John S., List: I am still puzzled. Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection with phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a Normative Science?
Also, in what sense are his Categories "central to semiotic"? His trichotomies for Sign classification are divisions into the *Universes *of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants, rather than the *Categories* of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns. What Peirce *did *say on various occasions is that Signs are the paradigmatic exemplars of the phenomenological Category of 3ns, which is the element of representation or (more generally) mediation. Nevertheless, again, the science that *studies *Signs is not part of phenomenology, but of Normative Science. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 3:55 PM, John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Auke, Francesco, Frances, Gary F, and Jon AS, > > I agree with your points, but none of them explain one important > issue: Peirce's categories of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns are central to > semiotic, and they are usually called *phenomenological* categories. > > But in that classification of 1903, he did not mention semiotic > in connection with phenomenology. At the end of this note, I > include a copy of every paragraph from the 1903 classification > that mentions the word 'phenomenology'. > > AvB > >> Speculative rhetoric the first branch of non-mathematical logic is >> an alias for semiotics. There is no reason at all to look elsewhere >> in the classification of the science. >> > > In the middle of CP 1.191, where Peirce is talking about normative > science, he wrote "All thought being performed by means of signs, > logic may be regarded as the science of the general laws of signs." > > That sentence mentions logic and signs in connection with normative > science. But why didn't he mention a connection between phenomenology > and signs in paragraph 186 or 190? > > FB > >> I take seriously his claim that "logic is semiotics" and use "semiotics" >> as equivalent to "logic" (in the broad sense). If this identification >> is made, every problem about semiotics' collocation in the scheme >> disappears >> > > I agree. But that does not explain why he did not mention either > word 'logic' or 'semiotic' in his discussion of phenomenology. > > FK > >> it could be that only "formal" semiotics was intended to be the >> new thrust for logics, but not a new label for logics. >> > > That is probably what Peirce intended, since he continued to use > both words. In fact, his ethics of terminology would prevent him > from dropping the word 'logic', which had a long history of usage. > > GF > >> I’m guessing that you don’t want to include semiotics with logic, >> as Peirce did in the Syllabus classification of 1903 (without using >> the word “semiotic”) >> > > I *definitely* want to include semiotic with logic. But that > is not the question I was asking. > > GF > >> I think Peirce’s 1903 solution to the problem was to trichotomize >> logic as Speculative Grammar, Critic and Methodeutic. >> > > But that sentence is in the middle of a discussion of normative > science. It doesn't explain why he didn't mention either word > 'logic' or 'semiotic' in connection with phenomenology. > > JAS > >> I agree with Gary F. and Francesco, and share Auke's puzzlement >> that there is any question about this. CSP: Normative Science has >> three widely separated divisions: >> (i) Esthetics; (ii) Ethics; (iii) Logic. >> > > I certainly wasn't puzzled about that. My question was about > the absence of any mention of semiotic in Peirce's discussion > of phenomenology. > > My guess: Peirce started to write a brief summary of his > classification. Note the one sentence paragraph 190 below, > but the much longer paragraphs 191. > > I suspect that Peirce continued to get many new ideas as he > wrote. Therefore, his omission of any mention of semiotic in > his discussion of phenomenology was accidental, not deliberate. > > That conclusion is supported by the fact that his lengthy discussion > about logic in a paragraph about the normative sciences seems to be > out of place. As Peirce was writing, he seemed to get sidetracked > by new ideas that came to mind. He probably wrote them down as > they came to him, and he never went back to edit the earlier parts. > > John > ____________________________________________________________________ > > CP 1.186 > Philosophy is divided into a. Phenomenology; b. Normative Science; > c. Metaphysics. Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of > elements universally present in the phenomenon; meaning by the > phenomenon, whatever is present at any time to the mind in any way. > Normative science distinguishes what ought to be from what ought not > to be, and makes many other divisions and arrangements subservient to > its primary dualistic distinction. Metaphysics seeks to give an account > of the universe of mind and matter. Normative science rests largely on > phenomenology and on mathematics; metaphysics on phenomenology and on > normative science. > > 189 > The Psychical Sciences are: a. Nomological Psychics or Psychology; > b. Classificatory Psychics, or Ethnology; c. Descriptive Psychics, > or History. Nomological psychics discovers the general elements and > laws of mental phenomena. It is greatly influenced by phenomenology, > by logic, by metaphysics, and by biology (a branch of classificatory > physics). Classificatory psychics classifies products of mind and > endeavors to explain them on psychological principles. At present it > is far too much in its infancy (except linguistics, to which reference > will be made below) to approach very closely to psychology. It borrows > from psychology and from physics. Descriptive psychics endeavors in > the first place to describe individual manifestations of mind, whether > they be permanent works or actions; and to that task it joins that of > endeavoring to explain them on the principles of psychology and > ethnology. It borrows from geography (a branch of descriptive physics), > from astronomy (another branch) and from other branches of physical > and psychical science. > > 190 > Phenomenology is, at present, a single study. > > 191 > Normative science has three widely separated divisions: i. Esthetics; ii. > Ethics; iii. Logic. > Esthetics is the science of ideals, or of that which is objectively > admirable without any ulterior reason. I am not well acquainted with this > science; but it ought to repose on phenomenology. Ethics, or the science of > right and wrong, must appeal to Esthetics for aid in determining the summum > bonum. It is the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, conduct. Logic > is the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, thought; and as such, must > appeal to ethics for its principles. It also depends upon phenomenology and > upon mathematics. > All thought being performed by means of signs, logic may be regarded > as the science of the general laws of signs. It has three branches: > 1, Speculative Grammar, or the general theory of the nature and meanings > of signs, whether they be icons, indices, or symbols; 2, Critic, which > classifies arguments and determines the validity and degree of force of > each kind; 3, Methodeutic, which studies the methods that ought to be > > pursued in the investigation, in the exposition, and in the application > of truth. Each division depends on that which precedes it. >
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