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}Gary R, Stephen,  list:

        Peirce also said that 'nothing' existed before the 'flash' or Big
Bang [he used the former not the latter, term]. 1.411, 412.  

        See also "To say that there was no action is to say there was no
actuality"...before which all was absolutely motionless and dead

         And "The initial condition, before the universe existed, was not a
state of pure abstract being. On the contrary, it was a state of just
nothing at all, not even a state of emptiness, for even emptiness is
something. If we are to proceed in a logical and scientific manner,
we must, in order to account for the whole universe, suppose an
initial condition in which the whole universe was non-existent, and
therefore, a state of absolute nothing" 6.215.

        "You must not let this interfere with or be interfered with by any
religious belief. Religion is a practical matter. Its beliefs are
formulae you will go upon. But a scientific proposition is merely
something you take up provisionally as being the proper hypothesis to
try first and endeavor to refute"

        "We start, then, with nothing, pure zero. But this is not the
nothing of negation....The nothing of negation is the nothing of
death, which comes second to, or after, everything.. But this pure
zero is the nothing of not having been born. there is no individual
thing, no compulsion outward nor inward, now law. It is the germinal
nothing, in which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As
such, it is absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility -
boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and now law. It is
boundless freedom. So of potential being there was in that initial
state no lack. 6.217

        "Now the question arises, what necessarily resulted from that state
of things? But the only sane answer is that where freedom was
boundless nothing in particular necessarily resulted" 6.218

        Then, Peirce goes on to say that he agrees [with Hegel] that the
universe is rational - but- it is not constrained to be rational..."I
will say that nothing necessarily resulted from the Nothing of
boundless freedom. That is, nothing according to deductive logic. But
such is not the logic of freedom or possibility. the logic of freedom
or potentiality, is that it shall annul itself. For if it does not
annul itself, it remains a completely idle and do-nothing
potentiality; and a completely idle potentiality is annulled by its
complete idleness" 6.219

        And we must remember 1.412 - where Peirce outlines the 'flash' where
this potentiality becomes a specific quality...and that habits, or
laws and mediation emerged.
        I think the debate about the emergence of the universe, whether
within a Big Bang or not - is valid and will probably go on for some
time - until we can get some empirical evidence!

        My reading of the above outline, however, obviously does not involve
any metaphysical Agent [God]. As Peirce wrote: " You must not let this
interfere with or be interfered with by any religious belief. " [6.217
my emphasis]. And these writings are also the ground for my rejection
of Thirdness as a priori or primary; I continue to posit that
Firstness, understood as potentiality - is primary. 

 On Thu 17/05/18  3:28 PM , Gary Richmond
 Edwina, John, Jon, list,
 Peirce's definition of belief is "that upon which a man is prepared
to act." 
 It is well known (Fisch 1954) that Peirce got his definition of
belief from Alexander Bain, of which he heard in the discussions of
the Metaphysical Club :  [1] "In particular, he [Nicholas St. John
Green] often urged the importance of applying Bain's definition of
belief, as "that upon which a man is prepared to act." From this
definition, pragmatism is scarce more than a corollary; so that I am
disposed to think of him as the grandfather of pragmatism." ( Peirce
 Near the conclusion of the paper Engel writes: 
 What matters is that we can identify a species of pragmatism,
theoria pragmatism, which, without renouncing the dispositional
conception of belief as a basic tenet of pragmatism, does not throw
by the board the basic dualities between believing and willing, fact
and value, theory and practice (op. cit, 19) [as, for example,
Richard Rorty tried to do-GR]
 Now this view of belief (and pragmatism) seems to me to be
essentially correct, and I consider it so for most all our beliefs,
especially to the extent to which they have been critically
evaluated. I would maintain that this is so whether our belief
pertains to science or religion or to some ordinary aspect of our
quotidian activity.  
 No doubt certain of our beliefs in science are so well founded, so
well tested , technologies, even advanced technologies, finally
having been developed out of them, that we can hardly doubt them--and
we do not doubt them. Those would indeed be "paper doubts." Indeed,
some of our scientific beliefs are so completely established--for
example, the mechanical ones--that really no sane, decently educated
person would think of doubting them. 
 But when we consider matters like the origin of the cosmos--whether
our belief is that the universe came into being as a result of a big
bang or was created by God--such beliefs are, in my opinion, of an
entirely different order. They cannot be formed in the way that, say,
mechanical and chemical laws are in our thinking, that is,
experimentally. There are signs and suggestions, but these can be and
are variously interpreted. Still, we (fallibly) believe what we
believe in these matters. 
 Consider, for example, Jonathan Strickland in writing on the
standard big bang theory and, after offering reasons why some
scientists (for example, Robert Gentry, Hannes Alfven, Halton Arp,
Goeffrey Burbridge, and even Sir Fred Hoyle who coined the term "Big
Bang"), "have questioned and criticized the model" concludes: 
  There are several other models as well. Could one of these theories
(or other ones we haven't even thought of) one day replace the big
bang theory as the accepted model of the universe? It's quite
possible. As time passes and our capability to study the universe
increases, we'll be able to make more accurate models of how the
universe developed.
 But for some scientists the standard big bang theory has become as
much a dogma as certain religious dogmas are for some fundamentalist
 I have been studying the Big Bang theory for decades as, no doubt,
have many on this list, and I find it wanting. For prime reason
(although there are many reasons relating more directly to physical
phenomena), it doesn't answer the question "Why is there something
rather than nothing?" so that when, for example, the late Stephen
Hawkings was asked what preceded the Big Bang his short answer was
 On the other hand, Peirce outlines an earliest cosmology (that is,
one of the hypothetical quasi-'conditions' or quasi-'states'
preceding the supposed Big Bang or, in my understanding, the Creation
of this, our, Cosmos) in his highly conjectural musings in the
concluding lecture of the series published as Reasoning and the Logic
of Things: The Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898. [3]catalog.php?isbn=9780674749672 Jon
Alan Schmidt has further developed those musings in a most
interesting and creative way in his recent paper which he's provided
a link to. In my reading, these speculations tend to support the
hypothesis of God.
 Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical Thinking Communication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718
 On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 1:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
        John, list:

        My understand of 'the Real' refers to generals rather than
individual instantiations or existences of that generality.

        Now - we can presumably consider that IF truth, i.e., in this case,
the Reality of X,  depends on an individual existentiality of X, then
isn't this the Scientific Method - or Peirce's pragmatism?  But- when
we say that the Reality of X depends only on our belief in it - then
- heck - we've essentially moved into nominalism - even if that
belief is held by a large population. 

 On Thu 17/05/18 10:09 AM , John F Sowa [5] sent:
 On 5/17/2018 9:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: 
 > My point is simply that reality has all sorts of permutations and
 > to disclude things is to complexify. 
 I agree.  And I recommend the anti-razor by Walter Chatton, who
 in years of debates with William of Ockham.  Both Chatton and Ockham

 were students of John Duns Scotus.  Ockham was a nominalist who
 the realism of Scotus.  But Chatton was a realist who defended
 in debates with Ockham.  (All three of them were Scots at Oxford.) 
 Brief summary of the anti-razor: 
 If a proposition p is true and its truth depends on the existence 
 of something x, then the existence of x must be assumed. 
 But Chatton stated his anti-razor in several different versions, 
 all of which imply my summary. 
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