Jon, list,
Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
I would like to suggest the following for consideration and comment.
- Genuine triadic relation - Dynamic Object, Sign (Type), Final
Interpretant
- Degenerate triadic relation - Dynamic Object, Sign-Replica (Token),
Dynamic Interpretant
- Doubly degenerate triadic relation - Immediate Object, Sign-Quality
(Tone or Mark), Immediate Interpretant
I have offered the first two characterizations on multiple occasions
previously, but the third is a new proposal derived from my recent
hypothesis that a Sign-Quality (Tone or Mark) is a character embodied in a
Sign-Replica (Token) that facilitates the latter's recognition as an
*Instance *of the Sign (Type). The words "man" and "man" are two different
Replicas of the same Sign, and have similar Sign-Qualities because they
belong to the same Sign System. The words "man" and "homme" are also two
different Replicas of the same Sign, but have different Sign-Qualities
because they belong to different Sign Systems.
Being *internal *to a Sign-Replica, a Sign-Quality relates to the Object as
represented (IO) and the Interpretant as expressed (II), and does so in a
monadic rather than dyadic way--consistent with Peirce's omission of
trichotomies for IO-S and S-II in his 1908 taxonomy. As such, a
Sign-Quality corresponds to the minimal state of *Essential *Information--i.e.,
Sign System Acquaintance, which includes familiarity with non-verbal cues
like tone of voice and volume. I still need to think through the
implications of this for the definition of the Immediate Object as distinct
from the Dynamic Object and all three Interpretants.
I am also starting to wonder if we should likewise differentiate (a) the
Dynamic Object that *permanently *relates to the Sign (Type) and Final
Interpretant from (b) the Dynamic Object that relates to the Sign-Replica
(Token) and Dynamic Interpretant in an *individual *Instance of the Sign.
For our recurring examples of a weathercock and ripples on a lake, perhaps
(a) is the direction of the wind *in general*, in accordance with the laws
of nature (i.e., inveterate habits of matter) that govern their behavior at
*any *place and time; while (b) is the direction of the wind *here and now*,
which someone *actually *interprets them to be indicating.
As always, feedback--including well-founded criticism--would be appreciated.
Jon, I suppose I should review your earlier posts on 1. and 2. above but
haven't the time at the moment to search and locate them. While I think I
approved them in my earlier thinking, a constant concern of mine just arose
again.
Namely, I still have trouble imaging how the Dynamic Object can stand in
any genuine triadic relation to the Sign. While 'it' determines the OI and
while it does this "in the mind," one knows the OD only by collateral
knowledge, that is various experience*s* of it. I am always taken back to
the thought that, at least in human semiosis, the OD can't really be known
in its fullness, that only some 'part' of it can ever be represented in a
Sign (even if that sign were a monograph on the Object) and that that
partial hint or suggestion of the OD *is* the OI.
1908 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 83
It is usual and proper to distinguish two Objects of a Sign, the Mediate
without, and the Immediate within the Sign. Its Interpretant is all that
the Sign conveys: acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral
experience. The Mediate Object is the Object outside of the Sign; I call it
the *Dynamoid* Object. The Sign must indicate it by a hint; and this hint,
or its substance, is the *Immediate* Object. Each of these two Objects may
be said to be capable of either of the three Modalities, though in the case
of the Immediate Object, this is not quite literally true.
The result for me is that while I have no trouble with 3. above, the first
two present unresolved issues in my thinking.
I think you have said that you see the OD as itself a Sign. I can't quite
see it as such. If it is known through collateral knowledge, which Peirce
says that it is, then even if each of those experiential moment*s* of it
were sign*s*, the OD itself is not a Sign. To me what is known of it by
collateral experience/knowledge *hints* at or *suggests* or *indicates *a
Sign (as Peirce writes) perhaps *prompts* a Sign, or rather, an OI.
1908 [c.] | Letters to Lady Welby | MS [R] L463:15
As to the Object of a Sign, it is to be observed that the Sign. . .really
is determined by its Object. . . the Sign may be said to pose as a
representative of its Object, that is, suggests an Idea of the Object which
is distinguishable from the Object in its own Being. The former I term
the *Dynamoid
Object* (for I want the word “genuine” to express something different); the
latter the *Immediate Object* (a well-established term of logic.) Each of
these may have either of the three Modalities of Being, the former in
itself, the latter in representation.
And even more to my point:
1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:498
. . . the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign
*cannot* express, which it can only *indicate* and leave the interpreter to
find out by *collateral experience*.
Now the nature of the OD in biosemiosis may prove to be less problematic
where it--or at least some part of it--might really function as Object
(collateral knowledge may mean something different in that idioscopic
science, or not not be needed at all).
What I am finding most valuable about your inquiry, Jon, is that your
various hypotheses are making me reflect more deeply on semiotic matters
which had once seemed settled. You are causing me to rethink some of my
earlier suppositions which I thought were, at least tentatively and
fallibly, more or less settled.
Meanwhile, I continue to see the OD as that which *would be* known at the
impossible (since asymptotic) conclusion of an "unlimited" inquiry.
1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:495
As to the Object, that may mean the Object as cognized in the Sign and
therefore an Idea, or it may be the Object as it is regardless of any
particular aspect of it, the Object in such relations as unlimited and
final study would show it to be. The former I call the *Immediate *Object,
the latter the *Dynamical* Object. For the latter is the Object that
Dynamical Science (or what at this day would be called “Objective” science)
can investigate.
I don't, in other words, see it in its fullness entering into any given
instance of semiosis.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*
On Thu, Aug 23, 2018 at 9:11 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> List:
>
> For Peirce, degeneracy has to do with *relations*. Genuine and
> degenerate 2ns correspond to the two different kinds of *dyadic *
> relations.
>
> CSP: This distinction between two kinds of seconds, which is almost
> involved in the very idea of a second, makes a distinction between two
> kinds of Secondness; namely, the Secondness of genuine seconds, or matters,
> which I call genuine Secondness, and the Secondness in which one of the
> seconds is only a Firstness, which I call degenerate Secondness; so that
> this Secondness really amounts to nothing but this, that a subject, in its
> being a second, has a Firstness, or quality. (CP 1.528; 1903)
>
>
> In Aristotelian terms ...
>
> CSP: ... there are two sorts of connection which do not involve anything
> but Matter and Form; namely, the determination of Matter by Form
> [degenerate], and the blind reaction of Matter with Matter [genuine]. (NEM
> 4:297; 1904)
>
>
> Likewise, as Edwina pointed out, there are three different kinds of
> *triadic *relations (CP 1.365-367). A *genuine *triadic relation *involves
> *dyadic relations, but is not *reducible *to them; a *degenerate *triadic
> relation *is *reducible to its constituent dyadic relations; and a *doubly
> degenerate* triadic relation is *qualitative* in nature. This is
> consistent with Peirce's description of Symbols, Indices, and Icons
> respectively as genuine, degenerate, and doubly degenerate Signs based on
> the nature of their *relations *with their Dynamic Objects (EP
> 2:306-307). With that in mind, I would like to suggest the following for
> consideration and comment.
>
> - Genuine triadic relation - Dynamic Object, Sign (Type), Final
> Interpretant
> - Degenerate triadic relation - Dynamic Object, Sign-Replica (Token),
> Dynamic Interpretant
> - Doubly degenerate triadic relation - Immediate Object, Sign-Quality
> (Tone or Mark), Immediate Interpretant
>
> I have offered the first two characterizations on multiple occasions
> previously, but the third is a new proposal derived from my recent
> hypothesis that a Sign-Quality (Tone or Mark) is a character embodied in a
> Sign-Replica (Token) that facilitates the latter's recognition as an *Instance
> *of the Sign (Type). The words "man" and "man" are two different
> Replicas of the same Sign, and have similar Sign-Qualities because they
> belong to the same Sign System. The words "man" and "homme" are also two
> different Replicas of the same Sign, but have different Sign-Qualities
> because they belong to different Sign Systems.
>
> Being *internal *to a Sign-Replica, a Sign-Quality relates to the Object
> as represented (IO) and the Interpretant as expressed (II), and does so in
> a monadic rather than dyadic way--consistent with Peirce's omission of
> trichotomies for IO-S and S-II in his 1908 taxonomy. As such, a
> Sign-Quality corresponds to the minimal state of *Essential
> *Information--i.e.,
> Sign System Acquaintance, which includes familiarity with non-verbal cues
> like tone of voice and volume. I still need to think through the
> implications of this for the definition of the Immediate Object as distinct
> from the Dynamic Object and all three Interpretants.
>
> I am also starting to wonder if we should likewise differentiate (a) the
> Dynamic Object that *permanently *relates to the Sign (Type) and Final
> Interpretant from (b) the Dynamic Object that relates to the Sign-Replica
> (Token) and Dynamic Interpretant in an *individual *Instance of the
> Sign. For our recurring examples of a weathercock and ripples on a lake,
> perhaps (a) is the direction of the wind *in general*, in accordance with
> the laws of nature (i.e., inveterate habits of matter) that govern their
> behavior at *any *place and time; while (b) is the direction of the wind *here
> and now*, which someone *actually *interprets them to be indicating.
>
> As always, feedback--including well-founded criticism--would be
> appreciated.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Aug 23, 2018 at 3:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Helmut, list
>>
>> Sorry- but I don't see that when Peirce wrote about the degenerate modes,
>> he also used the term 'form'.
>>
>> He refers to 'two distinct grades of Secondness and three grades
>> of Thirdness' [1.365] And refers to s 'degenerate sort' [1.365]
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Thu 23/08/18 3:58 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List,
>>
>> Yes, but when Peirce wrote about degenerateness, he mostly used the term
>> in combination with "form": "Degenerate form" of something. "Form", I would
>> say, is "class". The sign classes is a classification of compositions. I
>> think the topic of classification versus composition, and their mixed
>> forms, is quite complicated. Here is a quote, I dont remember the website I
>> have got it from, in which Peirce is fighting with the distinction between
>> composition and classification (though Peirce had not read Stanley N.
>> Salthe:)
>>
>> CP Principles of Philosophy, III. Phenomenology, 5. Degenerate Cases, 528:
>>
>> "At the same time, it is an idea of which Firstness, Secondness, and
>> Thirdness are component parts, since the distinction depends on whether the
>> two elements of Firstness and Secondness that are united are so united as
>> to be one or whether they remain two. This distinction between two kinds of
>> seconds, which is almost involved in the very idea of a second, makes a
>> distinction between two kinds of Secondness; namely, the Secondness of
>> genuine seconds, or matters, which I call genuine Secondness, and the
>> Secondness in which one of the seconds is only a Firstness, which I call
>> degenerate Secondness; so that this Secondness really amounts to nothing
>> but this, that a subject, in its being a second, has a Firstness, or
>> quality. It is to be remarked that this distinction arose from attending to
>> extreme cases; and consequently subdivision will be attached to it
>> according to the more or less essential or accidental nature of the genuine
>> or the degenerate Secondness."
>>
>> Best, Helmut
>> 23. August 2018 um 20:45 Uhr
>> "Edwina Taborsky"
>> wrote:
>>
>> Helmut, list
>>
>> When I am referring to such terms as genuine Secondness and degenerate
>> Secondness - as I'm sure you know, these are the terms Peirce used to
>> describe these categories. Nothing to do with a natural language
>> understanding of the term 'degenerate'.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Thu 23/08/18 12:16 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List,
>>
>> you know, one of my favourite topics is that of the distinction between
>> classification and composition (following Stanley N. Salthe). In this
>> respect I have come to the conclusion, that degeneration only is a matter
>> of classification, like in the sign classes (I write classification
>> subcategories with an oblique, and composition subcategories with a dot).
>> In classification the first subcategories are: 1/1, 1/2, 1/3, 2/1, 2/2,
>> 2/3, 3/1, 3/2, 3/3. Like the sign classes. But in composition, e.g. S, IO,
>> DO, II, DI, FI, or also in primisense, altersense, medisense, the
>> composition of consciousness, the first subclasses are: 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1,
>> 3.2, 3.3. Because here it is composition, you cannot speak of degeneracy,
>> is my opinion. Parts are not degenerate, only classes may be. A cogwheel is
>> not a degenerate gearbox, but a mule may be seen as a degenerate rodent,
>> because it cannot see very well.
>>
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>> 23. August 2018 um 17:43 Uhr
>> "Edwina Taborsky"
>>
>>
>> John, list
>>
>> Agreed - my point is that the world is more complex than a simple set of
>> two or even three terms. That's why Peirce expanded his categories into
>> their genuine and degenerate modes.
>>
>> I would think that Peirce's top-level would be Mind [pure Mind, 3-3 which
>> is aspatial and atemporal].
>>
>> Then, one would move into spatial and temporal existentialities...of rest
>> of the modes [3-2, 3-1, 2-2, 2-1, 1-1]
>>
>> However - this is an interesting exploration - but, my focus is more on
>> the pragmatic application of Peircean semiosis...ie. what happens when an
>> environmental stress requires a species to adapt its knowledge base and
>> change its mode of existence...
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
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