Edwina, List: ET: Therefore, no individual can categorically assert that their perspective IS the truth.
At first, this once again appears to be self-defeating; you, as an individual, are categorically asserting that your perspective (on this particular matter) is the truth. However ... ET: The point is as Peirce pointed out in his critique of Cartesianism: 'to make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious" 5.265. If your intention was simply to reiterate this comment by Peirce, then we are in agreement--not that "absolute truth is impossible," but that no individual (and finite) human can rightly claim to be the definitive authority on what is absolutely true. In other words, as Mike B. just noted--and as I affirmed in my first post this afternoon, on the thread topic--our beliefs and opinions in any state of Experiential Information are always *fallible*. Only in the state of Substantial Information--i.e., omniscience--would that not be the case. ET: ... no community or group THINKS. Only individuals think. Again, I agree; and this is one reason why Peirce carefully distinguished the study of *thinking*, which is the Special Science of psychology, from the study of *thought*--i.e., how one *should *think if one is properly aiming at the *ideal *of absolute truth--which is the Normative Science of logic as semeiotic. CSP: Logic is not the science of how we *do *think; but, in such sense as it can be said to deal with thinking at all, it only determines how we *ought *to think; nor how we ought to think in conformity with usage, but how we ought to think in order to think what is *true* ... a *thought *(Begriff), in the sense in which alone logic deals with thoughts, is not a thinking ... (CP 2.52-53; 1902) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Aug 1, 2018 at 7:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, list > > So-" human knowledge, ... consists of linguistically formulated > expectations submitted to critical discussion" [Popper. Objective > Knowledge, 66] > > First, it is individuals who engage in critical discussion. Second-. No > individual IS the scientific community. Therefore, no individual can > categorically assert that their perspective IS the truth. > > The question then becomes: First - what is the scientific community? Is it > existent over how much space and how much time? Who are its members? > Second- when and how does the scientific community decide that it has > reached 'the truth'? And how does one decide that one is 'quite far from' > or 'very close to'...this truth? > > You refer to the 'primary source of error' as the individual. Well, the > individual is a basic component of 'the community' - and no community or > group THINKS. Only individuals think. So obviously the individual is > both the source of error and the source of truth. The point is as Peirce > pointed out in his critique of Cartesianism: 'to make single individuals > absolute judges of truth is most pernicious" 5.265. > > But this leads to the quite valid question of: What is the community of > scholars? What is its membership, its temporality, its spatial existence? > Peirce pointed out that 'every unidealistic philosophy supposes some > absolutely inexplicable unanalyzable ultimate" 5.265. How do we know > we have reached this ideal point? Is it just a 'communal feeling of having > arrived'? [a priori] Is it an authoritative voice saying: We have arrived? > [authority]. Is it certainty [tenacity]? How do we know? > > But, what if, in the community of scholars, "if disciplined and candid > minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to > create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself" 5.265. But > this doubt-creation is not a 'given'. It doesn't often take place. > > Ah- so does the community turn on this renegade disciplined and candid > mind, declare him a heretic, an ignoramus? We have certainly seen, in the > intellectual history of mankind, that this indeed takes place repeatedly. > > So then what? > > Edwina > > On Wed 01/08/18 7:05 PM , Gary Richmond [email protected] sent: > > Edwina, list, > > Edwina wrote: "This doesn't mean relativism; it doesn't mean nominalism; > it means instead that our 'intellectual conceptions' must be offered as > open interpretations by one person, open to questions and different views > and not defined as 'the truth'." > > But it does, at least to me, sound like relativism. I don't agree that > all "'intellectual conceptions' must be offered as open interpretations by > one person. . ." Peirce valorizes the scientific community well over the > individual. Within a given community (recalling that the entirety of > Peirce's cenoscopic philosophy, including logic as semeiotic, is pure > theoretical science), within such a community the final 'truth' of the > matters under consideration will never be reached; but it can be > asymptotically approached--and a given scientific community can get very > 'close' to the truth inquired into. > > In addition, there is clearly falsity and error so that not all > "interpretations by one person" are equally valid. Some are downright wrong > in consideration of the commens of the informed community. In Peirce's > view the primary source of error is the individual who would seem to have > value in a given scientific community either as (1) a member of that > research community or (2) the generator of a testable hypothesis--and that > is all. > > [I would add to these those practitioners of what Peirce calls science of > review ("arranging the results of discovery, beginning with digests, and > going on to endeavor to form a philosophy of science. . ." (1903). But the > possibility--and, historically speaking, the fact--of personal error in > formulating such a philosophy is very great, in my opinion the error not > infrequently brought about by egoism and arrogance in not adequately > researching and representing the work of the scientific community. > > In the first of the 1898 Cambridge Lectures in the context of inquiry, > Peirce comments that "there is nothing which distinguished my personal > identify except my faults and my limitations--or if you please, my blind > will, which it is my highest endeavor to annihilate" (CP 1.673). > > In short, Peirce saw a valuable (see 1. and 2. above) but limited place > for the individual in science. Still, according to Peirce, one ought do > what s/he can do to make the world a more reasonable place. > > Best, > > Gary > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > 718 482-5690 > >
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