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}John, list:

        My understand of 'the Real' refers to generals rather than
individual instantiations or existences of that generality.

        Now - we can presumably consider that IF truth, i.e., in this case,
the Reality of X,  depends on an individual existentiality of X, then
isn't this the Scientific Method - or Peirce's pragmatism?  But- when
we say that the Reality of X depends only on our belief in it - then
- heck - we've essentially moved into nominalism - even if that
belief is held by a large population.

 On Thu 17/05/18 10:09 AM , John F Sowa sent:
 On 5/17/2018 9:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: 
 > My point is simply that reality has all sorts of permutations and
 > to disclude things is to complexify. 
 I agree.  And I recommend the anti-razor by Walter Chatton, who
 in years of debates with William of Ockham.  Both Chatton and Ockham

 were students of John Duns Scotus.  Ockham was a nominalist who
 the realism of Scotus.  But Chatton was a realist who defended
 in debates with Ockham.  (All three of them were Scots at Oxford.) 
 See [1] 
 Brief summary of the anti-razor: 
 If a proposition p is true and its truth depends on the existence 
 of something x, then the existence of x must be assumed. 
 But Chatton stated his anti-razor in several different versions, 
 all of which imply my summary. 

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