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}Stephen, list:

        This refers to the 'reality' of belief - as outlined by Peirce in
his Fixation of Belief.

        In my view, a belief is - as you say, supposition. It does not
function in the realm of facts. However, since, as Peirce also
pointed out, our universe operates within the mode of Reason
[Thirdness], then - can we presume that all of our beliefs are not
merely logical but also - real? That is - because we rationally THINK
of something, does this make that belief a reality? The same kind of
reality as, for instance, the reality of generals - which are the
commonality of the instantiation?

        I don't think that we can conclude that IF we think of something,
THEN, this means that 'something' is real. That would commit the
error of 'affirming the consequent'. We can't declare that something
is real. BECAUSE we think of it. Therefore - my view is that views of
'the divine' or any name you want to call it - can only be beliefs.
And this is what I see as a key problem: definitions. Until we define
what we mean by our terms, such as 'God' , 'theism', ...then, our
arguments for or against them are empty and subjective. 

         Peirce himself called this 'force' by many names, eg, Nature, as
'in 'Can there be the slightest hesitation in saying, then, that the
human intellect is implanted in man, either by a creator or by a
quasi-intentional effect of the struggle for existence?...and "among
the inscrutable purposes of God or the virtual purposes of nature"
[8.211] ..."Man seems to himself to have some glimmer of
co-understanding with God, or with Nature" [8.212]. And see 6.502,
where Peirce writes that 'the analogue of a mind...is what he means
by "God".

        In the scientific realm, which is built around the acceptance of the
use of reason, when we come up with a hypothesis - this must then be
tested within the existential world. As Peirce said, "deduction is
certain but relates only to ideal objects" [8.209] So, "induction
gives us the only approach to certainty concerning the real that we
can have [ibid].... Therefore, my point is that claims based around
only deduction remain beliefs - held by tenacity or authority - but
still, only beliefs.

        But are our beliefs only valid - and I mean valid as differentiated
from 'real' - if they can be empirically proven? I think that as a
species, almost unique in our requirement for social networking and
our use of symbolic language - then, beliefs are necessary for social
stability and even, our individual psychological health. Again, this
does not make our beliefs 'real'; it makes them socially valid - and,
as such, open to change when the societal need for them changes. 

        Edwina
 On Thu 17/05/18  5:17 AM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com
sent:
 In Triadic Philosophy if something is a matter of supposition like
theism the definition will not be anything more than supposition.
Wittgenstein understood this. This is why TP calls this mystery. It
is real but it is also a mystery. We can talk about our experience of
what we call the divine or any other name you want to give it. The
replies to my post about life beyond this planet are similar to posts
about theism. They reference mystery. Since we have no proof we do not
know. It is just as significant that something is not present as that
it is. The triadic maxim says the substance is practical and ordinary
and accessible. That is what I drive at. Everything else to me is
binary thinking that often shields another purpose than arriving at
truth and beauty which I take to be the aim of al consideration. You
can reply to this in the list if you think it is worth noting.
Otherwise no problem. Cheers, S  
amazon.com/author/stephenrose [1]


Links:
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[1] http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose
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