Edwina, list, Edwina wrote:
ET: First, it is individuals who engage in critical discussion. Second-. No individual IS the scientific community. Therefore, no individual can categorically assert that their perspective IS the truth. I agree. ET: The question then becomes: First - what is the scientific community? Is it existent over how much space and how much time? Who are its members? Second- when and how does the scientific community decide that it has reached 'the truth'? And how does one decide that one is 'quite far from' or 'very close to'...this truth? Peirce typically speaks less of "the scientific community" but of *particular scientific communities* taking up specific facets of Science. In one sense there is no scientific community as such, but only these discrete communities of well-trained people in the scientific niche in which they are working. Peirce holds, and I agree, that given the principle of fallibility, no single community at any given time can claim to have arrived at the truth even of the subject matter of their discrete researches, that their scientific community is at best asymptotically approaching it. Yet it seems to me that there are signs that a given community *is* approaching *the truth of the matter under investigation *(not 'The Truth') when, for example, after "critical discussion" (both homo- and hetero-criticism) that there grows a tendency towards consensus as hypotheses are generated, experiments are devised around these, and tests of these (individually and taken together) support the theories developed within that community. Another example might be when work is validated when some societal added value comes to prominence so that, say, some psychological or logical theory begins to be effectively used within a society, or a technology (taken in the broadest sense) is developed or enhanced through its employment. But these are at best 'hints' and may mean not too much (and may finally even be falsified). For the theory may in time be superseded, and *even* as it may continue to prove useful. ET: You refer to the 'primary source of error' as the individual. Well, the individual is a basic component of 'the community' - and no community or group THINKS. Only individuals think. So obviously the individual is both the source of error and the source of truth. The point is as Peirce pointed out in his critique of Cartesianism: 'to make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious" 5.265. As I noted in my previous post, it seems to me that the role of the individual in science is to either generate novel hypotheses within a field of inquiry and/or to act within that community to try to falsify that hypothesis through experimental testing. Certainly the individual is a basic component of the community of inquiry in which she's involved and, yes, only individuals think. But, on the principle just given above, *individuals within a scientific community can and, indeed, ought to correct each other*. In Peirce's opinion, such correction should be welcomed, even encouraged. This, of course, is not to say that one shouldn't argue as forcefully as one can for her position when it makes good sense to him. But Peirce describes a person who sticks to his view when virtually all others within his community of inquiry find it lacking (as,say, they see the evidence arguing against it) a 'crank' (or a 'crackpot', or something like that; I personally find such insults inappropriate and offensive (see below). Still, I would often say to my critical thinking students when they were, say, acting as jurors in a hypothetical trial, to strongly argue their own view of the evidence in the case, providing as much evidence and argumentation as was at their disposal; but at the same time to keep an open mind to others' arguments concerning the evidence, that is, to not stubbornly dig in their heels when other arguments could be seen as supported. Indeed, this might, and in my classes not infrequently did, lead to some jurors modifying their views. So, as I see it, in a well-prepared community of scientific interest think it is finally prudent and rational for the individual inquirer to respect the process of inquiry by entertaining, say, the consensus which others may be arriving at. ET: But this leads to the quite valid question of: What is the community of scholars? What is its membership, its temporality, its spatial existence? Peirce pointed out that 'every unidealistic philosophy supposes some absolutely inexplicable unanalyzable ultimate" 5.265. How do we know we have reached this ideal point? Is it just a 'communal feeling of having arrived'? [a priori] Is it an authoritative voice saying: We have arrived? [authority]. Is it certainty [tenacity]? How do we know? I think you've answered your own question by omitting above Peirce's fourth way in which we may fix our beliefs--through scientific inquiry. At the beginning of inquiry this ought, in my opinion, rest on the preparation of the individual researcher and the community of inquiry as to what there is of solid achievement by those who may have already worked on the problem or matters closely related to it (e.g., through a review of the literature, etc.). But that too needs to be criticized by the scientific community in question. Temporally, we do our work *hic et nunc*, but within the historical context just mentioned. And spatial distance has taken on another meaning in the age of the Internet one must admit, allowing us to engage in inquiry, for example, in this very forum if we care to, and with people in places quite remote from us. ET: But, what if, in the community of scholars, "if disciplined and candid minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself" 5.265. But this doubt-creation is not a 'given'. It doesn't often take place. I am not at all sure that this creation of doubt "doesn't often take place," at least not in the open mind of a person who reflects on the strongest arguments shared by his peers. "If *disciplined and candid minds carefully examine* [some individual's] theory and refuse to accept it," for that individual to cling to it is, in my opinion, at least a partial rejection of scientific method as Peirce envisioned it. ET: Ah- so does the community turn on this renegade disciplined and candid mind, declare him a heretic, an ignoramus? We have certainly seen, in the intellectual history of mankind, that this indeed takes place repeatedly. I apparently have a different reading of the snippet quoted above. It is *not* the 'renegade' whom Peirce says has a "disciplined and candid mind," but the members of the community who find the renegade's theory unacceptable as their own hypotheses are tested and their theory is for their community more and more supported. Then criticism of the 'renegade's' theory should create doubt in *his* mind. The community's rejection is not, or at least ought not be, a personal matter (I think Peirce's name-calling which I pointed to above is unfortunate) since a scientific community at its best criticizes only the ideas (hypotheses, theories) of individuals, not the person himself (casting aspersions by throwing out words like heretic, ignoramus, crank, crackpot hasn't a legitimate place in science although, as you remarked, it's happened not infrequently in the past). ET: So then what? In my opinion we all try to find a place in a genuine community of inquiry in a place where inquiry is valued and where heretical views are welcomed (until, say, the arguments against them make them untenable to the heretic himself). Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Aug 1, 2018 at 8:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, list > > So-" human knowledge, ... consists of linguistically formulated > expectations submitted to critical discussion" [Popper. Objective > Knowledge, 66] > > First, it is individuals who engage in critical discussion. Second-. No > individual IS the scientific community. Therefore, no individual can > categorically assert that their perspective IS the truth. > > The question then becomes: First - what is the scientific community? Is it > existent over how much space and how much time? Who are its members? > Second- when and how does the scientific community decide that it has > reached 'the truth'? And how does one decide that one is 'quite far from' > or 'very close to'...this truth? > > You refer to the 'primary source of error' as the individual. Well, the > individual is a basic component of 'the community' - and no community or > group THINKS. Only individuals think. So obviously the individual is > both the source of error and the source of truth. The point is as Peirce > pointed out in his critique of Cartesianism: 'to make single individuals > absolute judges of truth is most pernicious" 5.265. > > But this leads to the quite valid question of: What is the community of > scholars? What is its membership, its temporality, its spatial existence? > Peirce pointed out that 'every unidealistic philosophy supposes some > absolutely inexplicable unanalyzable ultimate" 5.265. How do we know > we have reached this ideal point? Is it just a 'communal feeling of having > arrived'? [a priori] Is it an authoritative voice saying: We have arrived? > [authority]. Is it certainty [tenacity]? How do we know? > > But, what if, in the community of scholars, "if disciplined and candid > minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to > create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself" 5.265. But > this doubt-creation is not a 'given'. It doesn't often take place. > > Ah- so does the community turn on this renegade disciplined and candid > mind, declare him a heretic, an ignoramus? We have certainly seen, in the > intellectual history of mankind, that this indeed takes place repeatedly. > > So then what? > > Edwina > > > > > > > > > On Wed 01/08/18 7:05 PM , Gary Richmond [email protected] sent: > > Edwina, list, > > Edwina wrote: "This doesn't mean relativism; it doesn't mean nominalism; > it means instead that our 'intellectual conceptions' must be offered as > open interpretations by one person, open to questions and different views > and not defined as 'the truth'." > > But it does, at least to me, sound like relativism. I don't agree that > all "'intellectual conceptions' must be offered as open interpretations by > one person. . ." Peirce valorizes the scientific community well over the > individual. Within a given community (recalling that the entirety of > Peirce's cenoscopic philosophy, including logic as semeiotic, is pure > theoretical science), within such a community the final 'truth' of the > matters under consideration will never be reached; but it can be > asymptotically approached--and a given scientific community can get very > 'close' to the truth inquired into. > > In addition, there is clearly falsity and error so that not all > "interpretations by one person" are equally valid. Some are downright wrong > in consideration of the commens of the informed community. In Peirce's > view the primary source of error is the individual who would seem to have > value in a given scientific community either as (1) a member of that > research community or (2) the generator of a testable hypothesis--and that > is all. > > [I would add to these those practitioners of what Peirce calls science of > review ("arranging the results of discovery, beginning with digests, and > going on to endeavor to form a philosophy of science. . ." (1903). But the > possibility--and, historically speaking, the fact--of personal error in > formulating such a philosophy is very great, in my opinion the error not > infrequently brought about by egoism and arrogance in not adequately > researching and representing the work of the scientific community. > > In the first of the 1898 Cambridge Lectures in the context of inquiry, > Peirce comments that "there is nothing which distinguished my personal > identify except my faults and my limitations--or if you please, my blind > will, which it is my highest endeavor to annihilate" (CP 1.673). > > In short, Peirce saw a valuable (see 1. and 2. above) but limited place > for the individual in science. Still, according to Peirce, one ought do > what s/he can do to make the world a more reasonable place. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > 718 482-5690 > > > On Wed, Aug 1, 2018 at 6:00 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> John, list >> >> And from your post - I conclude that not merely 'absolute precision' is >> impossible, but by that notion, absolute truth is impossible since >> 'continuous variation subsists'. ..which means - no final Truth. >> >> Therefore - the agenda of some to find the ultimate or final truth of the >> meaning of Peirce's work which will then stand as The Final Word On Peirce >> - is not possible. Such ultimate finality seems to me to occur only within >> mathematics, pure logic or the natural laws of physics and chemistry - and >> even these realms must be open to questions. Other explorations in 'what is >> reality' - which includes the complex semiosis of Peirce within his >> examination of the triad and the categories are subject to that fact that >> 'absolute precision is impossible'. >> >> This doesn't mean relativism; it doesn't mean nominalism; it means >> instead that our 'intellectual conceptions' must be offered as open >> interpretations by one person, open to questions and different views and >> not defined as 'the truth'. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> On Wed 01/08/18 5:33 PM , John F Sowa [email protected] sent: >> >> On 8/1/2018 4:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: >> > each interpreting Quasi-mind is always in a different state >> > of Experiential Information from any other--including the same >> > Quasi-mind at a different time. >> >> Yes. And following is a related quotation by Peirce: >> >> > The vague might be defined as that to which the principle of >> > contradiction does not apply... But wherever degree or any >> > other possibility of continuous variation subsists, absolute >> > precision is impossible. Much else must be vague, because no >> > man’s interpretation of words is based on exactly the same >> > experience as any other man’s. Even in our most intellectual >> > conceptions, the more we strive to be precise, the more >> > unattainable precision seems. It should never be forgotten >> > that our own thinking is carried on as a dialogue, and though >> > mostly in a lesser degree, is subject to almost every imperfection >> > of language. (CP 5:505-506) >> >> John >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm>http://www.cspeirce.com/ >> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
