Gary R., List: I am going to continue making the case for distinguishing the *General* Object, which is in a *genuine* triadic relation with the Sign (Type) and the Final Interpretant, from the *Dynamic* Object, which is in a *degenerate* triadic relation with the Sign-Replica (Token) and the Dynamic Interpretant. It turns out that Peirce referred explicitly to the notion of a "general object" on a few occasions.
CSP: And do not overlook the fact that the pragmaticist maxim says nothing of single experiments or of single experimental phenomena (for what is conditionally true *in futuro* can hardly be singular), but only speaks of *general kinds* of experimental phenomena. Its adherent does not shrink from speaking of *general objects* as real, since whatever is true represents a real. Now the laws of nature are true. (CP 5.426, EP 2:340; 1905, bold added) This seems consistent with my previous suggestion that a set of ripples on a lake or a weathercock is properly understood as a Sign-Replica (Token) whose *Dynamic* Object is the wind direction *here and now*; while the corresponding Sign (Type) has as its *General* Object the laws of nature that enable it to indicate the wind direction *at any place and time*. CSP: … thought, controlled by a rational experimental logic, tends to the fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of which will be the same in the end, however the perversity of thought of whole generations may cause the postponement of the ultimate fixation. If this be so, as every man of us virtually assumes that it is, in regard to each matter the truth of which he seriously discusses, then, according to the adopted definition of "real," the state of things which will be believed in that ultimate opinion is real. But, for the most part, such opinions will be general. Consequently, *some* *general objects* are real. (CP 5.430, EP 2:342-343; 1905, bold added) This implies that the "ultimate opinion"--i.e., what *would* be the Final (Destinate) Interpretant of all Signs, if they *were* to be connected together to constitute "the ideal sign which should be quite perfect" (EP 2:304; 1904) at the end of infinite inquiry by an infinite community--has, at least "for the most part," an Object that is *general*. CSP: What is the nature of all these relations [between different points in space] as well as those of time? They all result from complications of only two elements. One of these is the relation of a distributively *general object*, "any" something, to the single individual collection which embraces "any" such, and nothing else. The other is the relation of geometrical *betweenness* … (EP 2:368; 1906, bold added) Here we have a *General* Object differentiated from the individual collection of its members; i.e., the *Dynamic* Object. Moreover, as I pointed out previously, Peirce sometimes characterized the General Object of a Sign (Type) as a "universe," whether a discrete collection or a continuum. In fact, there is a sense in which the General Object of *every* Sign--or at least, of every *proposition*--is *the* Universe that corresponds to "the Truth." CSP: The logic of relatives furnishes the solution, by showing that propositions usually have several subjects, that one of these subjects is the so-called Universe of Discourse, that as a general rule a proposition refers to several Universes of Discourse, the chief of which are Singulars, and that all propositions whatsoever refer to one common universe,--the Universal Universe or aggregate of all Singulars, which in ordinary language we denominate the Truth. (EP 2:168; 1903) However, any Replica (Token) of a Sign (Type) can only refer to some *portion* of this "Universal Universe." CSP: As an example of a symbol of this character, we may rather take the symbol which is expressed in words as "the Truth," or "Universe of Being." Every symbol whatever must denote what this symbol denotes; so that any symbol considered as denoting the Truth necessarily denotes that which it denotes; and in denoting it, it is that very thing, or a fragment of it taken for the whole. It is the whole taken so far as it need be taken for the purpose of denotation; for denotation essentially takes a part for its whole. (EP 2:322; 1904) CSP: Indeed, all propositions refer to one and the same determinately singular subject, well-understood between all utterers and interpreters; namely, to The Truth, which is the universe of all universes, and is assumed on all hands to be real. But besides that, there is some lesser environment of the utterer and interpreter of each proposition that actually gets conveyed, to which that proposition more particularly refers and which is not general. (CP 5.506; c. 1905) Again, this denoted "fragment" or "lesser environment … which is not general" is the *Dynamic* Object; and quantification is the means by which a proposition distinguishes it from the *General *Object. Regards, Jon S. On Wed, Aug 29, 2018 at 2:20 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > I have continued to think about all of this over the last several days, > pulling together a bunch of passages from Peirce's writings that seem > relevant. Hopefully there will be more to come from that exercise in the > near future, but here are some initial responses for the time being. > > GR: I think differentiating a general from an individual DO is quite > intriguing although I'm far from convinced of this presumptive > differentiation. > > > It is basically the distinction between a Collective and a Concretive in > Peirce's 1908 taxonomy; a Sign (Type) must have an Object that is a > Necessitant, while a Sign-Replica (Token) can have an Object that is an > Existent. However, Peirce generally reserved the adjective "dynamic" for > Existents, so it seems like only an *individual *Sign-Replica--i.e., an > *Instance > *of the Sign--would have a *Dynamic *Object to go along with its *Dynamic > *Interpretant. He sometimes hinted at this with specific reference to > Symbols, which of course are always Types. > > CSP: A symbol, as we have seen, cannot indicate any particular thing; it > denotes a kind of thing. (CP 2.301, EP 2:9; 1894) > > CSP: Every subject, when it is directly indicated, as *humanity* and > *mortality* are, is singular. Otherwise, a precept, which may be called > its *quantifier*, prescribes how it is to be chosen out of a collection, > called its *universe* … The universe of a logical subject has always > hitherto been assumed to be a discrete collection, so that the subject is > an *individual* object or occasion. But in truth a universe may be > continuous ... (CP 2.339; c. 1895) > > CSP: Thus, while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its > meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must *denote* an individual, and > must *signify* a character. (CP 2.293, EP 2:275; 1903) > > > The "complete object" of a general Sign (Type) is "a kind of thing," > rather than "any particular thing"; a "universe," whether "a discrete > collection" or "continuous," rather than something "singular"; and "of > the nature of a law," even though each of its Replicas "must denote an > individual." Peirce suggested that we use quantifiers to convert a Sign's > *general > *Object to its Replica's *Dynamic *Object, and--as Francesco Bellucci > points out in his recent book, *Peirce's Speculative Grammar*--often > associated such quantification with the *Immediate *Object. More on that > below. > > GR: Yet (a) above (an OD which "permanently" relates to the Sign type), > seems to me problematic in that. when the weather vane is functioning in > accordance with its purpose, that it concerns the direction of the wind > here and now, and some actual interpreter of it. > > > How is that different from any other Sign (Type) vs. one of its Replicas > (Token)? When a *general *term (e.g., "vase") is functioning (in a > Replica) in accordance with its purpose, it often likewise concerns an > *individual > *state of affairs here and now (*this *vase), and some actual interpreter > of it. > > GR: Perhaps my 'problem' was that the IF (and its correlates) is *so > very abstract* in my thinking that it's hard for me to imagine what the > complete development of the meaning of a OD could possibly be. > > > I take it to be what Peirce described in "New Elements" as the Entelechy > of semiosis; "the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite > perfect, and so identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the > very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it" (EP 2:304; > 1904). > > CSP: The Final Interpretant does not consist in the way in which any mind > does act but in the way in which every mind would act. CP 8.315, 1909. > > GR: This seems to me to indicate a 'would-be' very different from all > others I can imagine. > > > It *is *different in the sense that it corresponds to the *ideal *state > of Substantial Information--basically, *omniscience* (cf. CP 4.65; > 1893). Every mind *would *act that way, if every mind knew *everything* that > there is to know, and thus had *infallible *Interpretative Habits. It is > what Peirce elsewhere described as the final opinion of an infinite > community after infinite inquiry. > > GR: But later you write: "In any case, I would say that *some Dynamic > Objects are Signs (Types) or Sign-Replicas (Tokens)*, but not necessarily > *all*" (emphasis added). It seems to me that if I interpret you > correctly that you are contradicting your earlier comment. > > > Which earlier comment of mine does this seem to you to be contradicting? > I guess a better way to say what I intended here is that Signs and > Sign-Replicas *can *serve as Dynamic Objects for other Signs--after all, > we would not be able to talk *about *Signs or Sign-Replicas if they could > not serve as the Dynamic Objects of the Signs and Sign-Replicas that we use > when doing so--but the Dynamic Object of the word "rock" (for example) is > ordinarily *not *a Sign or Sign-Replica. As Kelly Parker put it in *The > Continuity of Peirce's Thought*, "Peirce held that there are existent > things, characterized predominantly by Secondness, independent of semiosis > ... Independent existence, then, is hypothesized as the dynamical object of > certain representations ... we must suppose that there is some determinate > truth about it which would be revealed as the final interpretant of a > perfect representation of that object" (p. 220). > > GR: For now I'm still mainly concerned with how the OD determines the OI > in accordance with Peirce's non-causal definition of "determines." > > > For the sake of clarity, how would you express that "non-causal > definition" of "determines" in this context? > > > As mentioned above, perhaps one aspect is constraining a Sign-Replica > (Token) to identify its Dynamic Object as an *individual *member or > subset of the collective or continuous universe that serves as the *general > *Object of the Sign (Type) that it instantiates. Another might be that > the Sign-Replica's *meaning *within a Sign System (Immediate Interpretant > = Essential Depth) must correspond to a non-exhaustive set of characters > that the Dynamic Object *actually possesses*, which is sufficient to *denote > *it accordingly (Immediate Object = Essential Breadth). Collateral > Experience would then be the Informed Breadth that corresponds to a > particular Quasi-mind's Informed Depth--the aggregate of previous Dynamic > Interpretants to which the same Dynamic Object has already determined that > Quasi-mind by means of other Sign-Replicas. > > > See attached for a summary of where I am tentatively headed at this point. > > > Thanks, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, Aug 28, 2018 at 5:55 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, list, >> >> JAS: I was expecting some pushback on differentiating a *general *Dynamic >> Object from an *individual *one, especially since I am not yet entirely >> convinced of it myself. >> >> >> I think differentiating a general from an individual DO is quite >> intriguing although I'm far from convinced of this presumptive >> differentiation. You'd offered this notion in an earlier post. . . >> >> >> JAS: I am also starting to wonder if we should likewise differentiate (a) >> the Dynamic Object that *permanently *relates to the Sign (Type) and >> Final Interpretant from (b) the Dynamic Object that relates to the >> Sign-Replica (Token) and Dynamic Interpretant in an *individual *Instance >> of the Sign. >> >> >> . . . then offered "our recurring examples of a weathercock and ripples >> on a lake," the former as the general OD "that permanently relates to the >> Sign (Type)" and IF, and the latter "that relates to the Sign-Replica >> (Token)" and ID in a single instance of the sign. >> >> JAS: For our recurring examples of a weathercock and ripples on a lake, >> perhaps (a) is the direction of the wind *in general*, in accordance >> with the laws of nature (i.e., inveterate habits of matter) that govern >> their behavior at *any *place and time; while (b) is the direction of >> the wind *here and now*, which someone *actually *interprets them to be >> indicating. >> >> >> Yet (a) above (an OD which "permanently" relates to the Sign type), seems >> to me problematic in that. when the weather vane is functioning in >> accordance with its purpose, that it concerns the direction of the wind *here >> and now*, and some *actual interpreter* of it. But I'm still reflecting >> on this notion (perhaps recalling the examples of these two different sign >> classes in the 1904 Classification of Signs: Sign II, "An individual >> diagram" and Sign V, "A diagram, apart from its factual individuality." (Of >> course I'm not suggesting a direct parallel here, but that some additional >> "minute" analysis may be in order.) >> >> You continued: >> >> JAS: However, I am rather startled by your suggestion that Peirce was >> *completely >> wrong* about the Sign (Type), (Dynamic) Object, and (Final) Interpretant >> being the three correlates of a *genuine *triadic relation. Perhaps I >> have simply misunderstood your difficulty, but I will attempt to address it >> anyway. >> >> >> I am much more comfortable with this formulation now. Perhaps my >> 'problem' was that the IF (and its correlates) is *so very abstract* in >> my thinking that it's hard for me to imagine what the complete development >> of the meaning of a OD could possibly be. Take this snippet: >> >> The Final Interpretant does not consist in the way in which any mind does >> act but in the way in which every mind would act. CP 8.315, 1909. >> >> This seems to me to indicate a 'would-be' >> very different >> from >> all others I can imagine. Be that as it may, after quoting me. . . >> >> GR: ... in human semiosis, the OD can't really be known in its fullness >> ... I continue to see the OD as that which *would *be known at the >> impossible (since asymptotic) conclusion of an "unlimited" inquiry. >> >> . . .you continued: >> >> JAS: I completely agree, because *concrete* semiosis only *actually *occurs >> by means of *individual *Instances of Signs--i.e., *individual *Replicas >> (Tokens), each of which (I am positing) is in a *degenerate *triadic >> relation with an *individual *Dynamic Object and an *individual *Dynamic >> Interpretant. As a result, the state of our knowledge is always that of >> *Experiential *Information; but knowing the Dynamic Object "in its >> fullness" would correspond to the *ideal *state of *Substantial *Information, >> and thus its *genuine *triadic relation to the Sign (Type) and Final >> Interpretant. >> >> >> I'm beginning to see your point in emphasizing an *individual *OD and >> and *individual* ID here and am tending to strongly agree with you. But, >> again, I have trouble conceiving of "the ideal state of Substantial >> Information" which the the OD would represent in that putative absolutely >> final genuine triadic relation. >> >> We may also be in agreement that the OD is itself *not* a Sign for, as >> you wrote: >> >> GR: I continue to see the OD as that which *would *be known at the >> impossible (since asymptotic) conclusion of an "unlimited" inquiry. >> >> >> JAS: I completely agree, because *concrete* semiosis only *actually *occurs >> by means of *individual *Instances of Signs. . . As a result, the state >> of our knowledge is always that of *Experiential *Information; but >> knowing the Dynamic Object "in its fullness" would correspond to the >> *ideal *state of *Substantial *Information, and thus its *genuine *triadic >> relation to the Sign (Type) and Final Interpretant. >> >> >> But later you write: "In any case, I would say that *some Dynamic >> Objects are Signs (Types) or Sign-Replicas (Tokens)*, but not >> necessarily *all*" (emphasis added). It seems to me that if I interpret >> you correctly that you are contradicting your earlier comment. Still, you >> had written: >> >> JAS: Sometimes the following passage is interpreted ][to mean that the OD >> is itself a Sign >> . >> >> CSP: Every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can >> only be a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself of the >> nature of a sign or thought. For the sign does not affect the object but is >> affected by it; so that the object must be able to convey thought, that is, >> must be of the nature of thought or of a sign. (CP 1.538; 1903) >> >> >> And commented: >> >> JAS: However, I believe instead that the key words here are "in so far >> as," such that Peirce was hinting at either (a) the Dynamic/Immediate >> Object distinction, which he started explicitly acknowledging less than a >> year later; or (b) the general/individual Dynamic Object distinction that I >> am now suggesting, since "the nature of a sign or thought" is precisely to >> be general (3ns) rather than individual (2ns). In any case, I would say >> that *some *Dynamic Objects are Signs (Types) or Sign-Replicas (Tokens), >> but not necessarily *all*. >> >> >> I too think that "the key words here are 'in so far as'," but believe >> that, since the nature of sign is to be general, and since the OI must >> represent *something* of the perhaps near infinite characters and >> indexical features (so to speak) of the OD, that it is in *this* way >> that the OD will be "itself of the nature of a sign or thought." So, >> again, I would tend to disagree with you "that *some *Dynamic Objects >> are Signs (Types) or Sign-Replicas (Tokens)." You quote me and then >> wrote: >> >> GR: I don't, in other words, see [the Dynamic Object] in its fullness >> entering into any given instance of semiosis. >> >> >> JAS: It depends on what you mean here by "entering into." The Dynamic >> Object (in its fullness) determines the Sign (Type) to determine the >> Final Interpretant in accordance with what *would *be the *infallible >> *Interpretative >> Habits of an *infinite *Quasi-mind; this (DO-S-FI) is a *genuine *triadic >> relation. >> >> >> I would tend to agree with you re: (OD-S-IF). You continued. >> >> JAS: It (do you mean by 'it' the OD as it is typically considered, or >> the OD "in its fullness"? GR) *governs *individual Instances of that >> Sign, in which the Dynamic Object (in certain respects) determines the >> Sign-Replica (Token) to determine the Dynamic Interpretant in accordance >> with the *fallible *Interpretative Habits of a *finite* Quasi-mind, as >> developed through previous Collateral Experience; this (DO-SR-DI) is a >> *degenerate *triadic relation. It *involves *particular characters, >> which the Immediate Object determines as the Sign-Qualities (Tones or >> Marks) that determine the Immediate Interpretant in accordance with a >> particular Sign System; this (IO-SQ-II) is a *doubly degenerate* triadic >> relation. >> >> >> The key words for me here are "in certain respects" and "involves >> particular characters" such that "the Immediate Object determines as the >> Sign-Qualities (Tones or Marks) that determine the Immediate Interpretant >> in accordance with a particular Sign System." Yet none of this suggests to >> me that in human semiosis that the OD is itself a Sign. So, yes: >> >> JAS: . . .discerning its implications for the DO/IO distinction requires >> further contemplation. I also still need to work out whether and how it >> harmonizes with the *different *sense in which "the Dynamoid [Dynamic] >> Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, >> which determines the Destinate [Final] Interpretant, which determines the >> Effective [Dynamic] Interpretant, which determines the Explicit [Immediate] >> Interpretant" (EP 2:481; 1908). According to Peirce, this is the >> sequential arrangement of the corresponding trichotomies for Sign >> *classification* in accordance with the principle that "a Possible can >> determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by >> nothing but a Necessitant" (ibid). >> >> >> For now I'm still mainly concerned with how the OD determines the OI in >> accordance with Peirce's non-causal definition of "determines." The better >> I understand that part of the 'equation' the more I should be able to >> follow your, for me, very interesting and quite valuable inquiry. Of course >> I wish--as I know you do--that others on the list would offer feedback and >> well-considered criticism. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *718 482-5690* >> >
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