Dear Francesco, list:
In London, a person gets mugged every ten minutes.
And he’s getting mighty sick of it!
Why is this joke funny?
~Katy Sarah Jones,
Towards an understanding of the use of indefinite expressions for definite
reference in English discourse
With best wishes,
Jerry R
On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 3:41 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
> Now I understand better wath Jon meant with the following
>
> JAS: the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
> for classifying Signs.
>
> He meant that the fact that an object is general does not imply that the
> sign is a symbol. If with "general" it is meant "whatever possesses certain
> characters", this is obviosuly and patently false:
>
> CSP: "There are three kinds of representamens, or signs: icons, or images;
> indices; and symbols, or general signs" (R 492, 1903)
>
> CSP: "All general, or definable, Words, whether in the sense of Types or
> of Tokens, are certainly Symbols. That is to say, they denote the objects
> that they do by virtue only of there being a habit that associates their
> signification with them." (Prolegomena, 1906)
>
> "Deduction involves the analysis of the meanings of general signs, i.e. of
> symbols", CSP to F. A. Woods, R L 477 (1913).
>
> Best
> Francesco
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 10:26 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List
>>>
>>> JAS: As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose
>>> Object is also an Object of the proposition. Should we understand the
>>> Immediate Object of a proposition to be a Sign?
>>>
>>
>> If one agrees that the subject of a proposition is its imemdiate object,
>> of course yes, the immediate object of the proposition is a sign (usually,
>> a rhematic index).
>>
>>>
>>> FB: The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a
>>> Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The
>>> problem is already here.
>>>
>>>
>>> JAS: The second sentence here is true, but the first sentence is false;
>>> the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
>>> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
>>> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
>>> for classifying Signs. A Collective Actisign Icon is perfectly consistent
>>> with Peirce's later taxonomies.
>>>
>>
>> Is the generality of the object itself still a fourth kind of generality?
>> Where does Peirce speaks of a general dynamic object in itself? As I see
>> it, when a sign has a general dynamic object, that sign is a symbol.
>> Talking of abstractive, concretive and collective in this context only
>> confuses things I think. Unless you use "general" in the sense of
>> "necessitant" (see below).
>>
>> Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent would mean
>> that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, which Peirce
>> was far from having done. I guess many of your comments depend on such
>> ordering, but since Peirce did not provide a definitive ordering, I wonder
>> whether we are going beyond exegesis.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> JAS: he thus classified a particular proposition ("Some *S* is *P*") as
>>> a Descriptive Symbol, which is *impossible*; all Symbols, and therefore
>>> all propositions, are Copulatives. Even if we treat it as a
>>> Sinsign/Actisign serving as a Replica, it could only be either a
>>> Designative or a Copulative.
>>>
>>
>> In order for a descriptive symbol to be impossible, the trichotomy
>> descriptives, designative, and copulants has to precede in order the
>> trichotomy icon, index, symbol. Do you have any evidence that Peirce
>> established such ordering?
>>
>> Also, and more importantly, you say that "all Symbols, and therefore all
>> propositions, are Copulatives". Leaving aside whether it is true that they
>> are copulatives. From your use of "therefore" I infer that you think that
>> propositions can only be symbolic. Do you exclude the possibility of
>> indexical propositions?
>>
>>
>>>
>>> FB: Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in
>>> the sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive
>>> generality, or in neither sense.
>>>
>>>
>>> JAS: By "General Object" I mean basically what Peirce called the Dynamic
>>> Object of a Collective Sign.
>>>
>>
>> Peirce says "For a Sign whose Dynamoid Object is a Necessitant, I have at
>> present no better designation than a Collective" (EP 2: 480). Are you using
>> general in the sense of necessitant? And if yes, what's the purpose of
>> doing this, given that three other kinds of semiotic generality are around?
>>
>> Francesco
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:14 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
>>> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon, List
>>>>
>>>> thanks for these observations. My comments are interspersed below.
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Francesco, List:
>>>>>
>>>>> I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to
>>>>> move on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the
>>>>> Immediate Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the
>>>>> latter.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate
>>>> object intended as the subject of a proposition
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into
>>>>> vague/singular/general, Peirce in 1908 explicitly characterized particular
>>>>> and universal propositions as Descriptives and Copulatives, respectively,
>>>>> while discussing the example of the many statues of Civil War soldiers
>>>>> that
>>>>> one could find throughout the northern United States in the early 20th
>>>>> century.
>>>>>
>>>>> CSP: That statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign. Yet it
>>>>> is what we call a "General" sign, meaning that it is *applicable *to
>>>>> many singulars. It is not *itself* General: it is its Object which is
>>>>> taken to be General. And yet this Object is not truly Universal, in the
>>>>> sense of implying a truth of the kind of "Any *S* is *P*"; it only
>>>>> expresses "Some *S* is *P*." This makes it *not *a //*Copulant*/
>>>>> *Copulative*// but only a *Descriptive*. (EP 2:486)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> As an actual piece of granite, the statue is obviously an Actisign;
>>>>> i.e., an individual Instance (Token) of a general Sign (Type). Peirce
>>>>> here
>>>>> further classified it as a Descriptive, because he held that the
>>>>> equivalent
>>>>> proposition would be particular, rather than singular or universal;
>>>>> presumably "*S*" corresponds to "Civil War soldier" and "*P*" to "a
>>>>> person who looked like this." However, that conflicts with what he went
>>>>> on
>>>>> to say later in the very same manuscript.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a
>>>> Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The
>>>> problem is already here. Perhaps the solution is that a Symbol cannot be a
>>>> "normal" Actisign but it can be an Actisign which is a replica of a
>>>> Famisign. The distinction between standard Sinsigns and Replicas comes from
>>>> the Syllabus.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> CSP: But an Actual Occurrence always determines the Possibility of
>>>>> its character; whence no Descriptive can be a Famisign ... As an example
>>>>> of
>>>>> this, no number of Descriptive propositions of the type "Some *S* is
>>>>> *P*" can ever determine the truth of a Copulative Proposition "Any *S*
>>>>> is *P*." It is, if possible, still more obvious that Possibility can
>>>>> never determine Actuality and therefore *a Descriptive cannot be an
>>>>> Actisign* ... (EP 2:488; bold added)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I am a strong proponent of the principle of charity, seeking to
>>>>> harmonize any author's writings as much as possible; but Peirce clearly
>>>>> must have been incorrect in one or the other of these passages,
>>>>> because they are directly contradictory. The latter one is fully
>>>>> consistent with the order of determination for the semeiotic Correlates as
>>>>> spelled out in something that he wrote no more than a few days earlier (EP
>>>>> 2:481), so my judgment is that he was wrong to classify the statue--and,
>>>>> for that matter, a particular proposition--as a Descriptive.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think he was not wrong to classify particular propositions as
>>>> Descriptives, the passage clearly shows that with "Descriptive" he means
>>>> "Some S is P". Since he says that a Descriptive cannot be an Actisign, in
>>>> order for this to be an instance of the furst rule (R1, a first determines
>>>> only a first) the trichotomy Descriptive/Designative/Copulant has to
>>>> precede the trichotomy Potisign/Actisign/Famisign.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Again, my current proposal is that instead we treat quantification as
>>>>> the aspect of a proposition's *Immediate *Object that converts the
>>>>> Sign's *General *Object into the Replica's *Dynamic *Object.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If quantification really were an aspect of a proposition's immediate
>>>> object, while didn't Peirce say, in all his writings on the classification
>>>> of signs, that the vague/singular/general division does not exhaust the
>>>> immediate object of propositions, and is inapplicable to non-propositional
>>>> signs. Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in
>>>> the sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive
>>>> generality, or in neither sense. If you use "general object" in neither
>>>> sense, I think your use is unPeircean.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Every proposition in itself, as a Symbol and therefore a general Sign,
>>>>> must be a Copulative. As with "Any man is mortal," the continuous
>>>>> predicate in this case is "_____ possesses the character of _____," where
>>>>> the two blanks correspond to a Designative as the subject ("*S*" with
>>>>> a quantifier) and a Descriptive as the predicate ("*P*"). The
>>>>> subject of each *Replica *of the proposition must have an
>>>>> *individual *Dynamic Object, which is why a quantifier--which Peirce
>>>>> sometimes tellingly called a "Selective"--is necessary; it indicates
>>>>> whether the *choice* of that individual from the Sign's (collective
>>>>> or continuous) General Object is left up to the Utterer ("Some *S*"), the
>>>>> Interpreter ("Any *S*"), or neither ("This *S*").
>>>>>
>>>>> CSP: A sign (under which designation I place every kind of thought,
>>>>> and not alone external signs) that is in any respect objectively
>>>>> indeterminate (i.e., whose object is undetermined by the sign itself) is
>>>>> objectively *general *in so far as it extends to the interpreter the
>>>>> privilege of carrying its determination further ... A sign that is
>>>>> objectively indeterminate in any respect is objectively *vague *in so
>>>>> far as it reserves further determination to be made in some other
>>>>> conceivable sign, or at least does not appoint the interpreter as its
>>>>> deputy in this office ... Every utterance naturally leaves the right of
>>>>> further exposition in the utterer; and therefore, in so far as a sign is
>>>>> indeterminate, it is vague, unless it is expressly or by a well-understood
>>>>> convention rendered general. (CP 5.447, EP 2:350-351; 1906)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Peirce's 1908 example could perhaps be taken either way. On the one
>>>>> hand, each statue is vague/particular ("Some *S* is *P*") in the
>>>>> sense that the sculptor as the Utterer determined the specific appearance
>>>>> of the person depicted by it, which might or might not correspond to an
>>>>> actual person. On the other hand, each statue is general/universal
>>>>> ("Any *S* is *P*") in the sense that for many different local
>>>>> families as the Interpreters, "that very realistic statue represents the
>>>>> mourned one who fell in the war" (EP 2:486).
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I beg you to notice that in the first passage that you quote "general
>>>> object" has to be taken in the sense of "object of a symbol". For he says:
>>>> "It is not itself General: it is its Object which is taken to be General",
>>>> i.e. is not a legisign/famisign, but is a symbol. Cf.: "Of course, I always
>>>> use ‘general’ in the usual sense of general as is its object. If I wish to
>>>> say that a sign is general as to its matter, I call it a Type, or Typical."
>>>> (R 293). It seems to me that you are confusing the generality of the object
>>>> (dynamic object of symbol) and the distributive universality of the subject
>>>> of a proposition (immediate object of a proposition).
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>> Francesco
>>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
>
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