Jeff, Francesco, List: JD: My understanding is that the sign and not the immediate object that is being classified as a vague, singular or general.
I agree; what I should have said was, "Consistent with his earlier division of Signs according to the Immediate Object into vague/singular/general ..." FB: I think it is clear that the immediate object is an indication, and does not "describe" or "predicate" anything of the object (unlike what Jon, in a previous post, has suggested: "the object's characters/qualities which, taken together, constitute its Immediate Object"). I agree; again, my view of the Immediate Object has evolved since I made that comment a couple of months ago. I currently see it as whatever possesses the characters/qualities predicated by the Immediate Interpretant, in accordance with the definitions of the Sign System (Essential Information). JD: Do you have any suggestions for how we might understand this triadic production of the proper effect of the sign? As you might guess, my suggestion is that what Peirce meant by "the intended, or proper, effect of the sign" in that particular passage was the *Immediate *Interpretant; especially since later in the same paragraph he described the Interpretant that he had in mind as "all that is *explicit in the sign itself* apart from its context and circumstances of utterance" (CP 5.473; 1907, bold added). "Triadic production" in this case would then correspond to what I have posited as the *doubly degenerate* triadic relation between the Immediate Object, the Sign-Qualities (Tones) that facilitate recognition of the Sign-Replica (Token) as an Instance of the Sign (Type) within a given Sign System, and the Immediate Interpretant. JD: What, do you think, is the connection between the role of the immediate object that stands in the triadic relation described at 5.473 and the triadic relation of assurance that is part and parcel of inferential processes (e.g., of thought)? Let me respond to this question by posing another question--what should we identify as the Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant of an Argument? JD: What can we learn from the existential graphs and phenomenology about ... the role of the immediate object ... ? My (admittedly limited) understanding of Existential Graphs is that they can only represent Symbols, although as always those may *involve *Indices and/or Icons. Therefore, any Signs scribed on the Phemic Sheet are Copulants. On the other hand, Peirce's tentative 1908 division of Signs according to the Mode of Presentation of the Immediate *Interpretant *was Hypothetic/Categorical/Relative. Like vague/singular/general, these terms ordinarily name different kinds of *propositions*; and in the EGs, they are distinguished by how many lines of identity are required to represent them--zero for hypothetical, one for categorical, and more than one for relative. Does this shed any light on the nature and role of the Immediate Interpretant? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 2:50 PM, Francesco Bellucci < bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote: > Jeff, List > > thanks for your comments. Further thoughts are interspersed: > >> My understanding is that the *sign *and not the *immediate object* that >> is being classified as a vague, singular or general. The classification is >> based on the immediate object having the character of a presentation that >> is a possible, existent or necessitant. In the case of the immediate >> object, things are somewhat more complicated than in the case of, say, the >> classification of signs based on the nature of the dynamical object. The >> reason, of course, is that the immediate object is, in some sense, a part >> of or an aspect of the sign. >> > Right, it's the sign that is vague, singular, or general. Of course, we > should take notice of Peirce's caveat "in the same respect"(R 9, pp. 2–3). > The multiple quantified sign "Every catholic adores some woman" is general > with respect to catholics and vague with respect to women. > >> Having said that, I am supposing that the immediate object serves a >> particular function in its relation to the sign and interpretant. Peirce >> suggests at CP 8.314 where he offers the example of a conversation he had >> with Juliette about the weather that the immediate object serves the >> function of conveying the "notion of the present weather so far as this >> is common to her mind and mine -- not the character of it, but the identity >> of it." There are two interesting suggestions here. One that the >> immediate object seems to serve as a mark of the identity of the object >> under discussion. The second suggestion is that the immediate object can be >> something that is held in common by two people who are part of a dialogue. >> > I think it is clear that the immediate object is an indication, and does > not "describe" or "predicate" anything of the object (unlike what Jon, in a > previous post, has suggested: "the object's characters/qualities which, > taken together, constitute its Immediate Object"). And since it is an > indication, it is something that utterer and interpreter must share: so if > I say "Napoleon is lethargic" I presume that you know what the proper name > "Napoleon" designes. The same is true of the quantifiers: if I say > "everything is lethargic" I presume that you understand what universe of > discourse the variable may range in. > >> What other functions does the immediate object serve? At CP 5.473, he >> says that "a mental representation of the index is produced, which >> mental representation is called the *immediate object *of the sign; and >> this object does triadically produce the intended, or proper, effect of the >> sign strictly by means of another mental sign;..." One thing that >> strikes me about this passage is that it is the immediate object and not, >> apparently, the dynamical object, that has a role in triadically producing >> the proper effect of the sign. Do you have any suggestions for how we might >> understand this triadic production of the proper effect of the sign? >> > No suggestion, this passage is obscure to me. > >> In the late classification of signs, Peirce characterizes the assurance >> in the relationship between the object, sign and interpretant in terms of a >> triadic relation. He indicates that the sign is classified in terms of an >> assurance of instinct where the inference is abductive, experience where >> the inference is inductive, or form where the inference is deductive. What, >> do you think, is the connection between the role of the immediate object >> that stands in the triadic relation described at 5.473 and the triadic >> relation of assurance that is part and parcel of inferential processes >> (e.g., of thought)? >> > No idea. I only note that the "triadic" description of the three forms of > inference in that context is probably meant to signalize that the "perfect" > (i.e. perfectly triadic) sign-relation is only found in arguments. > > Best > F > >> Following the suggestion that John Sowa has made, I think that an appeal >> to Peirce's work in formal logic--especially the later work on the >> existential graphs--might provide us with useful tools for making a more >> minute analysis of examples. What is more, I think that the application of >> such formal tools would be considerably aided if we also employed the tools >> of phenomenological analysis when looking at particular cases of >> inference--such as when we are looking at the role of the immediate object >> in Peirce's discussion with Juliette about the weather. What can we learn >> from the existential graphs and phenomenology about the dialogue that is >> taking place between the two--and the role of the immediate object in >> explaining what it is being conveyed as the conversation progresses from >> Juliette's question to Peirce's reply to the decisions she makes about how >> to prepare for her day? >> >> Yours, >> >> Jeff >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 >> >
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