Edwina, list,
Edwina wrote: "This doesn't mean relativism; it doesn't mean nominalism; it
means instead that our 'intellectual conceptions' must be offered as open
interpretations by one person, open to questions and different views and
not defined as 'the truth'."
But it *does*, at least to me, sound like relativism. I don't agree that
all "'intellectual conceptions' must be offered as open interpretations by
one person. . ." Peirce valorizes the scientific community *well *over the
individual. Within a given community (recalling that the entirety of
Peirce's *cenoscopic philosophy*, including *logic as semeiotic*, is *pure
theoretical science*), within such a community the final 'truth' of the
matters under consideration will never be reached; but it can be
asymptotically approached--and a given scientific community can get very
'close' to the truth inquired into.
In addition, there is clearly falsity and error so that not all
"interpretations by one person" are equally valid. Some are downright wrong
in consideration of the *commens *of the informed community. In Peirce's
view the primary source of error* is* the individual who would seem to have
value in a given scientific community either as (1) a member of that
research community or (2) the generator of a testable hypothesis--and that
is all.
[I would add to these those practitioners of what Peirce calls *science of
review* ("arranging the results of discovery, beginning with digests, and
going on to endeavor to form a philosophy of science. . ." (1903). But the
possibility--and, historically speaking, the fact--of personal error in
formulating such a philosophy is very great, in my opinion the error not
infrequently brought about by egoism and arrogance in not adequately
researching and representing the work of the scientific community.
In the first of the 1898 *Cambridge Lectures* in the context of inquiry,
Peirce comments that "there is nothing which distinguished my personal
identify except my faults and my limitations--or if you please, my blind
will, which it is my highest endeavor to annihilate" (CP 1.673).
In short, Peirce saw a valuable (see 1. and 2. above) but limited place for
the individual in science. Still, according to Peirce, one ought do what
s/he can do to make the world a more reasonable place.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*
On Wed, Aug 1, 2018 at 6:00 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:
> John, list
>
> And from your post - I conclude that not merely 'absolute precision' is
> impossible, but by that notion, absolute truth is impossible since
> 'continuous variation subsists'. ..which means - no final Truth.
>
> Therefore - the agenda of some to find the ultimate or final truth of the
> meaning of Peirce's work which will then stand as The Final Word On Peirce
> - is not possible. Such ultimate finality seems to me to occur only within
> mathematics, pure logic or the natural laws of physics and chemistry - and
> even these realms must be open to questions. Other explorations in 'what is
> reality' - which includes the complex semiosis of Peirce within his
> examination of the triad and the categories are subject to that fact that
> 'absolute precision is impossible'.
>
> This doesn't mean relativism; it doesn't mean nominalism; it means instead
> that our 'intellectual conceptions' must be offered as open
> interpretations by one person, open to questions and different views and
> not defined as 'the truth'.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Wed 01/08/18 5:33 PM , John F Sowa [email protected] sent:
>
> On 8/1/2018 4:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> > each interpreting Quasi-mind is always in a different state
> > of Experiential Information from any other--including the same
> > Quasi-mind at a different time.
>
> Yes. And following is a related quotation by Peirce:
>
> > The vague might be defined as that to which the principle of
> > contradiction does not apply... But wherever degree or any
> > other possibility of continuous variation subsists, absolute
> > precision is impossible. Much else must be vague, because no
> > man’s interpretation of words is based on exactly the same
> > experience as any other man’s. Even in our most intellectual
> > conceptions, the more we strive to be precise, the more
> > unattainable precision seems. It should never be forgotten
> > that our own thinking is carried on as a dialogue, and though
> > mostly in a lesser degree, is subject to almost every imperfection
> > of language. (CP 5:505-506)
>
> John
>
>
>
>
>
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