When quantum stumbled over the Copenhagen interpretation, the solution was "Shut up and calculate." and the anomalies remain unresolved. But the impasse has become immense and I believe political. This is a topic of general interest that relates to Peirce's sense that science eventually arrives at a consensus. O imagine he might have improved on Bell and come up with a resolution! We have become more or less prisoners of science in a certain sense.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Thu, Aug 2, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, list, > > Edwina wrote: > > ET: First, it is individuals who engage in critical discussion. Second-. > No individual IS the scientific community. Therefore, no individual can > categorically assert that their perspective IS the truth. > > I agree. > > ET: The question then becomes: First - what is the scientific community? > Is it existent over how much space and how much time? Who are its members? > Second- when and how does the scientific community decide that it has > reached 'the truth'? And how does one decide that one is 'quite far from' > or 'very close to'...this truth? > > Peirce typically speaks less of "the scientific community" but of *particular > scientific communities* taking up specific facets of Science. In one > sense there is no scientific community as such, but only these discrete > communities of well-trained people in the scientific niche in which they > are working. Peirce holds, and I agree, that given the principle of > fallibility, no single community at any given time can claim to have > arrived at the truth even of the subject matter of their discrete > researches, that their scientific community is at best asymptotically > approaching it. > > Yet it seems to me that there are signs that a given community *is* > approaching *the truth of the matter under investigation *(not 'The > Truth') when, for example, after "critical discussion" (both homo- and > hetero-criticism) that there grows a tendency towards consensus as > hypotheses are generated, experiments are devised around these, and tests > of these (individually and taken together) support the theories developed > within that community. Another example might be when work is validated when > some societal added value comes to prominence so that, say, some > psychological or logical theory begins to be effectively used within a > society, or a technology (taken in the broadest sense) is developed or > enhanced through its employment. But these are at best 'hints' and may mean > not too much (and may finally even be falsified). For the theory may in > time be superseded, and *even* as it may continue to prove useful. > > ET: You refer to the 'primary source of error' as the individual. Well, > the individual is a basic component of 'the community' - and no community > or group THINKS. Only individuals think. So obviously the individual is > both the source of error and the source of truth. The point is as Peirce > pointed out in his critique of Cartesianism: 'to make single individuals > absolute judges of truth is most pernicious" 5.265. > > As I noted in my previous post, it seems to me that the role of the > individual in science is to either generate novel hypotheses within a field > of inquiry and/or to act within that community to try to falsify that > hypothesis through experimental testing. Certainly the individual is a > basic component of the community of inquiry in which she's involved and, > yes, only individuals think. But, on the principle just given above, > *individuals > within a scientific community can and, indeed, ought to correct each other*. > In Peirce's opinion, such correction should be welcomed, even encouraged. > > This, of course, is not to say that one shouldn't argue as forcefully as > one can for her position when it makes good sense to him. But Peirce > describes a person who sticks to his view when virtually all others within > his community of inquiry find it lacking (as,say, they see the evidence > arguing against it) a 'crank' (or a 'crackpot', or something like that; I > personally find such insults inappropriate and offensive (see below). > > Still, I would often say to my critical thinking students when they were, > say, acting as jurors in a hypothetical trial, to strongly argue their own > view of the evidence in the case, providing as much evidence and > argumentation as was at their disposal; but at the same time to keep an > open mind to others' arguments concerning the evidence, that is, to not > stubbornly dig in their heels when other arguments could be seen as > supported. Indeed, this might, and in my classes not infrequently did, lead > to some jurors modifying their views. > > So, as I see it, in a well-prepared community of scientific interest think > it is finally prudent and rational for the individual inquirer to respect > the process of inquiry by entertaining, say, the consensus which others may > be arriving at. > > ET: But this leads to the quite valid question of: What is the community > of scholars? What is its membership, its temporality, its spatial > existence? Peirce pointed out that 'every unidealistic philosophy supposes > some absolutely inexplicable unanalyzable ultimate" 5.265. How do we know > we have reached this ideal point? Is it just a 'communal feeling of having > arrived'? [a priori] Is it an authoritative voice saying: We have arrived? > [authority]. Is it certainty [tenacity]? How do we know? > > I think you've answered your own question by omitting above Peirce's > fourth way in which we may fix our beliefs--through scientific inquiry. At > the beginning of inquiry this ought, in my opinion, rest on the preparation > of the individual researcher and the community of inquiry as to what there > is of solid achievement by those who may have already worked on the problem > or matters closely related to it (e.g., through a review of the literature, > etc.). But that too needs to be criticized by the scientific community in > question. > > Temporally, we do our work *hic et nunc*, but within the historical > context just mentioned. And spatial distance has taken on another meaning > in the age of the Internet one must admit, allowing us to engage in > inquiry, for example, in this very forum if we care to, and with people in > places quite remote from us. > > ET: But, what if, in the community of scholars, "if disciplined and candid > minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to > create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself" 5.265. But > this doubt-creation is not a 'given'. It doesn't often take place. > > I am not at all sure that this creation of doubt "doesn't often take > place," at least not in the open mind of a person who reflects on the > strongest arguments shared by his peers. "If *disciplined and candid > minds carefully examine* [some individual's] theory and refuse to accept > it," for that individual to cling to it is, in my opinion, at least a > partial rejection of scientific method as Peirce envisioned it. > > ET: Ah- so does the community turn on this renegade disciplined and candid > mind, declare him a heretic, an ignoramus? We have certainly seen, in the > intellectual history of mankind, that this indeed takes place repeatedly. > > I apparently have a different reading of the snippet quoted above. It is > *not* the 'renegade' whom Peirce says has a "disciplined and candid > mind," but the members of the community who find the renegade's theory > unacceptable as their own hypotheses are tested and their theory is for > their community more and more supported. Then criticism of the 'renegade's' > theory should create doubt in *his* mind. The community's rejection is > not, or at least ought not be, a personal matter (I think Peirce's > name-calling which I pointed to above is unfortunate) since a scientific > community at its best criticizes only the ideas (hypotheses, theories) of > individuals, not the person himself (casting aspersions by throwing out > words like heretic, ignoramus, crank, crackpot hasn't a legitimate place in > science although, as you remarked, it's happened not infrequently in the > past). > > ET: So then what? > > In my opinion we all try to find a place in a genuine community of inquiry > in a place where inquiry is valued and where heretical views are welcomed > (until, say, the arguments against them make them untenable to the heretic > himself). > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *718 482-5690* > > On Wed, Aug 1, 2018 at 8:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Gary R, list >> >> So-" human knowledge, ... consists of linguistically formulated >> expectations submitted to critical discussion" [Popper. Objective >> Knowledge, 66] >> >> First, it is individuals who engage in critical discussion. Second-. No >> individual IS the scientific community. Therefore, no individual can >> categorically assert that their perspective IS the truth. >> >> The question then becomes: First - what is the scientific community? Is >> it existent over how much space and how much time? Who are its members? >> Second- when and how does the scientific community decide that it has >> reached 'the truth'? And how does one decide that one is 'quite far from' >> or 'very close to'...this truth? >> >> You refer to the 'primary source of error' as the individual. Well, the >> individual is a basic component of 'the community' - and no community or >> group THINKS. Only individuals think. So obviously the individual is >> both the source of error and the source of truth. The point is as Peirce >> pointed out in his critique of Cartesianism: 'to make single individuals >> absolute judges of truth is most pernicious" 5.265. >> >> But this leads to the quite valid question of: What is the community of >> scholars? What is its membership, its temporality, its spatial existence? >> Peirce pointed out that 'every unidealistic philosophy supposes some >> absolutely inexplicable unanalyzable ultimate" 5.265. How do we know >> we have reached this ideal point? Is it just a 'communal feeling of having >> arrived'? [a priori] Is it an authoritative voice saying: We have arrived? >> [authority]. Is it certainty [tenacity]? How do we know? >> >> But, what if, in the community of scholars, "if disciplined and candid >> minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to >> create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself" 5.265. But >> this doubt-creation is not a 'given'. It doesn't often take place. >> >> Ah- so does the community turn on this renegade disciplined and candid >> mind, declare him a heretic, an ignoramus? We have certainly seen, in the >> intellectual history of mankind, that this indeed takes place repeatedly. >> >> So then what? >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Wed 01/08/18 7:05 PM , Gary Richmond [email protected] sent: >> >> Edwina, list, >> >> Edwina wrote: "This doesn't mean relativism; it doesn't mean nominalism; >> it means instead that our 'intellectual conceptions' must be offered as >> open interpretations by one person, open to questions and different views >> and not defined as 'the truth'." >> >> But it does, at least to me, sound like relativism. I don't agree that >> all "'intellectual conceptions' must be offered as open interpretations by >> one person. . ." Peirce valorizes the scientific community well over the >> individual. Within a given community (recalling that the entirety of >> Peirce's cenoscopic philosophy, including logic as semeiotic, is pure >> theoretical science), within such a community the final 'truth' of the >> matters under consideration will never be reached; but it can be >> asymptotically approached--and a given scientific community can get very >> 'close' to the truth inquired into. >> >> In addition, there is clearly falsity and error so that not all >> "interpretations by one person" are equally valid. Some are downright wrong >> in consideration of the commens of the informed community. In Peirce's >> view the primary source of error is the individual who would seem to >> have value in a given scientific community either as (1) a member of that >> research community or (2) the generator of a testable hypothesis--and that >> is all. >> >> [I would add to these those practitioners of what Peirce calls science >> of review ("arranging the results of discovery, beginning with digests, >> and going on to endeavor to form a philosophy of science. . ." (1903). But >> the possibility--and, historically speaking, the fact--of personal error in >> formulating such a philosophy is very great, in my opinion the error not >> infrequently brought about by egoism and arrogance in not adequately >> researching and representing the work of the scientific community. >> >> In the first of the 1898 Cambridge Lectures in the context of inquiry, >> Peirce comments that "there is nothing which distinguished my personal >> identify except my faults and my limitations--or if you please, my blind >> will, which it is my highest endeavor to annihilate" (CP 1.673). >> >> In short, Peirce saw a valuable (see 1. and 2. above) but limited place >> for the individual in science. Still, according to Peirce, one ought do >> what s/he can do to make the world a more reasonable place. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> >> >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> 718 482-5690 >> >> >> On Wed, Aug 1, 2018 at 6:00 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> John, list >>> >>> And from your post - I conclude that not merely 'absolute precision' is >>> impossible, but by that notion, absolute truth is impossible since >>> 'continuous variation subsists'. ..which means - no final Truth. >>> >>> Therefore - the agenda of some to find the ultimate or final truth of >>> the meaning of Peirce's work which will then stand as The Final Word On >>> Peirce - is not possible. Such ultimate finality seems to me to occur only >>> within mathematics, pure logic or the natural laws of physics and chemistry >>> - and even these realms must be open to questions. Other explorations in >>> 'what is reality' - which includes the complex semiosis of Peirce within >>> his examination of the triad and the categories are subject to that >>> fact that 'absolute precision is impossible'. >>> >>> This doesn't mean relativism; it doesn't mean nominalism; it means >>> instead that our 'intellectual conceptions' must be offered as open >>> interpretations by one person, open to questions and different views and >>> not defined as 'the truth'. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed 01/08/18 5:33 PM , John F Sowa [email protected] sent: >>> >>> On 8/1/2018 4:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: >>> > each interpreting Quasi-mind is always in a different state >>> > of Experiential Information from any other--including the same >>> > Quasi-mind at a different time. >>> >>> Yes. And following is a related quotation by Peirce: >>> >>> > The vague might be defined as that to which the principle of >>> > contradiction does not apply... But wherever degree or any >>> > other possibility of continuous variation subsists, absolute >>> > precision is impossible. Much else must be vague, because no >>> > man’s interpretation of words is based on exactly the same >>> > experience as any other man’s. Even in our most intellectual >>> > conceptions, the more we strive to be precise, the more >>> > unattainable precision seems. It should never be forgotten >>> > that our own thinking is carried on as a dialogue, and though >>> > mostly in a lesser degree, is subject to almost every imperfection >>> > of language. (CP 5:505-506) >>> >>> John >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm>http://www.cspeirce.com/ >>> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
