Jeff, list,

This message isn't directly about the subject of this thread, but I did
take a pretty close look at some of the 1908 manuscripts you'd transcribed
and recently linked to https://fromthepage.com/jeffdo
wn1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-611-15 and wanted to reiterate what an
extraordinary contribution you and others on the list (for example, Jon
Allan Schmidt and Gary Furhman) and off it are making by giving your time
and effort to transcribing Peirce documents in the SPIN project.

This is just to say 'thank you' for all the work you have done in
developing the project and which you and others have contributed to it in
the transcribing. I'm sure you'd be eager to have other forum members join
the effort.

Best,

Gary

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Apr 5, 2018 at 5:56 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Jeff:
>
> It looks like you sent this to me only, but intended to post it to the
> List, so I hope that you do not mind if I respond (briefly) on-List.
>
> JD:  In the definition of the sign, it appears that we have two kinds of
> determination:  one type is dyadic in character, such as when correlate A
> determines correlate B; the other type is triadic in character, such as
> when correlate C determines D in accord with E, where E is a general rule
> that mediates between C and D.
>
>
> Does C=Object, D=Interpretant, and E=Sign?  If so, in what sense is a Sign
> "a general rule"?
>
> Thanks for the link to those manuscripts, which are apparently from late
> 1908.  I will take a look when I get a chance.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Thu, Apr 5, 2018 at 4:15 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>> Jon S, Gary R, List,
>>
>> It seems clear, at least to me, that there must be some significant
>> differences between the kinds determination that hold between correlates in
>> dyadic or triadic relations that have the character of possibles,
>> existents or necessitants. Otherwise, we would not have a rule that "a
>> Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be
>> determined by nothing but a Necessitant." As such, I think it is
>> important to work out the analyses that Peirce developed in his account of
>> determination. In the definition of the sign, it appears that we have two
>> kinds of determination:  one type is dyadic in character, such as when
>> correlate A determines correlate B; the other type is triadic in character,
>> such as when correlate C determines D in accord with E, where E is a
>> general rule that mediates between C and D.
>>
>> I've transcribed part of a manuscript (MS 611-15), and it is available as
>> part of the Peirce collection on FromthePage. Thus far, the transcription
>> is not complete, so anyone who is interested is encouraged to join in the
>> effort. In this manuscript, Peirce develops an account of determination
>> that starts with our common experience of what is involved in making and
>> carrying out a decision that determines our conduct. Starting with this
>> type of case, he then generalizes upon the account of determination so that
>> it applies broadly. At various points, he steps back from the examination
>> of our common experience and tries to provide a more exact logical analysis
>> of the relations involved, focusing on three kinds of relations:  (1) A
>> determines B, (2) C determines D in accord with E, (3) and F determines
>> H to be after G. None of the analyses is complete or error free. Peirce
>> sees some of the errors and tries to correct them in later drafts as he
>> expands on the earlier drafts. Other errors seem to remain--in part
>> because the analyses are not brought to completion. Upon seeing the
>> complications involved in the formal analyses of the relations of
>> determination, one begins to get a clearer sense of the conceptual
>> difficulties that lurk beneath the surface. I recommend taking a look
>> because this discussion has been helpful to me.
>>
>> https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-611-15
>>
>> Yours,
>>
>> Jeff
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354
>>
>
>
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