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}Francesco, list
Thanks for your very clear outline of the term of 'general' as used
by Peirce.
One thing to note, in my view, is that at no time does Peirce move
away from using this term as embedded within the semiosic process.
That is, the term 'general' refers to that which is referred to by a
symbol; by a legisign; and by a full sentence. This pragmatic
embedded nature suggests that the term cannot be set up to operate as
a pure intellectual construct, akin to a Platonic Form.
Edwina
On Wed 05/09/18 2:57 AM , Francesco Bellucci
[email protected] sent:
Jon, Gary, List
thanks for your replies.
As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses
"general" in at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs
indices, which have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general
in themselves (as types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally
quantified sentences are also said to be "general" by Peirce
("distributively general" his preferred term).
GR: May I ask just one question for now: In light of the several
quotations which Jon offered (in another thread which you may not
have had occasion to read) [...] [w]hy do write that the notion of a
general object appears to you as "very unPeircean"?
At CP 5.426 and 5.430 Peirce say general objects are real. It's the
object of a symbol which is real. "Man" is a symbol, its object is
whatever possesses the characters of men. Since, according to Peirce,
generals are real, the object of a symbol is real. At EP 2, p. 368
"general object" is used in another sense: "distributively general
object" means the universal quantifier: "any man ....". That's why
the notion of a general object (as opposed to immediate and dynamic,
and not as a species of the immediate) looks very unPeircean to me:
if we mean the object of a symbol, it's the dynamic object which is
general; if we mean the object of a universally quantified sentence,
it's the immediate object that is general; if we mean a legisign,
it's the sign, not the object, that is general. I don't see what
other uses of "general object" are relevant or needed in the
interpretation of Peirce.
JAS: I am afraid that I am not following the argument here. As I
already quoted Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is not
equivalent to "universally quantified"; both universal ("All men are
mortal") and particular ("Some men are mortal") propositions are
general, as opposed to singular ("This man is mortal"). Moreover,
any common noun, such as "man," is a general Rheme ("_____ is a
man," cf. EP 2:309-310; 1904) despite not being quantified at all;
and it does have an Immediate Object, which is whatever possesses the
set of characters that corresponds to its definition--i.e., its
Immediate Interpretant. Quantification only comes into play when
this general Rheme is employed in a proposition.
The first point is easily answerable. In those contexts (such as CP
2.324) in which "general" includes universal and existental and is
opposed to singular, Peirce most often uses the term "indefinite".
Cf. e.g. R 9, pp. 2–3. But in most contexts, when general is
opposed to vague and singular, it means "distributively general".
That the sense in which "general" is used in the division of signs
according to the immediate object is "distributively general" is
clear from R 339, p. 253 and R 284, p. 67
According to the Immediate Object (how represented)
Indefinite Sign
Singular Sign
Distributively General Sign (R 339, p. 253)
General Sign. The sign represents its Immediate Object in the
logically formal character of the Tertian, which is Distributive
Generality. (R 284, p. 67)
Second, I perfectly agree that any common noun, such as "man" or the
rheme "---is a man"; is general: but in the sense of being a symbol,
i.e. a sign whose object is, as Jon justly says, whatever possesses
the set of characters that corresponds to its definition. But the
general object of a symbol, i.e. the object that possesses the set of
characters that corresponds to the symbol's definition, is the
dynamic, not the immediate object. For icon/index/symbol is a
division according to the dynamic, not the immediate object.
Suppose that the object of "---is a man", i.e. the object that
possesses the set of characters that corresponds to its definition,
is the immediate object. What it is that possesses the set of
characters that corresponds to the definition of man? Of course,
every really existing man, as well as those existed and those that
will exist. If this is the immediate object of the rheme "--is a
man", what's its dynamic object?
Another example. Take the sign "Napoleon is lethargic". It contains
a proper name, "Napoleon", which refers to the real Napoleon, the
historical figure. Peirce says that a sentence's subject, i.e. the
proper name, is its "object" (he says so in very many places). What
object? Should we say that the proper name "Napoleon" is the dynamic
object of the sign? But then what is the historical figure? the
immediate object, perhaps? Or should we say that the historical
figure is the dynamic object? But then, Peirce's claim that the
subject of a sentence is its "object" could only mean that it is its
immediate object. You see, as soon as one wonders what the difference
between the real object outside the sign and the "subject" of the sign
is, one is obliged to distinguish two kinds of objects, one dynamic
the other immediate:
“The Mediate Object is the Object outside of the Sign; I call it
the Dynamoid Object. The Sign must indicate it by a hint; and this
hint, or its substance, is the Immediate Object” (SS 83).
The historical figure of Napoleon is outside the sign "Napoleon is
lethargic". Its being and its characters do not depend on what the
sign says of it. But the sign, besides saying something about it
(that it is lethargic), indicates it, by means of a proper name. And
this hint, this proper name, is the immediate object.
Now take that the sign "Napoleon is lethargic" and remove from it
its subject. You get the rheme "--- is lethargic". This rheme has no
hint by which its object is indicated, i.e. has no immediate object.
We could, of course, restore the indication, e.g. indicating an
object of this sign indefinitely, i.e. either vagually or generally:
"someone is lethargic" or "everything is lethargic".
BestFrancesco
On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:37 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Francesco, List:
FB: If rhemes have an immediate object, then according to Peirce's
taxonomies of 1904-1906 "all men" must be a rheme, because signs with
immediate objects may be general (universally quantified). But "all
men" is not a rheme; therefore, rhemes do not have immediate objects.
I am afraid that I am not following the argument here. As I already
quoted Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is not equivalent to
"universally quantified"; both universal ("All men are mortal") and
particular ("Some men are mortal") propositions are general, as
opposed to singular ("This man is mortal"). Moreover, any common
noun, such as "man," is a general Rheme ("_____ is a man," cf. EP
2:309-310; 1904) despite not being quantified at all; and it does
have an Immediate Object, which is whatever possesses the set of
characters that corresponds to its definition--i.e., its Immediate
Interpretant. Quantification only comes into play when this general
Rheme is employed in a proposition.
In other words, the conclusion that I draw from Peirce's 1904-1906
division of the Immediate Object into vague/singular/general is not
that only propositions have Immediate Objects, but that the
Immediate Object of a proposition includes the quantification of its
general subject(s). Nevertheless, I think that his application of
this particular trichotomy to propositions is problematic--even when
revised to Descriptive/Designative/Copulative in 1908; more on that
soon.
FB: I must say I do not understand the discussion of "general
object".
Rather than repeating myself, I will respectfully request that you
consider reading through the other current List thread on "The nature
of the Dynamic Object" in its entirety, if you have not done so
already; perhaps beginning with the only post in its predecessor
thread
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2018-08/msg00342.html
[2]).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4]
On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 3:45 PM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
Dear Jon, List
Thanks for your response. Here some further thoughts.
You will agree that the notion of immediate object as a technical
notion of semiotics emerges in 1904, that it emerges in the
classification of signs, and that its purpose in the classification
of signs up to 1906 is to divide signs into vague, singular, and
general. You will also agree that in that context, as well as in
other writings of the same year (Kaina Stoicheia, MSS 4-11), singular
means existentially quantified and general means universally
quantified (distributively general). I see that you also agree that
"all men" is not a rheme. Let's proceed from here.
If rhemes have an immediate object, then according to Peirce's
taxonomies of 1904-1906 "all men" must be a rheme, because signs with
immediate objects may be general (universally quantified). But "all
men" is not a rheme; therefore, rhemes do not have immediate objects.
I must say I do not understand the discussion of "general object".
As far as I know, symbols have a general object (indices an
individual object), legisigns are general in themselves (as types)
and universally quantified sentences are also said to be "general" by
Peirce ("distributively general" his preferred term). Talk of "general
objects" besides the dynamic and the immediate sounds to me very
unPeircean.
BestFrancesco
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