Helmut, Edwina, Perhaps I should have specified that I was referring to Peirce’s usage of these terms, including “analysis.” I know there are other uses of these terms, but on the Peirce list I feel bound by Peirce’s ethics of terminology, without bothering to say so. To make up for that omission from my post, I’ll give it this time entirely in Peirce’s own words:
[[ It seems to me that one of the first useful steps toward a science of semeiotic (σημειωτική), or the cenoscopic science of signs, must be the accurate definition, or logical analysis, of the concepts of the science. I define a Sign as anything which on the one hand is so determined by an Object and on the other hand so determines an idea in a person's mind, that this latter determination, which I term the Interpretant of the sign, is thereby mediately determined by that Object. A sign, therefore, has a triadic relation to its Object and to its Interpretant. But it is necessary to distinguish the Immediate Object, or the Object as the Sign represents it, from the Dynamical Object, or really efficient but not immediately present Object. It is likewise requisite to distinguish the Immediate Interpretant, i.e. the Interpretant represented or signified in the Sign, from the Dynamic Interpretant, or effect actually produced on the mind by the Sign; and both of these from the Normal Interpretant, or effect that would be produced on the mind by the Sign after sufficient development of thought. On these considerations I base a recognition of ten respects in which Signs may be divided. ] letter to Welby, December 1908 (CP 8.343, EP2:482) ] [[ Logical analysis is not an analysis into existing elements. It is the tracing out of relations between concepts on the assumption that along with each given or found concept is given its negative, and every other relation resulting from a transposition of its correlates. ] CP 1.294, c.1905 ] [[ How much shall be embraced in the predicate and how many subjects shall be recognized depends, for the ordinary analyses of logic, upon what mode of analysis will answer the purpose in hand. ] EP2:172, 1903 ] [[ Everybody recognizes that it is no inconsiderable art, this business of “phaneroscopic” analysis by which one frames a scientific definition. ] EP2:403, 1907 ] Gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> Sent: 23-Jul-18 09:15 To: [email protected] Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Depth and Signification List: I consider Helmut's point as valid; I consider that a Sign, as a triad, most definitely has a composition - of that triad. So, yes, an IO is part of a Sign's composition, but, the DO is, I maintain, also part of the Sign's composition. After all - the Sign, that triad, only functions when it is in interaction/relation with a DO. And the DO only functions as a DO when it is in interaction with another DO- in a triadic semiosic process. I don't agree that "the concepts of sign, object and interpretant are products of the analysis of semiosic phenomena'. This suggests that they are purely intellectual constructs of the human mind. I see them instead as actual, real phenomena, as parts of a dynamic interactional process of matter/mind that produces instantiations of matter/mind. Edwina On Mon 23/07/18 8:33 AM , [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> sent: Helmut, Sign, object and interpretant are the three correlates of a triadic relation. They are not matters of a sign’s composition. An immediate object could be considered a “matter of the sign’s composition” in the sense that it is “within” or “part of” the sign; a dynamic object is not. The concepts of sign, object and interpretant are products of the analysis of semiosic phenomena. Object and interpretant can be further subdivided as their categorial nature allows. The products of these analyses of semiosis are the basis of Peirce’s classifications of sign types. Gary f.
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