List:
I'm afraid I don't see the point of Gary F's post - for I don't see
how my outline, in support of Helmut's post, contradicts or denies
Peirce's usage of these terms - including 'analysis'. Therefore, I
feel that I have followed Peirce's 'ethics of terminology'.
I note that Peirce defines the Dynamic Object as the "really
efficient but not immediately present Object".
Exactly - the DO is part of the Sign's triadic relations; it is an
'efficient force' - - and this is why I disagree with Gary F's view
that the DO is not part of the composition of the Sign ....
“matter of the sign’s composition” in the sense that it is
“within” or “part of” the sign; a dynamic object is not".
After all, without that interaction with what is called the DO -
then, the IO wouldn't exist - nor the II or even DI or even, the
Representamen!
And of course, I agree that" Logical analysis is not an analysis
into existing elements. It is the tracing out of relations between
concepts on the assumption that along with each given or found
concept is given its negative, and every other relation resulting
from a transposition of its correlates. ] CP 1.294, c.1905 ]"
Exactly- and this is why I have a problem with JAS's microanalysis
of terms - which, in my view, is a mechanical outline that ignores
the dynamics of networked semiosic relations.
So- we have some basic disagreements in interpreting Peircean
semiosis. Nothing wrong with that!
Edwina
On Mon 23/07/18 11:04 AM , [email protected] sent:
Helmut, Edwina,
Perhaps I should have specified that I was referring to Peirce’s
usage of these terms, including “analysis.” I know there are
other uses of these terms, but on the Peirce list I feel bound by
Peirce’s ethics of terminology, without bothering to say so. To
make up for that omission from my post, I’ll give it this time
entirely in Peirce’s own words:
[[ It seems to me that one of the first useful steps toward a
science of semeiotic (σημειωτική), or the cenoscopic
science of signs, must be the accurate definition, or logical
analysis, of the concepts of the science. I define a Sign as
anything which on the one hand is so determined by an Object and on
the other hand so determines an idea in a person's mind, that this
latter determination, which I term the Interpretant of the sign, is
thereby mediately determined by that Object. A sign, therefore, has a
triadic relation to its Object and to its Interpretant. But it is
necessary to distinguish the Immediate Object, or the Object as the
Sign represents it, from the Dynamical Object, or really efficient
but not immediately present Object. It is likewise requisite to
distinguish the Immediate Interpretant, i.e. the Interpretant
represented or signified in the Sign, from the Dynamic Interpretant,
or effect actually produced on the mind by the Sign; and both of
these from the Normal Interpretant, or effect that would be produced
on the mind by the Sign after sufficient development of thought. On
these considerations I base a recognition of ten respects in which
Signs may be divided. ] letter to Welby, December 1908 (CP 8.343,
EP2:482) ]
[[ Logical analysis is not an analysis into existing elements. It is
the tracing out of relations between concepts on the assumption that
along with each given or found concept is given its negative, and
every other relation resulting from a transposition of its
correlates. ] CP 1.294, c.1905 ]
[[ How much shall be embraced in the predicate and how many
subjects shall be recognized depends, for the ordinary analyses of
logic, upon what mode of analysis will answer the purpose in hand. ]
EP2:172, 1903 ]
[[ Everybody recognizes that it is no inconsiderable art, this
business of “phaneroscopic” analysis by which one frames a
scientific definition. ] EP2:403, 1907 ]
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 23-Jul-18 09:15
To: [email protected]
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Depth and Signification
List:
I consider Helmut's point as valid; I consider that a Sign, as a
triad, most definitely has a composition - of that triad. So, yes, an
IO is part of a Sign's composition, but, the DO is, I maintain, also
part of the Sign's composition. After all - the Sign, that triad,
only functions when it is in interaction/relation with a DO.
And the DO only functions as a DO when it is in interaction with
another DO- in a triadic semiosic process.
I don't agree that "the concepts of sign, object and interpretant
are products of the analysis of semiosic phenomena'. This suggests
that they are purely intellectual constructs of the human mind. I see
them instead as actual, real phenomena, as parts of a dynamic
interactional process of matter/mind that produces instantiations of
matter/mind.
Edwina
On Mon 23/07/18 8:33 AM , [email protected] [1] sent:
Helmut,
Sign, object and interpretant are the three correlates of a triadic
relation. They are not matters of a sign’s composition. An
immediate object could be considered a “matter of the sign’s
composition” in the sense that it is “within” or “part of”
the sign; a dynamic object is not. The concepts of sign, object and
interpretant are products of the analysis of semiosic phenomena.
Object and interpretant can be further subdivided as their categorial
nature allows. The products of these analyses of semiosis are the
basis of Peirce’s classifications of sign types.
Gary f.
Links:
------
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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