two > kinds of determination: one type is dyadic in character, such as when > correlate A determines correlate B; the other type is triadic in character, > such as when correlate C determines D in accord with E, where E is a > general rule that mediates between C and D. > > I've transcribed part of a manuscript (MS 611-15), and it is available as > part of the Peirce collection on FromthePage. Thus far, the transcription > is not complete, so anyone who is interested is encouraged to join in the > effort. In this manuscript, Peirce develops an account of determination > that starts with our common experience of what is involved in making and > carrying out a decision that determines our conduct. Starting with this > type of case, he then generalizes upon the account of determination so that > it applies broadly. At various points, he steps back from the examination > of our common experience and tries to provide a more exact logical analysis > of the relations involved, focusing on three kinds of relations: (1) A > determines B, (2) C determines D in accord with E, (3) and F determines H > to be after G. None of the analyses is complete or error free. Peirce > sees some of the errors and tries to correct them in later drafts as he > expands on the earlier drafts. Other errors seem to remain--in part > because the analyses are not brought to completion. Upon seeing the > complications involved in the formal analyses of the relations of > determination, one begins to get a clearer sense of the conceptual > difficulties that lurk beneath the surface. I recommend taking a look > because this discussion has been helpful to me. > > https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-611-15 > > Yours, > > Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 >
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