Jerry, I think you're right. At the very least I overly precided two very vague concept, viz., God and 'Being in general', by relating them to force and acceleration which can be fairly precided.
CSP: "All the instinctive beliefs, I notice, are vague. The moment they are precided, the pragmatist will begin to doubt them." (CP 6:499) As for why Being should be understood as vague, I think John Venn puts it very well. John Venn, in Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic. pg. 277-278: * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * IV. The next question for discussion concerns the limits of Definition. In other words, over what range of existences of any kind can we reasonably ask for definitions, and where and why must we cease to do so? The answer to this, enquiry turns in great part upon the kind of definition we propose to offer. (1) On the old scholastic view the limits assigned were quite definite. Every class, except the widest, must be included in some genus, and be marked off from it by a differentia, and must therefore possess the elements of a complete definition. The point needing explanation here, however, is as to what must be reckoned as the widest class. Some writers speak as if this must always have been held to be *Being* in general. This however was the view of none, or next to none, of the Aristotelian logicians. They took the Categories as their standard, and looked no further upwards than to the highest class in a Category. These ten Categories were regarded as so radically distinct from each other, that it was a misapplication of the process of abstraction to attempt to bring them under one single head. Accordingly the upward limit of definition in each category was reached at the highest class but one in that category. In the other direction the limit was reached when we got down to *infima species*; that is, one in which the members were separated by no essential, but only by accidental characteristics. One other exception must also be noticed. These Categories were by no means intended, as sometimes stated, to be a 'list of all nameable things'. On the contrary there were a number of things which were definitely excluded from any category, and which were consequently incapable of technical definition. They were generally summed up as follows:— "Complexum, Consignificans, Privatio, Fictum, Pars, Deus, Æquivocum, Transcendens, Ens Rationis, Sunt exclusa decem classibus ista novem." * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Matt On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 1:23 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > Matt: > > On May 17, 2018, at 11:47 AM, Matt Faunce <matthewjohnfau...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > in "not 'the physico-psychical universe' itself". Isn't the relation of > God the Creator to His Creation, viz., the physico-psychical universe, for > all we know, the same as the relation of force to acceleration? > > > Physical mathematics is wed to geometry is a very very deep way. > > > Thus, I do not see any logical possibility for a relation between a simple > mathematical concept such as a symbol representing a variable with theology > in general or a notion of God in particular. > > > Cheers > > Jerry > >
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