Jerry, I think you're right. At the very least I overly precided two very
vague concept, viz., God and 'Being in general', by relating them to force
and acceleration which can be fairly precided.

CSP: "All the instinctive beliefs, I notice, are vague. The moment they are
precided, the pragmatist will begin to doubt them." (CP 6:499)

As for why Being should be understood as vague, I think John Venn puts it
very well.

John Venn, in Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic. pg. 277-278:
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
IV. The next question for discussion concerns the limits of Definition. In
other words, over what range of existences of any kind can we reasonably
ask for definitions, and where and why must we cease to do so? The answer
to this, enquiry turns in great part upon the kind of definition we propose
to offer.

(1) On the old scholastic view the limits assigned were quite definite.
Every class, except the widest, must be included in some genus, and be
marked off from it by a differentia, and must therefore possess the
elements of a complete definition. The point needing explanation here,
however, is as to what must be reckoned as the widest class. Some writers
speak as if this must always have been held to be *Being* in general. This
however was the view of none, or next to none, of the Aristotelian
logicians. They took the Categories as their standard, and looked no
further upwards than to the highest class in a Category. These ten
Categories were regarded as so radically distinct from each other, that it
was a misapplication of the process of abstraction to attempt to bring them
under one single head. Accordingly the upward limit of definition in each
category was reached at the highest class but one in that category. In the
other direction the limit was reached when we got down to *infima species*;
that is, one in which the members were separated by no essential, but only
by accidental characteristics.

One other exception must also be noticed. These Categories were by no means
intended, as sometimes stated, to be a 'list of all nameable things'. On
the contrary there were a number of things which were definitely excluded
from any category, and which were consequently incapable of technical
definition. They were generally summed up as follows:—

"Complexum, Consignificans, Privatio, Fictum, Pars, Deus, Æquivocum,
Transcendens, Ens Rationis, Sunt exclusa decem classibus ista novem."
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Matt


On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 1:23 PM Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Matt:
>
> On May 17, 2018, at 11:47 AM, Matt Faunce <matthewjohnfau...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> in "not 'the physico-psychical universe' itself". Isn't the relation of
> God the Creator to His Creation, viz., the physico-psychical universe, for
> all we know, the same as the relation of force to acceleration?
>
>
> Physical mathematics is wed to geometry is a very very deep way.
>
>
> Thus, I do not see any logical possibility for a relation between a simple
> mathematical concept such as a symbol representing a variable with theology
> in general or a notion of God in particular.
>
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




Reply via email to