Gary R., List: GR: While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have noted, signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic.
Representation/mediation (3ns) is *one *irreducible element of the Phaneron, but so is quality (1ns), and so is reaction (2ns). GR: I think to reduce the application of the cat[eg]ories to the 3ns of signs + "the Universes of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants," (again, not semeiotic but metaphysical categories) is to reduce almost to absurdity the central importance of the Universal Categories not only to semeiotics but, in my opinion, almost all the sciences which follow it. To clarify, I wholeheartedly agree that the Categories play a significant role throughout Peirce's entire architectonic. The assertion that I questioned was that they are "central to semiotic," which I took to imply that they are somehow more prominent in that branch than others. My understanding is that instead the Categories are most fundamentally *phenomenological*. I must point out again that Possibles/Existents/Necessitants are the constituents of three *Universes*, not *Categories*, although there is an obvious alignment with 1ns/2ns/3ns. I am no longer convinced that these Universes are truly *metaphysical*; after all, they are the primary basis for classifying Signs within *Speculative Grammar*, the first branch of *logic as semeiotic*. I continue to be intrigued by Peirce's remark in "New Elements" to the effect that the employment of metaphysical terms and concepts in that context is a kind of *hypostatic abstration*. CSP: The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 8:25 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, John, Francesco, Gary F, Auke, list, > > I too am mystified as to why John is suggesting that semeiotic should be > placed below phenomenology in Peirce's classification of sciences. As JAS > wrote: Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection with > phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a Normative Science? > > But perhaps a hint as to what John may have in mind occurs in his initial > post in this thread: > > JS: When I drew a diagram to illustrate Peirce's classification, > I did not include semeiotic because he had not mentioned it. > But since it is a science, it belongs somewhere in that diagram. > Where? > > I believe that it belongs directly under phenomenology, since every > perception involves signs. > > > While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have noted, > signs are not *studied* in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic. And > while I'm not yet ready to fully commit to this suggestion, I am tending > to think that Auke may be correct in suggesting that the study of semeiotics > *per > se** principally* occurs in the first of the three branches of logic, > i.e., theoretical grammar. The second branch, critical logic ("logic as > logic" as Peirce at least once characterized it) concerns itself > *principally* with "classif[ying] arguments and determin[ing] the > validity and degree of force of each kind," while the third and final > branch, methodeutic (or, theoretical rhetoric) principally takes up "the > methods that ought to be pursued in the investigation, in the exposition, > and in the application of truth." But all of these branches of logic are, > as I see it, informed by the categories. > > > 1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute > beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:260 > > All thought being performed by means of signs, logic may be regarded as > the science of the general laws of signs. It has three branches: (1) > *Speculative > Grammar*, or the general theory of the nature and meanings of signs, > whether they be icons, indices, or symbols; (2) *Critic*, which > classifies arguments and determines the validity and degree of force of > each kind; (3) *Methodeutic*, which studies the methods that ought to be > pursued in the investigation, in the exposition, and in the application of > truth. *Each division depends on that which precedes it *(boldface added). > > > I recall that many years ago Joe Ransdell and I had a list discussion > about the place, not of semiotics but of phenomenology. At one point he > suggested that it might not be a science at all and, in any event, even if > it were, there wasn't much scientific work to do there and, moreover, > Peirce had already done most all the important work in it. As you might > imagine, I disagreed. > > I think that it's possible (and in my experience, a fact) that some > logicians and semioticians have trouble imaginingg that, "since every > perception involves signs," that wherever you *might* place > phenomenology--if you classify it as a science at all--semiotics has either > to replace it or, as John has done, place semiotics very near phenomenology > (so, near the head of cenoscopic science). It may be that *everything is > semiotic*, but semiotic is studied in *semeiotic* (I always use this > spelling when referring to Peirce's tripartite science). > > I have sometimes thought, and a few times on this list introduced the > notion, that this issue might be at least partially resolved by considering > more seriously Peirce's distinction between *logica utens*, the ordinary > logic we all use and must use, and *logica docens*, the formal study of > logic as a normative science. For it is surely true that if we are to say > anything at all about phenomenological inquiries-and, for that matter, > theoretical esthetical and ethical inquiries, we are fairly dependent on > our ordinary logic, our *logica* *utens*. Theoretical ethics, esthetics, > and logic as semeiotic (that is, the normative sciences) can, however, > offer *examples* to the first cenoscopic science, phenomenology. So, > along with such exemplary cases, since we have a *logica utens *we can > make progress in that under-studied and, in my opinion, under-appreciated > science. Phenomenology is hard to do, as Peirce in several places makes > clear, such that, as in every discipline, some are drawn to it and others > are not, some have great intellectual capacity for tackling it, some have > less. > > JAS wrote: Also, in what sense are his Categories "central to semiotic"? > His trichotomies for Sign classification are divisions into the > *Universes *of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants, rather than the > *Categories* of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns. > > I would disagree with Jon in this matter since I *do*, as does John, see > the Categories as "central to semiotic," that there is much more categorial > involvement in semeiotics than "the *Universes *of Possibles, Existents, > and Necessitants" which are, after all, principles that the science > following logic as semeiotic, that is, metaphysics offers. However, a > discussion of this would divert us from the present one. > > JAS wrote: What Peirce *did *say on various occasions is that Signs are > the paradigmatic exemplars of the phenomenological Category of 3ns, which > is the element of representation or (more generally) mediation. > > Yes, and this is yet another way in which the categories figure in > semeiotic. Why the three branches of semeiotic are themselves categorially > informed (as most of Peirce's classication of sciences are). Many of the > topics of semeiotic relating especially, but not exclusively, to the > classification of signs, but also to to critical logic and theoretical > rhetoric (including pragmatism) draw upon phenomenology . I think to reduce > the application of the catories to the 3ns of signs + "the *Universes *of > Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants," (again, not semeiotic but > metaphysical categories) is to reduce almost to absurdity the central > importance of the Universal Categories not only to semeiotics but, in my > opinion, almost all the sciences which follow it. While it seems clear > enough that the triad possibles/existents/necessitants is itself > tricategorial. > > JAS concluded: Nevertheless, again, the science that *studies *Signs is > not part of phenomenology, but of Normative Science > > Regarding this there seems to be, for good reason as I see it, more > agreement than disagreement. > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690* >
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