Welcome Francesco; dear list,
You said: The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. *The problem is already here*. Would you mind clarifying, please? What’s the problem again and what rules? Thanks, With best wishes, Jerry R On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Francesco, list > > Thanks for your very clear outline of the term of 'general' as used by > Peirce. > > One thing to note, in my view, is that at no time does Peirce move away > from using this term as embedded within the semiosic process. That is, the > term 'general' refers to that which is referred to by a symbol; by a > legisign; and by a full sentence. This pragmatic embedded nature suggests > that the term cannot be set up to operate as a pure intellectual construct, > akin to a Platonic Form. > > Edwina > > > > On Wed 05/09/18 2:57 AM , Francesco Bellucci > [email protected] sent: > > Jon, Gary, List > > thanks for your replies. > > As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general" in > at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices, which > have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves (as > types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally quantified sentences are > also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively general" his preferred > term). > > GR: May I ask just one question for now: In light of the several > quotations which Jon offered (in another thread which you may not have had > occasion to read) [...] [w]hy do write that the notion of a general > object appears to you as "very unPeircean"? > > > At CP 5.426 and 5.430 Peirce say general objects are real. It's the object > of a symbol which is real. "Man" is a symbol, its object is whatever > possesses the characters of men. Since, according to Peirce, generals are > real, the object of a symbol is real. At EP 2, p. 368 "general object" is > used in another sense: "distributively general object" means the > universal quantifier: "any man ....". That's why the notion of a general > object (as opposed to immediate and dynamic, and not as a species of the > immediate) looks very unPeircean to me: if we mean the object of a symbol, > it's the dynamic object which is general; if we mean the object of a > universally quantified sentence, it's the immediate object that is general; > if we mean a legisign, it's the sign, not the object, that is general. I > don't see what other uses of "general object" are relevant or needed in the > interpretation of Peirce. > > > JAS: I am afraid that I am not following the argument here. As I already > quoted Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is not equivalent to > "universally quantified"; both universal ("All men are mortal") and > particular ("Some men are mortal") propositions are general, as opposed > to singular ("This man is mortal"). Moreover, any common noun, such as > "man," is a general Rheme ("_____ is a man," cf. EP 2:309-310; 1904) > despite not being quantified at all; and it does have an Immediate > Object, which is whatever possesses the set of characters that corresponds > to its definition--i.e., its Immediate Interpretant. Quantification > only comes into play when this general Rheme is employed in a proposition. > > > The first point is easily answerable. In those contexts (such as CP > 2.324) in which "general" includes universal and existental and is > opposed to singular, Peirce most often uses the term "indefinite". Cf. e.g. > R 9, pp. 2–3. But in most contexts, when general is opposed to vague and > singular, it means "distributively general". That the sense in which > "general" is used in the division of signs according to the immediate > object is "distributively general" is clear from R 339, p. 253 and R 284, > p. 67 > > > According to the Immediate Object (how represented) > Indefinite Sign > Singular Sign > Distributively General Sign (R 339, p. 253) > > General Sign. The sign represents its Immediate Object in the logically > formal character of the Tertian, which is Distributive Generality. (R > 284, p. 67) > > Second, I perfectly agree that any common noun, such as "man" or the rheme > "---is a man"; is general: but in the sense of being a symbol, i.e. a sign > whose object is, as Jon justly says, whatever possesses the set of > characters that corresponds to its definition. But the general object of a > symbol, i.e. the object that possesses the set of characters that > corresponds to the symbol's definition, is the dynamic, not the immediate > object. For icon/index/symbol is a division according to the dynamic, not > the immediate object. > > Suppose that the object of "---is a man", i.e. the object that possesses > the set of characters that corresponds to its definition, is the immediate > object. What it is that possesses the set of characters that corresponds to > the definition of man? Of course, every really existing man, as well as > those existed and those that will exist. If this is the immediate object of > the rheme "--is a man", what's its dynamic object? > > Another example. Take the sign "Napoleon is lethargic". It contains a > proper name, "Napoleon", which refers to the real Napoleon, the historical > figure. Peirce says that a sentence's subject, i.e. the proper name, is its > "object" (he says so in very many places). What object? Should we say that > the proper name "Napoleon" is the dynamic object of the sign? But then what > is the historical figure? the immediate object, perhaps? Or should we say > that the historical figure is the dynamic object? But then, Peirce's claim > that the subject of a sentence is its "object" could only mean that it is > its immediate object. You see, as soon as one wonders what the difference > between the real object outside the sign and the "subject" of the sign is, > one is obliged to distinguish two kinds of objects, one dynamic the other > immediate: > > “The Mediate Object is the Object outside of the Sign; I call it the > Dynamoid Object. The Sign must indicate it by a hint; and this hint, or > its substance, is the Immediate Object” (SS 83). > > The historical figure of Napoleon is outside the sign "Napoleon is > lethargic". Its being and its characters do not depend on what the sign > says of it. But the sign, besides saying something about it (that it is > lethargic), indicates it, by means of a proper name. And this hint, this > proper name, is the immediate object. > > Now take that the sign "Napoleon is lethargic" and remove from it its > subject. You get the rheme "--- is lethargic". This rheme has no hint by > which its object is indicated, i.e. has no immediate object. We could, of > course, restore the indication, e.g. indicating an object of this sign > indefinitely, i.e. either vagually or generally: "someone is lethargic" or > "everything is lethargic". > > Best > Francesco > > On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:37 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Francesco, List: >> >> FB: If rhemes have an immediate object, then according to Peirce's >> taxonomies of 1904-1906 "all men" must be a rheme, because signs with >> immediate objects may be general (universally quantified). But "all men" is >> not a rheme; therefore, rhemes do not have immediate objects. >> >> >> I am afraid that I am not following the argument here. As I already >> quoted Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is not equivalent to >> "universally quantified"; both universal ("All men are mortal") and >> particular ("Some men are mortal") propositions are general, as opposed >> to singular ("This man is mortal"). Moreover, any common noun, such as >> "man," is a general Rheme ("_____ is a man," cf. EP 2:309-310; 1904) >> despite not being quantified at all; and it does have an Immediate >> Object, which is whatever possesses the set of characters that corresponds >> to its definition--i.e., its Immediate Interpretant. Quantification only >> comes into play when this general Rheme is employed in a proposition. >> >> In other words, the conclusion that I draw from Peirce's 1904-1906 >> division of the Immediate Object into vague/singular/general is not that only >> propositions have Immediate Objects, but that the Immediate Object of a >> proposition includes the quantification of its general subject(s). >> Nevertheless, I think that his application of this particular trichotomy to >> propositions is problematic--even when revised to >> Descriptive/Designative/Copulative in 1908; more on that soon. >> >> FB: I must say I do not understand the discussion of "general object". >> >> >> Rather than repeating myself, I will respectfully request that you >> consider reading through the other current List thread on "The nature of >> the Dynamic Object" in its entirety, if you have not done so already; >> perhaps beginning with the only post in its predecessor thread ( >> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2018-08/msg00342.html). >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 3:45 PM, Francesco Bellucci < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Dear Jon, List >>> >>> Thanks for your response. Here some further thoughts. >>> >>> You will agree that the notion of immediate object as a technical notion >>> of semiotics emerges in 1904, that it emerges in the classification of >>> signs, and that its purpose in the classification of signs up to 1906 is to >>> divide signs into vague, singular, and general. You will also agree that in >>> that context, as well as in other writings of the same year (Kaina >>> Stoicheia, MSS 4-11), singular means existentially quantified and general >>> means universally quantified (distributively general). I see that you also >>> agree that "all men" is not a rheme. Let's proceed from here. >>> >>> If rhemes have an immediate object, then according to Peirce's >>> taxonomies of 1904-1906 "all men" must be a rheme, because signs with >>> immediate objects may be general (universally quantified). But "all men" is >>> not a rheme; therefore, rhemes do not have immediate objects. >>> >>> I must say I do not understand the discussion of "general object". As >>> far as I know, symbols have a general object (indices an individual >>> object), legisigns are general in themselves (as types) and universally >>> quantified sentences are also said to be "general" by Peirce >>> ("distributively general" his preferred term). Talk of "general objects" >>> besides the dynamic and the immediate sounds to me very unPeircean. >>> >>> Best >>> Francesco >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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