List: Although it might seem reasonable to think that the order of determination of the three Interpretants would be from possibility (Ii) to actuality (Id) to habit or tendency (If), Peirce explicitly stated otherwise when discussing the feasible combinations of the divisions for the Immediate Object and the Sign itself.
CSP: In general, it is of the essence of a Real Tendency that no Actual Occurrence can of itself determine it in any way … But an Actual Occurrence always determines the Possibility of its character … It is, if possible, still more obvious that Possibility can never determine Actuality … (EP 2:480; 1908) The same principle that guides Sign classification when moving from one trichotomy to the next applies here--the actual *cannot* determine the habitual, and the possible *cannot* determine the actual. Hence the sequence of Interpretants should be reversed (If, Id, Ii); and if this is correct, then both of the following statements must be true in accordance with Peirce's 1908 taxonomy. - A Sign whose Final Interpretant's *purpose* is Gratific can only determine a feeling as its Dynamic Interpretant (Sympathetic). - Only a Sign whose Final Interpretant's *purpose* is to produce self-control (Temperative) can determine another Sign as its Dynamic Interpretant (Usual). These seem fairly straightforward and plausible; essentially, the kind of effect that the Sign is *destined* to produce (If) governs which kinds of *actual* effects its Replicas can have on interpreting Quasi-minds (Id), just like a law of nature as a Real general--an *inveterate* habit--governs the behavior of existing Things. All Signs have a Dynamic Interpretant that includes feeling, but only some also "evoke some kind of effort," whether mental or physical; and only some of those produce another Sign-Replica (EP 2:409 and cf. CP 5.475-476; both 1907). Furthermore, both of the following statements must also be true. - A Sign that determines a feeling as its Dynamic Interpretant (Sympathetic) can only *present* its Immediate Interpretant as Hypothetic. - Only a Sign that determines another Sign as its Dynamic Interpretant (Usual) can *present* its Immediate Interpretant as Relative. Evaluation in this case hinges on clarifying Peirce's 1908 division according to the Immediate Interpretant into Hypothetic/Categorical/Relative, which he offered "with great hesitation" (CP 8.369, EP 2:489), although it appeared in his Logic Notebook as early as 1906 (R 339:423-424[284r-285r]). He presumably derived the terms themselves from three types of *propositions* (CP 2.271; 1903). - Hypothetical - "any proposition compounded of propositions" such that it is "either conditional, copulative, or disjunctive." - Categorical - any proposition "not concerned with the identity of more than one individual." - Relative - any proposition "concerned with the identity of more than one individual." For hypothetical propositions, it seems likely that Peirce primarily had conditionals in mind because of their modal nature. CSP: The quantified subject of a hypothetical proposition is a *possibility*, or *possible case*, or *possible state of things*. In its primitive sense, that which is *possible *is a hypothesis which in a given state of information is not known, and cannot certainly be inferred, to be false. (CP 2.347; c. 1895) Categorical propositions are routinely employed in first-order predicate logic. CSP: A categorical proposition is one whose immediate parts are terms … The subject of a categorical proposition is that concerning which something is said, the predicate is that which is said of it … Categorical propositions are said to be divided according to their *Quantity*, into the universal, the particular, the indefinite, and the singular. (CP 4.40-42; 1893) Peirce considered hypothetical propositions to be logically equivalent to categorical propositions--e.g., "if A then B" in propositional calculus corresponds to "all A is B" in predicate calculus--and relative propositions are basically just complex categorical propositions. However, the three types are readily distinguishable in the Existential Graphs by the number of Lines of Identity that they require--none for a hypothetical proposition, exactly one for a categorical proposition, and more than one for a relative proposition (R 481:10; no date). This seems like an important clue, since Peirce described the Phemic Sheet as follows (CP 4.550-553; 1906). - "… the Quasi-mind of all the Signs represented on the Diagram." - The means by which "two parties [Graphist and Interpreter] collaborate in composing a Pheme, and in operating upon this so as to develop a Delome." - "… the Quasi-mind in which the Graphist and Interpreter are at one …" - "… a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their discussion …" In other words, the Phemic Sheet represents the Commens, which is precisely what the Communicational Interpretant determines (EP 2:478; 1906). When a Sign-Replica is scribed as a Graph-Instance on it (cf. CP 4.536; 1906), the Immediate Interpretant is presented as Hypothetic if there are no Lines of Identity, as Categorical if there is just one, and as Relative if there are two or more. The Phemic Sheet is strictly a *logical* Quasi-mind; it can only be determined to another Sign as the Dynamic Interpretant of a previous Sign (Usual). Since all three Modes of Presentation of the Immediate Interpretant are still feasible, that trichotomy must indeed come *after* the one for the Mode of Being of the Dynamic Interpretant. Hence the order of determination of the three Interpretants is If, Id, Ii; and since Peirce explicitly indicated that Od, Oi, and S precede these (EP 2:481; 1908), only the arrangement of the Relation trichotomies remains to be established. Regards, Jon S. On Sat, Mar 31, 2018 at 2:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > List: > > I am taking a (probably brief) break here from my ongoing *metaphysical > *musings > to tackle an unsettled aspect of Peirce's *semeiotic*; specifically, his > speculative grammar In a 1908 letter to Victoria Lady Welby, he spelled > out the rule that governs which Sign classifications are viable in > accordance with the "order of determination," the logical sequence of > divisions; but he then proceeded to specify it only for the six Correlates, > not for their four Relations. > > > CSP: It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; > it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a > Necessitant. Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the > Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign > itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determines the > Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the > six trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they > would if they were independent, only yield 28 classes; and if, as I > strongly opine (not to say almost prove) there are four other trichotomies > of signs of the same order of importance, instead of making 59,049 classes, > these will only come to 66. (EP 2:481) > > > Unfortunately, once again, Peirce did not use his most common terms for > the three Interpretants--Immediate, Dynamic, and Final. However, once > again, Effective almost certainly corresponds to the Dynamic Interpretant > as the feeling, exertion, or further Sign to which the Sign *actually* > determines an interpreting Quasi-mind. In this case, the secondary > literature reflects varying opinions regarding the other two > Interpretants--do Destinate and Explicit correspond to Immediate and Final, > respectively, or the other way around? I have been advocating the first > option for some time now, mainly because it accords with the following > definitions. > > > - Immediate Interpretant (Ii) - the range of *possible* > feelings/actions/thoughts that the Sign *may* produce. > - Dynamic Interpretant (Id) - any *actual* feeling/action/thought that > the Sign *does* produce. > - Final Interpretant (If) - the *habit* of feeling/action/thought that > the Sign *would* produce. > > In Peirce's semiotic terminology, determination is not strictly synonymous > with causation, as the notion of *determinism* would imply. Instead, its > meaning is more along the lines of constraint, delimitation, or simply > making something *more determinate*. The actual is a subset of the > possible, and the habitual only comes about by reiteration--either of the > possible in the Inner World, or of the actual in the Outer World (CP 5.487, > EP 2:413; 1907). Hence if these definitions and sequence are correct, it > seems that the order of determination conveniently matches their > *temporal* succession in any concrete instance of semiosis (Ii, Id, If). > > > As for the Relation trichotomies, both a 1904 letter from Peirce to Lady > Welby (CP 8.338) and a careful *a posteriori* assessment by T. L. Short > in his 2007 book, *Peirce's Theory of Signs* (pp. 248-256), indicate that > the division into Presented/Urged/Submitted (later > Suggestive/Imperative/Indicative) > comes *after* the division into Rheme/Dicisign/Argument (later > Seme/Pheme/Delome). However, Peirce unwaveringly associated the latter > with the Sign's Relation to its Final Interpretant (S-If), which entails > that S-If determines S-Id. In the past, I have proposed switching these > assignments, since it seems more consistent to arrange the Relation > trichotomies in the same sequence as their corresponding Correlate > trichotomies; but as I have always acknowledged, this would be a clear > deviation from Peirce. > > > Could it be that instead the Final Interpretant determines the Dynamic > Interpretant, which determines the Immediate Interpretant? This would > entail that the Destinate and Explicit Interpretants are the Final and > Immediate Interpretants, respectively. After all, the terminology itself > suggests such a correspondence--the Immediate Interpretant is "explicit" in > the sense of being "revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself" > (CP 4.536; 1906), because it is "represented or signified in the Sign" (CP > 8.434, EP 2:482; 1908); and Peirce often associated that which is > "destined" with that which is "final," even doing so specifically with > respect to habits of conduct and the ideal outcome of inquiry as the "final > opinion." > > > CSP: Now, just as conduct controlled by ethical reason tends toward > fixing certain habits of conduct, the nature of which … does not depend > upon any accidental circumstances, and in that sense, may be said to be > *destined*; so, thought, controlled by a rational experimental logic, > tends to the fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of > which will be the same in the end … (CP 5.430, EP 2:342; 1905) > > > CSP: I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so > far as there is any "truth") to its being the predestined result to which > sufficient inquiry *would* ultimately lead. (CP 5.494, EP 2:419; 1907) > > > The next step will be to explore some implications of this alternative. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
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