Gary R., List: GR: Namely, I still have trouble imaging how the Dynamic Object can stand in any genuine triadic relation to the Sign.
I was expecting some pushback on differentiating a *general *Dynamic Object from an *individual *one, especially since I am not yet entirely convinced of it myself. However, I am rather startled by your suggestion that Peirce was *completely wrong* about the Sign (Type), (Dynamic) Object, and (Final) Interpretant being the three correlates of a *genuine *triadic relation. Perhaps I have simply misunderstood your difficulty, but I will attempt to address it anyway. GR: ... in human semiosis, the OD can't really be known in its fullness ... I continue to see the OD as that which *would *be known at the impossible (since asymptotic) conclusion of an "unlimited" inquiry. I completely agree, because *concrete* semiosis only *actually *occurs by means of *individual *Instances of Signs--i.e., *individual *Replicas (Tokens), each of which (I am positing) is in a *degenerate *triadic relation with an *individual *Dynamic Object and an *individual *Dynamic Interpretant. As a result, the state of our knowledge is always that of *Experiential *Information; but knowing the Dynamic Object "in its fullness" would correspond to the *ideal *state of *Substantial *Information, and thus its *genuine *triadic relation to the Sign (Type) and Final Interpretant. GR: I think you have said that you see the OD as itself a Sign. I can't quite see it as such. Neither can I, so you must be recalling someone else's remarks. Sometimes the following passage is interpreted that way. CSP: Every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only be a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a sign or thought. For the sign does not affect the object but is affected by it; so that the object must be able to convey thought, that is, must be of the nature of thought or of a sign. (CP 1.538; 1903) However, I believe instead that the key words here are "in so far as," such that Peirce was hinting at either (a) the Dynamic/Immediate Object distinction, which he started explicitly acknowledging less than a year later; or (b) the general/individual Dynamic Object distinction that I am now suggesting, since "the nature of a sign or thought" is precisely to be general (3ns) rather than individual (2ns). In any case, I would say that *some *Dynamic Objects are Signs (Types) or Sign-Replicas (Tokens), but not necessarily *all*. GR: I don't, in other words, see [the Dynamic Object] in its fullness entering into any given instance of semiosis. It depends on what you mean here by "entering into." The Dynamic Object (in its fullness) determines the Sign (Type) to determine the Final Interpretant in accordance with what *would *be the *infallible *Interpretative Habits of an *infinite *Quasi-mind; this (DO-S-FI) is a *genuine *triadic relation. It *governs *individual Instances of that Sign, in which the Dynamic Object (in certain respects) determines the Sign-Replica (Token) to determine the Dynamic Interpretant in accordance with the *fallible *Interpretative Habits of a *finite* Quasi-mind, as developed through previous Collateral Experience; this (DO-SR-DI) is a *degenerate *triadic relation. It *involves *particular characters, which the Immediate Object determines as the Sign-Qualities (Tones or Marks) that determine the Immediate Interpretant in accordance with a particular Sign System; this (IO-SQ-II) is a *doubly degenerate* triadic relation. At least, that is my current proposal; and again, discerning its implications for the DO/IO distinction requires further contemplation. I also still need to work out whether and how it harmonizes with the *different *sense in which "the Dynamoid [Dynamic] Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate [Final] Interpretant, which determines the Effective [Dynamic] Interpretant, which determines the Explicit [Immediate] Interpretant" (EP 2:481; 1908). According to Peirce, this is the sequential arrangement of the corresponding trichotomies for Sign *classification* in accordance with the principle that "a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (ibid). GR: You are causing me to rethink some of my earlier suppositions which I thought were, at least tentatively and fallibly, more or less settled. It is reassuring to know that I am not alone in being "unsettled" by this experience. Of course, such is the nature of sincere inquiry in a Peircean spirit. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Aug 24, 2018 at 2:44 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list, > > Jon, I suppose I should review your earlier posts on 1. and 2. above but > haven't the time at the moment to search and locate them. While I think I > approved them in my earlier thinking, a constant concern of mine just arose > again. > > Namely, I still have trouble imaging how the Dynamic Object can stand in > any genuine triadic relation to the Sign. While 'it' determines the OI and > while it does this "in the mind," one knows the OD only by collateral > knowledge, that is various experience*s* of it. I am always taken back to > the thought that, at least in human semiosis, the OD can't really be known > in its fullness, that only some 'part' of it can ever be represented in a > Sign (even if that sign were a monograph on the Object) and that that > partial hint or suggestion of the OD *is* the OI. > > 1908 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 83 > > It is usual and proper to distinguish two Objects of a Sign, the Mediate > without, and the Immediate within the Sign. Its Interpretant is all that > the Sign conveys: acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral > experience. The Mediate Object is the Object outside of the Sign; I call > it the *Dynamoid* Object. The Sign must indicate it by a hint; and this > hint, or its substance, is the *Immediate* Object. Each of these two > Objects may be said to be capable of either of the three Modalities, though > in the case of the Immediate Object, this is not quite literally true. > > > The result for me is that while I have no trouble with 3. above, the first > two present unresolved issues in my thinking. > > I think you have said that you see the OD as itself a Sign. I can't quite > see it as such. If it is known through collateral knowledge, which Peirce > says that it is, then even if each of those experiential moment*s* of it > were sign*s*, the OD itself is not a Sign. To me what is known of it by > collateral experience/knowledge *hints* at or *suggests* or *indicates *a > Sign (as Peirce writes) perhaps *prompts* a Sign, or rather, an OI. > > 1908 [c.] | Letters to Lady Welby | MS [R] L463:15 > > As to the Object of a Sign, it is to be observed that the Sign. . .really > is determined by its Object. . . the Sign may be said to pose as a > representative of its Object, that is, suggests an Idea of the Object which > is distinguishable from the Object in its own Being. The former I term the > *Dynamoid > Object* (for I want the word “genuine” to express something different); > the latter the *Immediate Object* (a well-established term of logic.) > Each of these may have either of the three Modalities of Being, the former > in itself, the latter in representation. > > > And even more to my point: > > 1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:498 > > . . . the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign > *cannot* express, which it can only *indicate* and leave the interpreter > to find out by *collateral experience*. > > > Now the nature of the OD in biosemiosis may prove to be less problematic > where it--or at least some part of it--might really function as Object > (collateral knowledge may mean something different in that idioscopic > science, or not not be needed at all). > > What I am finding most valuable about your inquiry, Jon, is that your > various hypotheses are making me reflect more deeply on semiotic matters > which had once seemed settled. You are causing me to rethink some of my > earlier suppositions which I thought were, at least tentatively and > fallibly, more or less settled. > > Meanwhile, I continue to see the OD as that which *would be* known at the > impossible (since asymptotic) conclusion of an "unlimited" inquiry. > > 1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:495 > > As to the Object, that may mean the Object as cognized in the Sign and > therefore an Idea, or it may be the Object as it is regardless of any > particular aspect of it, the Object in such relations as unlimited and > final study would show it to be. The former I call the *Immediate *Object, > the latter the *Dynamical* Object. For the latter is the Object that > Dynamical Science (or what at this day would be called “Objective” science) > can investigate. > > > I don't, in other words, see it in its fullness entering into any given > instance of semiosis. > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690* >
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