List, If one downloads Jon's paper and wants to quickly get to the discussion of Peirce's cosmology in RLT--where he argues that 3ns not 1ns is primal, contrasting this with his earlier views as expressed in "A Guess at the Riddle" (the passage Edwina often cites)--scroll down to section page 9 in section 4 beginning at "At first glance, this might seem to contradict Peirce's earlier cosmological writings, such as an oft-cited narrative in 'A Guess at the Riddle' " through page 14 to section 6.
Of course for those interested in the how "all this" relates to the NA, the entire paper is recommended. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 5:27 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, Jon, list, > > Edwina: "My reading of the above outline, however, obviously does not > involve any metaphysical Agent [God]. As Peirce wrote: " You must not let > this interfere with or be interfered with by any religious belief. " > [6.217 my emphasis]. " > > Well, we've been through this before. It seems to me that while you > reference Peirce's earlier cosmological musings that you never make > reference to his 1898 comments on what I have called the proto-universe > (call it what you wish, but it is most definitely an analysis of the > conditions prior to the putative big bang). I think this discussion might > be able to move forward dramatically if participants in this discussion > could offer their interpretations of Peirce's remarks there. A short cut > might be to frist read those passages in Jon's paper related to them. In > any event, *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* (RLT) is available in an > inexpensive paperback edition; here's a link to to Jon's paper: > https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187/152244 > > Yes, of course Peirce holds that science as science must be > single-mindedly taken up with no interference by or thought of religion or > even practical matters. And, in fact, there is no mention of God whatsoever > in Peirce's 1898 lectures. But what one 'does' with the *result* of any > inquiry is another matter there being, for example, practical arts and > applied sciences. But you are correct that to keep these inquiries 'pure' > so to speak, Peirce doesn't discuss God here at all. He makes a point not > to. Still, there is in Peirce's classification of science a religious > metaphysics in which he did some significant work himself. > > You conclude: "And these writings are also the ground for my rejection > of Thirdness as a priori or primary; I continue to posit that Firstness, > understood as potentiality - is primary." > > Well, again, in the last of the 1898 lectures Peirce posits *not 1ns *but > continuity as primary (I'm working from memory as I am still away from my > desk). The blackboard analogy offers the surface of the blackboard as that > ur-continuity. Now there is no concept more closely linked to 3ns I don't > believe than continuity, not even time (of course time doesn't exist in the > proto-cosmos conjectured in this lecture, nor is it there time even in the > early stages of the cosmos which is to issue forth* as this* universe). > > The first chalk mark 'made' upon that board is the first discontinuity. As > Peirce writes (I'm quoting from Jon's paper): > > The whole universe of true and real possibilities forms a continuum, upon > which this Universe of Actual Existence is, by virtue of the essential > Secondness of Existence, a discontinuous mark—like a line figure drawn on > the area of the blackboard. (RLT 162; 1898) > > > As Jon puts it in his paper turning to the later lecture in the series > which includes the blackboard analogy: > > A chalk line drawn on the blackboard represents the spontaneous > introduction of a brute discontinuity. However, the mark itself it is not > really a line; it is a surface with its own continuity, which is entirely > derived from and dependent on that of the underlying blackboard. The only > true line is the limit of the white and black areas, and this is the > discontinuity—"the reaction between two continuous surfaces into which it > is separated" (CP 6.203). Peirce thus acknowledged that all three > Categories—whiteness or blackness (1ns), their boundary (2ns), and the > continuity of each (3ns)—are necessary for the reality of the chalk mark > (CP 6.205). However, *the continuity of the blackboard (3ns) is > primordial, in the sense that its reality precedes and sustains that of > anything drawn upon it; this is "its really commanding function.*" > (emphasis added) > > > Note the short Peirce snippet in the quotation just above. Jon continues: > > > A chalk mark that persists, rather than being erased, represents the > establishment of a habit—which is also entirely derived from and dependent > on the continuity of the underlying blackboard: This habit is a > generalizing tendency, and as such a generalization, and as such a general, > and as such a continuum or continuity. *It must have its origin in the > original continuity which is inherent in potentiality.* *Continuity, as > generality, is inherent in potentiality, which is essentially general. (CP > 6.204)* As additional marks are drawn and persist, they join together due > to other developing habits and become "reacting systems," which aggregate > and merge into larger such systems (CP 6.206-207). Eventually, "out of one > of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe > of existence in which we happen to be" (CP 6.208). (Emphasis added) > > > Well, that's all I have time for now and, as mentioned above, I'm hampered > in not having RLT at hand at the moment. I would strongly advise all here > who are truly interested in this topic to read Jon's paper and at least the > last lecture in RLT. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690* > > On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 4:13 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Gary R, Stephen, list: >> >> Peirce also said that 'nothing' existed before the 'flash' or Big Bang >> [he used the former not the latter, term]. 1.411, 412. >> >> See also "To say that there was no action is to say there was no >> actuality"...before which all was absolutely motionless and dead 1.275. >> >> And "The initial condition, before the universe existed, was not a state >> of pure abstract being. On the contrary, it was a state of just nothing at >> all, not even a state of emptiness, for even emptiness is something. If we >> are to proceed in a logical and scientific manner, we must, in order to >> account for the whole universe, suppose an initial condition in which the >> whole universe was non-existent, and therefore, a state of absolute >> nothing" 6.215. >> >> "You must not let this interfere with or be interfered with by any >> religious belief. Religion is a practical matter. Its beliefs are formulae >> you will go upon. But a scientific proposition is merely something you take >> up provisionally as being the proper hypothesis to try first and endeavor >> to refute" >> >> "We start, then, with nothing, pure zero. But this is not the nothing of >> negation....The nothing of negation is the nothing of death, which comes >> second to, or after, everything.. But this pure zero is the nothing of not >> having been born. there is no individual thing, no compulsion outward nor >> inward, now law. It is the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is >> involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is absolutely undefined and unlimited >> possibility - boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and now law. It >> is boundless freedom. So of potential being there was in that initial state >> no lack. 6.217 >> >> "Now the question arises, what necessarily resulted from that state of >> things? But the only sane answer is that where freedom was boundless >> nothing in particular necessarily resulted" 6.218 >> >> Then, Peirce goes on to say that he agrees [with Hegel] that the universe >> is rational - but- it is not constrained to be rational..."I will say that >> nothing necessarily resulted from the Nothing of boundless freedom. That >> is, nothing according to deductive logic. But such is not the logic of >> freedom or possibility. the logic of freedom or potentiality, is that it >> shall annul itself. For if it does not annul itself, it remains a >> completely idle and do-nothing potentiality; and a completely idle >> potentiality is annulled by its complete idleness" 6.219 >> >> And we must remember 1.412 - where Peirce outlines the 'flash' where this >> potentiality becomes a specific quality...and that habits, or laws and >> mediation emerged. >> >> I think the debate about the emergence of the universe, whether within a >> Big Bang or not - is valid and will probably go on for some time - until we >> can get some empirical evidence! >> >> My reading of the above outline, however, obviously does not involve any >> metaphysical Agent [God]. As Peirce wrote: " You must not let this >> interfere with or be interfered with by any religious belief. " [6.217 >> my emphasis]. And these writings are also the ground for my rejection >> of Thirdness as a priori or primary; I continue to posit that Firstness, >> understood as potentiality - is primary. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> >> On Thu 17/05/18 3:28 PM , Gary Richmond [email protected] sent: >> >> Edwina, John, Jon, list, >> >> Peirce's definition of belief is "that upon which a man is prepared to >> act." >> >> It is well known (Fisch 1954) that Peirce got his definition of belief >> from Alexander Bain, of which he heard in the discussions of the >> Metaphysical Club : [1] "In particular, he [Nicholas St. John Green] often >> urged the importance of applying Bain's definition of belief, as "that upon >> which a man is prepared to act." From this definition, pragmatism is scarce >> more than a corollary; so that I am disposed to think of him as the >> grandfather of pragmatism." ( Peirce CP 5.12, 1907) In "BELIEF AS A >> DISPOSITION TO ACT: VARIATIONS ON A PRAGMATIST THEME" by Pascal Engel >> https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/91be/5413de00ed7d1e6bada9b8 >> df9c3dd5710221.pdf >> >> >> Near the conclusion of the paper Engel writes: >> >> >> What matters is that we can identify a species of pragmatism, theoria >> pragmatism, which, without renouncing the dispositional conception of >> belief as a basic tenet of pragmatism, does not throw by the board the >> basic dualities between believing and willing, fact and value, theory and >> practice (op. cit, 19) [as, for example, Richard Rorty tried to do-GR] >> >> >> Now this view of belief (and pragmatism) seems to me to be essentially >> correct, and I consider it so for most all our beliefs, especially to the >> extent to which they have been critically evaluated. I would maintain that >> this is so whether our belief pertains to science or religion or to some >> ordinary aspect of our quotidian activity. >> >> No doubt certain of our beliefs in science are so well founded, so well >> tested , technologies, even advanced technologies, finally having been >> developed out of them, that we can hardly doubt them--and we do not >> doubt them. Those would indeed be "paper doubts." Indeed, some of our >> scientific beliefs are so completely established--for example, the >> mechanical ones--that really no sane, decently educated person would think >> of doubting them. >> >> But when we consider matters like the origin of the cosmos--whether our >> belief is that the universe came into being as a result of a big bang or >> was created by God--such beliefs are, in my opinion, of an entirely >> different order. They cannot be formed in the way that, say, mechanical and >> chemical laws are in our thinking, that is, experimentally. There are signs >> and suggestions, but these can be and are variously interpreted. Still, we >> (fallibly) believe what we believe in these matters. >> >> Consider, for example, Jonathan Strickland in writing on the standard big >> bang theory and, after offering reasons why some scientists (for example, >> Robert Gentry, Hannes Alfven, Halton Arp, Goeffrey Burbridge, and even Sir >> Fred Hoyle who coined the term "Big Bang"), "have questioned and criticized >> the model" concludes: >> >> There are several other models as well. Could one of these theories (or >> other ones we haven't even thought of) one day replace the big bang theory >> as the accepted model of the universe? It's quite possible. As time passes >> and our capability to study the universe increases, we'll be able to make >> more accurate models of how the universe developed. >> https://science.howstuffworks.com/dictionary/astronomy-terms >> /big-bang-theory7.htm >> >> >> But for some scientists the standard big bang theory has become as much a >> dogma as certain religious dogmas are for some fundamentalist religionists. >> >> I have been studying the Big Bang theory for decades as, no doubt, have >> many on this list, and I find it wanting. For prime reason (although there >> are many reasons relating more directly to physical phenomena), it doesn't >> answer the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" so that >> when, for example, the late Stephen Hawkings was asked what preceded the >> Big Bang his short answer was "nothing." >> >> On the other hand, Peirce outlines an earliest cosmology (that is, one of >> the hypothetical quasi-'conditions' or quasi-'states' preceding the >> supposed Big Bang or, in my understanding, the Creation of this, our, >> Cosmos) in his highly conjectural musings in the concluding lecture of the >> series published as Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cambridge >> Conferences Lectures of 1898. >> <http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674749672> >> http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674749672 Jon Alan >> Schmidt has further developed those musings in a most interesting and >> creative way in his recent paper which he's provided a link to. In my >> reading, these speculations tend to support the hypothesis of God. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> 718 482-5690 >> >> On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 1:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> John, list: >>> >>> My understand of 'the Real' refers to generals rather than individual >>> instantiations or existences of that generality. >>> >>> Now - we can presumably consider that IF truth, i.e., in this case, >>> the Reality of X, depends on an individual existentiality of X, then >>> isn't this the Scientific Method - or Peirce's pragmatism? But- when we >>> say that the Reality of X depends only on our belief in it - then - heck - >>> we've essentially moved into nominalism - even if that belief is held by a >>> large population. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu 17/05/18 10:09 AM , John F Sowa [email protected] sent: >>> >>> On 5/17/2018 9:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: >>> > My point is simply that reality has all sorts of permutations and that >>> > to disclude things is to complexify. >>> >>> I agree. And I recommend the anti-razor by Walter Chatton, who engaged >>> in years of debates with William of Ockham. Both Chatton and Ockham >>> were students of John Duns Scotus. Ockham was a nominalist who rejected >>> the realism of Scotus. But Chatton was a realist who defended Scotus >>> in debates with Ockham. (All three of them were Scots at Oxford.) >>> >>> See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/walter-chatton/ >>> >>> Brief summary of the anti-razor: >>> If a proposition p is true and its truth depends on the existence >>> of something x, then the existence of x must be assumed. >>> >>> But Chatton stated his anti-razor in several different versions, >>> all of which imply my summary. >>> >>> John >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
