Jeff, List: Regarding your first reconstruction (#1-#3), I do not think that Peirce ever deviated from the basic principle that the Object determines the Sign, which determines the Interpretant, such that the Object determines the Interpretant via the mediation of the Sign. The later taxonomies simply expand the Object to Dynamic and Immediate, and the Interpretant to Final, Dynamic, and Immediate. Lieb (among others) aligns the Destinate Interpretant with Ii and the Explicit Interpretant with If; but as I have argued in this thread, I now think that it makes more sense both terminologically (Destinate=Final, Explicit=Immediate) and conceptually for the If to determine the Id, which determines the Ii.
Regarding your second reconstruction (#1-#4), I am having trouble understanding exactly what you mean by #3 and #4. In #3, are you suggesting that the three Interpretants are in a triadic relation to *each other*, or that each stands in *its own* triadic relation to the Od and the Sign? In #4, "mental image" seems to limit the Interpretants to human semiosis; and did you mean to state in the last sentence that the *Interpretant *represents the Od-Oi correspondence relation? Normally we would say that the Sign represents the Od *itself*, and it seems to me that an Interpretant can only represent something if it is another Sign, rather than a feeling or exertion. I still struggle at times to grasp exactly what Peirce meant by "determines," especially in different contexts. Does the Object determine the Sign and the Sign determine the Interpretant in exactly the same sense that the Od determines the Oi, which determines the Sign, which determines the If (or Ii), etc.? I am also not following your last paragraph. In your second sentence, what is the general/necessitant, and what are the two existents? Are you suggesting that "determination" in this context is always with respect to "possible characters"? In your third sentence, which three Correlates (there are six total) did you have in mind? What would be the existents that embody them per your fourth sentence? Perhaps a concrete example would help clarify all of this. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 10:44 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon S, List, > > Having spent some time digging for textual evidence--one way or the > other--concerning the order of determination in the relations between > objects, signs and interpretants, here is an alternate reading based on > what I've found thus far. > > On the model presented in NDTR, the order is simply, > > 1) object determines sign > > 2) sign determines interpretant > > 3) object determines interpretant via the mediation of the sign (and > possibly also via the relations between the object and sign, on the one > hand, and the sign and interpretant, on the other). > > This appears, at first glance, to be somewhat at odds with the order of > determination provided later, when the division between two objects and > three interpretants is made (e.g., see the interpretation by Lieb in the > collection of letters between Peirce and Lady Welby). > > Having spent more time digging, here is a simplified version of my still > tentative and rather incomplete reconstruction of what Peirce seems to be > saying about the relations of determination. > > 1) a dynamical object determines sign > > 2) the sign determines each of the three interpretants > > 3) the dynamical object determines the three interpretants to stand in a > triadic relation, one to the others via the mediation of the sign and the > relations that it stands to object and interpretant. > > 4) the interpretants (largely the final) determines a mental image of the > relation that holds between the dynamical object and sign (e.g., its being > a icon, index or symbol) to stand in a relation of correspondence with the > object. The sign represents that relation of correspondence between mental > image (which functions as the immediate object) and the dynamical object. > > I've expressed the fourth point in overly complicated terms, but I hope > the general idea comes through. On this reading of the later texts, > Peirce is later elaborating on the earlier account in NDTR--but in a > manner that is entirely consonant with what he claimed there. > > For my part, I think that the relations of determination should be > understood as applying at three levels that are considered strata--that of > possibles, existents and necessitants. Where there is a general that serves > as a necessitant, two existents are, in their possible > characters, determined in accord with the general rule. When each of the > three correlates has the character of a thought sign, it is one habit > determining another habit in accord with a general rule. In this sort of > case involving three thought-signs as correlates, each of the habits is > embodied in existents having possible characters. And so on. > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 >
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