BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list:
My understand of 'the Real' refers to generals rather than
individual instantiations or existences of that generality.
Now - we can presumably consider that IF truth, i.e., in this case,
the Reality of X, depends on an individual existentiality of X, then
isn't this the Scientific Method - or Peirce's pragmatism? But- when
we say that the Reality of X depends only on our belief in it - then
- heck - we've essentially moved into nominalism - even if that
belief is held by a large population.
Edwina
On Thu 17/05/18 10:09 AM , John F Sowa [email protected] sent:
On 5/17/2018 9:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
> My point is simply that reality has all sorts of permutations and
that
> to disclude things is to complexify.
I agree. And I recommend the anti-razor by Walter Chatton, who
engaged
in years of debates with William of Ockham. Both Chatton and Ockham
were students of John Duns Scotus. Ockham was a nominalist who
rejected
the realism of Scotus. But Chatton was a realist who defended
Scotus
in debates with Ockham. (All three of them were Scots at Oxford.)
See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/walter-chatton/ [1]
Brief summary of the anti-razor:
If a proposition p is true and its truth depends on the existence
of something x, then the existence of x must be assumed.
But Chatton stated his anti-razor in several different versions,
all of which imply my summary.
John
Links:
------
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fplato.stanford.edu%2Fentries%2Fwalter-chatton%2F
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