Jon S, Gary R, List,
It seems clear, at least to me, that there must be some significant differences between the kinds determination that hold between correlates in dyadic or triadic relations that have the character of possibles, existents or necessitants. Otherwise, we would not have a rule that "a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant." As such, I think it is important to work out the analyses that Peirce developed in his account of determination. In the definition of the sign, it appears that we have two kinds of determination: one type is dyadic in character, such as when correlate A determines correlate B; the other type is triadic in character, such as when correlate C determines D in accord with E, where E is a general rule that mediates between C and D. I've transcribed part of a manuscript (MS 611-15), and it is available as part of the Peirce collection on FromthePage. Thus far, the transcription is not complete, so anyone who is interested is encouraged to join in the effort. In this manuscript, Peirce develops an account of determination that starts with our common experience of what is involved in making and carrying out a decision that determines our conduct. Starting with this type of case, he then generalizes upon the account of determination so that it applies broadly. At various points, he steps back from the examination of our common experience and tries to provide a more exact logical analysis of the relations involved, focusing on three kinds of relations: (1) A determines B, (2) C determines D in accord with E, (3) and F determines H to be after G. None of the analyses is complete or error free. Peirce sees some of the errors and tries to correct them in later drafts as he expands on the earlier drafts. Other errors seem to remain--in part because the analyses are not brought to completion. Upon seeing the complications involved in the formal analyses of the relations of determination, one begins to get a clearer sense of the conceptual difficulties that lurk beneath the surface. I recommend taking a look because this discussion has been helpful to me. <https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-611-15>https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-611-15 <https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-611-15><https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-611-15>Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, April 5, 2018 10:17:01 AM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Order of Determination Jeff, List: I still suspect that there are at least subtle differences in the meaning of "determines" between these three passages. CSP: In every genuine Triadic Relation, the First Correlate may be regarded as determining the Third Correlate in some respect; and triadic relations may be divided according as that determination of the Third Correlate is to having some quality, or to being in some existential relation to the Second Correlate, or to being in some relation of thought to the Second for something. A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. (EP 2:290; 1903) CSP: ... a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." (EP 2:410; 1907) CSP: It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant ... the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant ... (EP 2:481;1908) The first is from NDTR and indicates that the Sign (Representamen) determines the Interpretant "in some respect," such that the Interpretant is another Sign of the same Object in the same triadic relation; based on the later taxonomies, Peirce was talking about the Dynamic Object and the Final Interpretant. The second is from "Pragmatism" and describes a concrete instance of semiosis; I am inclined to think that Peirce was still referring here to the Od and If. The third is from a draft letter to Lady Welby and pertains to which Sign classes are logically feasible once the Oi, Ii, and Id are added to the mix. Are Od and Oi really two Objects, or two aspects of a single Object that determines the Sign? Are If, Id, and Ii really three Interpretants, or three aspects of a single Interpretant that the Sign determines? I continue to look forward to your responses to the specific questions that I posed yesterday. Thanks, Jon S. On Thu, Apr 5, 2018 at 11:16 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jon S, List, Let me respond to a question you haven't yet raised, and then I'll try to respond to the questions you have. The initial idea I was trying to suggest was meant to be an interpretation of the the relation of determination that holds between the sign and the three kinds of interpretants in the mature account as part of the 66-fold classification. Here is the suggestion I made: 2) the sign determines each of the three interpretants Lieb asserts that the sign determines the immediate interpretant, and the immediate interpretant determines the dynamical interpretant, and the dynamical interpretant determines the final interpretant. For my part, I found this approach attractive. One of the problems I ran into in trying to support such a reading is that it is at odds with the earlier view expressed in NDTR, which says that the sign determines the interpretant--as Peirce has consistently asserted since quite early around 1866. The second problem that I ran into is that there seemed to be insufficient support for such a reading in the texts. Instead, upon looking closer, I see passages where Peirce explicitly says that the sign determines each of the three interpretants--immediate, dynamical and final. Note that this appears to be consistent with Jon's assertions. * A Sign whose Final Interpretant's purpose is Gratific can only determine a feeling as its Dynamic Interpretant (Sympathetic). * Only a Sign whose Final Interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control (Temperative) can determine another Sign as its Dynamic Interpretant (Usual). In both of these assertions, the sign (and not another interpretant) is what determines the dynamical interpretant. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Sent: Wednesday, April 4, 2018 10:46 AM To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Order of Determination Jeff, List: Regarding your first reconstruction (#1-#3), I do not think that Peirce ever deviated from the basic principle that the Object determines the Sign, which determines the Interpretant, such that the Object determines the Interpretant via the mediation of the Sign. The later taxonomies simply expand the Object to Dynamic and Immediate, and the Interpretant to Final, Dynamic, and Immediate. Lieb (among others) aligns the Destinate Interpretant with Ii and the Explicit Interpretant with If; but as I have argued in this thread, I now think that it makes more sense both terminologically (Destinate=Final, Explicit=Immediate) and conceptually for the If to determine the Id, which determines the Ii. Regarding your second reconstruction (#1-#4), I am having trouble understanding exactly what you mean by #3 and #4. In #3, are you suggesting that the three Interpretants are in a triadic relation to each other, or that each stands in its own triadic relation to the Od and the Sign? In #4, "mental image" seems to limit the Interpretants to human semiosis; and did you mean to state in the last sentence that the Interpretant represents the Od-Oi correspondence relation? Normally we would say that the Sign represents the Od itself, and it seems to me that an Interpretant can only represent something if it is another Sign, rather than a feeling or exertion. I still struggle at times to grasp exactly what Peirce meant by "determines," especially in different contexts. Does the Object determine the Sign and the Sign determine the Interpretant in exactly the same sense that the Od determines the Oi, which determines the Sign, which determines the If (or Ii), etc.? I am also not following your last paragraph. In your second sentence, what is the general/necessitant, and what are the two existents? Are you suggesting that "determination" in this context is always with respect to "possible characters"? In your third sentence, which three Correlates (there are six total) did you have in mind? What would be the existents that embody them per your fourth sentence? Perhaps a concrete example would help clarify all of this. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 10:44 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jon S, List, Having spent some time digging for textual evidence--one way or the other--concerning the order of determination in the relations between objects, signs and interpretants, here is an alternate reading based on what I've found thus far. On the model presented in NDTR, the order is simply, 1) object determines sign 2) sign determines interpretant 3) object determines interpretant via the mediation of the sign (and possibly also via the relations between the object and sign, on the one hand, and the sign and interpretant, on the other). This appears, at first glance, to be somewhat at odds with the order of determination provided later, when the division between two objects and three interpretants is made (e.g., see the interpretation by Lieb in the collection of letters between Peirce and Lady Welby). Having spent more time digging, here is a simplified version of my still tentative and rather incomplete reconstruction of what Peirce seems to be saying about the relations of determination. 1) a dynamical object determines sign 2) the sign determines each of the three interpretants 3) the dynamical object determines the three interpretants to stand in a triadic relation, one to the others via the mediation of the sign and the relations that it stands to object and interpretant. 4) the interpretants (largely the final) determines a mental image of the relation that holds between the dynamical object and sign (e.g., its being a icon, index or symbol) to stand in a relation of correspondence with the object. The sign represents that relation of correspondence between mental image (which functions as the immediate object) and the dynamical object. I've expressed the fourth point in overly complicated terms, but I hope the general idea comes through. On this reading of the later texts, Peirce is later elaborating on the earlier account in NDTR--but in a manner that is entirely consonant with what he claimed there. For my part, I think that the relations of determination should be understood as applying at three levels that are considered strata--that of possibles, existents and necessitants. Where there is a general that serves as a necessitant, two existents are, in their possible characters, determined in accord with the general rule. When each of the three correlates has the character of a thought sign, it is one habit determining another habit in accord with a general rule. In this sort of case involving three thought-signs as correlates, each of the habits is embodied in existents having possible characters. And so on. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354
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