Jon, are you warranted in saying "not", in "not 'the physico-psychical
universe' itself". Isn't the relation of God the Creator to His Creation,
viz., the physico-psychical universe, for all we know, the same as the
relation of force to acceleration?
CSP: "Whether we ought to say that force *is* an acceleration, or that it
*causes* an acceleration, is a mere question of propriety of language…"
On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 11:08 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> Edwina, Stephen R., List:
> Robert Lane's new book, *Peirce on Realism and Idealism*, helpfully
> clarifies Peirce's verbal and pragmaticistic definitions of "real," and how
> he carefully distinguished that term from "external." On Peirce's account,
> the "real" is "that which is independent of what anyone thinks *about it*,"
> while the "external" is "that which is independent of what anyone thinks
> anything at all*" (Lane, p. 3). The upshot is that there are *internal
> realities*, such as the fact that I had a particular dream last night;
> but this by no means entails that *what I dreamed* was real. On the
> contrary, since the contents of my dream are directly dependent on my
> (unconscious) thoughts *about them*, what I dreamed is most definitely *not
> *real (cf. CP 6.453).
> Likewise, according to Peirce a belief is not a reality merely by virtue
> of someone holding it; on the contrary, in order to be real, the *Dynamic
> Object *of the belief must be such as it is independently of anyone *holding
> *that belief. Hence when Peirce described God as "*Ens necessarium*; in
> my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452),
> he was not merely asserting his (subjective) belief in God; he was
> explicitly claiming that the referent of the vernacular word "God" is
> (objectively) Real--"having Properties, i.e. characters sufficing to
> identify their subject, and possessing these whether they be anywise
> attributed to it by any single man or group of men, or not" (CP 6.453).
> Based on this and other writings, those attributes include necessary Being,
> creative power/activity, omniscience, omnipotence, benignity, transcendence
> (vs. immanence), infinity, supremacy, and infallibility.
> Since you mentioned CP 6.502, I think that it is worth quoting at greater
> CSP: If a pragmaticist is asked what he means by the word "God," he can
> only say that just as long acquaintance with a man of great character may
> deeply influence one's whole manner of conduct, so that a glance at his
> portrait may make a difference, just as almost living with Dr. Johnson
> enabled poor Boswell to write an immortal book and a really sublime book,
> just as long study of the works of Aristotle may make him an acquaintance,
> so if contemplation and study of the physico-psychical universe can imbue a
> man with principles of conduct analogous to the influence of a great man's
> works or conversation, then that analogue of a mind--for it is impossible
> to say that *any *human attribute is *literally *applicable--is what he
> means by "God" ... the discoveries of science, their enabling us to *predict
> *what will be the course of nature, is proof conclusive that, though we
> cannot think any thought of God's, we can catch a fragment of His Thought,
> as it were.
> Peirce is clearly saying here that by carefully reading the "book of
> nature," we become acquainted with its Author, which is what we mean by
> "God"--not "the physico-psychical universe" itself, but the One who created
> it and is still creating it.
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 7:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> Stephen, list:
>> This refers to the 'reality' of belief - as outlined by Peirce in his
>> Fixation of Belief.
>> In my view, a belief is - as you say, supposition. It does not function
>> in the realm of facts. However, since, as Peirce also pointed out, our
>> universe operates within the mode of Reason [Thirdness], then - can we
>> presume that all of our beliefs are not merely logical but also - real?
>> That is - because we rationally THINK of something, does this make that
>> belief a reality? The same kind of reality as, for instance, the reality of
>> generals - which are the commonality of the instantiation?
>> I don't think that we can conclude that IF we think of something, THEN,
>> this means that 'something' is real. That would commit the error of
>> 'affirming the consequent'. We can't declare that something is real.
>> BECAUSE we think of it. Therefore - my view is that views of 'the divine'
>> or any name you want to call it - can only be beliefs. And this is what I
>> see as a key problem: definitions. Until we define what we mean by our
>> terms, such as 'God' , 'theism', ...then, our arguments for or against them
>> are empty and subjective.
>> Peirce himself called this 'force' by many names, eg, Nature, as 'in 'Can
>> there be the slightest hesitation in saying, then, that the human intellect
>> is implanted in man, either by a creator or by a quasi-intentional effect
>> of the struggle for existence?...and "among the inscrutable purposes of God
>> or the virtual purposes of nature" [8.211] ..."Man seems to himself to have
>> some glimmer of co-understanding with God, or with Nature" [8.212]. And see
>> 6.502, where Peirce writes that 'the analogue of a mind...is what he means
>> by "God".
>> In the scientific realm, which is built around the acceptance of the use
>> of reason, when we come up with a hypothesis - this must then be tested
>> within the existential world. As Peirce said, "deduction is certain but
>> relates only to ideal objects" [8.209] So, "induction gives us the only
>> approach to certainty concerning the real that we can have
>> [ibid].... Therefore, my point is that claims based around only deduction
>> remain beliefs - held by tenacity or authority - but still, only beliefs.
>> But are our beliefs only valid - and I mean valid as differentiated from
>> 'real' - if they can be empirically proven? I think that as a species,
>> almost unique in our requirement for social networking and our use of
>> symbolic language - then, beliefs are necessary for social stability and
>> even, our individual psychological health. Again, this does not make our
>> beliefs 'real'; it makes them socially valid - and, as such, open to change
>> when the societal need for them changes.
>> On Thu 17/05/18 5:17 AM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com sent:
>> In Triadic Philosophy if something is a matter of supposition like theism
>> the definition will not be anything more than supposition. Wittgenstein
>> understood this. This is why TP calls this mystery. It is real but it is
>> also a mystery. We can talk about our experience of what we call the divine
>> or any other name you want to give it. The replies to my post about life
>> beyond this planet are similar to posts about theism. They reference
>> mystery. Since we have no proof we do not know. It is just as
>> significant that something is not present as that it is. The triadic maxim
>> says the substance is practical and ordinary and accessible. That is what I
>> drive at. Everything else to me is binary thinking that often shields
>> another purpose than arriving at truth and beauty which I take to be the
>> aim of al consideration. You can reply to this in the list if you think it
>> is worth noting. Otherwise no problem. Cheers, S
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at