Jon, John, Francesco, Gary F, Auke, list,
I too am mystified as to why John is suggesting that semeiotic should be
placed below phenomenology in Peirce's classification of sciences. As JAS
wrote: Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection with
phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a Normative Science?
But perhaps a hint as to what John may have in mind occurs in his initial
post in this thread:
JS: When I drew a diagram to illustrate Peirce's classification,
I did not include semeiotic because he had not mentioned it.
But since it is a science, it belongs somewhere in that diagram.
Where?
I believe that it belongs directly under phenomenology, since every
perception involves signs.
While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have noted,
signs are not *studied* in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic. And
while I'm not yet ready to fully commit to this suggestion, I am tending to
think that Auke may be correct in suggesting that the study of semeiotics *per
se** principally* occurs in the first of the three branches of logic, i.e.,
theoretical grammar. The second branch, critical logic ("logic as logic" as
Peirce at least once characterized it) concerns itself *principally*
with "classif[ying]
arguments and determin[ing] the validity and degree of force of each kind,"
while the third and final branch, methodeutic (or, theoretical rhetoric)
principally takes up "the methods that ought to be pursued in the
investigation, in the exposition, and in the application of truth." But all
of these branches of logic are, as I see it, informed by the categories.
1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute
beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:260
All thought being performed by means of signs, logic may be regarded as the
science of the general laws of signs. It has three branches: (1) *Speculative
Grammar*, or the general theory of the nature and meanings of signs,
whether they be icons, indices, or symbols; (2) *Critic*, which classifies
arguments and determines the validity and degree of force of each kind; (3)
*Methodeutic*, which studies the methods that ought to be pursued in the
investigation, in the exposition, and in the application of truth. *Each
division depends on that which precedes it *(boldface added).
I recall that many years ago Joe Ransdell and I had a list discussion about
the place, not of semiotics but of phenomenology. At one point he suggested
that it might not be a science at all and, in any event, even if it were,
there wasn't much scientific work to do there and, moreover, Peirce had
already done most all the important work in it. As you might imagine, I
disagreed.
I think that it's possible (and in my experience, a fact) that some
logicians and semioticians have trouble imaginingg that, "since every
perception involves signs," that wherever you *might* place
phenomenology--if you classify it as a science at all--semiotics has either
to replace it or, as John has done, place semiotics very near phenomenology
(so, near the head of cenoscopic science). It may be that *everything is
semiotic*, but semiotic is studied in *semeiotic* (I always use this
spelling when referring to Peirce's tripartite science).
I have sometimes thought, and a few times on this list introduced the
notion, that this issue might be at least partially resolved by considering
more seriously Peirce's distinction between *logica utens*, the ordinary
logic we all use and must use, and *logica docens*, the formal study of
logic as a normative science. For it is surely true that if we are to say
anything at all about phenomenological inquiries-and, for that matter,
theoretical esthetical and ethical inquiries, we are fairly dependent on
our ordinary logic, our *logica* *utens*. Theoretical ethics, esthetics,
and logic as semeiotic (that is, the normative sciences) can, however,
offer *examples* to the first cenoscopic science, phenomenology. So, along
with such exemplary cases, since we have a *logica utens *we can make
progress in that under-studied and, in my opinion, under-appreciated
science. Phenomenology is hard to do, as Peirce in several places makes
clear, such that, as in every discipline, some are drawn to it and others
are not, some have great intellectual capacity for tackling it, some have
less.
JAS wrote: Also, in what sense are his Categories "central to semiotic"?
His trichotomies for Sign classification are divisions into the *Universes *of
Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants, rather than the *Categories* of
1ns, 2ns, and 3ns.
I would disagree with Jon in this matter since I *do*, as does John, see
the Categories as "central to semiotic," that there is much more categorial
involvement in semeiotics than "the *Universes *of Possibles, Existents,
and Necessitants" which are, after all, principles that the science
following logic as semeiotic, that is, metaphysics offers. However, a
discussion of this would divert us from the present one.
JAS wrote: What Peirce *did *say on various occasions is that Signs are the
paradigmatic exemplars of the phenomenological Category of 3ns, which is
the element of representation or (more generally) mediation.
Yes, and this is yet another way in which the categories figure in
semeiotic. Why the three branches of semeiotic are themselves categorially
informed (as most of Peirce's classication of sciences are). Many of the
topics of semeiotic relating especially, but not exclusively, to the
classification of signs, but also to to critical logic and theoretical
rhetoric (including pragmatism) draw upon phenomenology . I think to reduce
the application of the catories to the 3ns of signs + "the *Universes *of
Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants," (again, not semeiotic but
metaphysical categories) is to reduce almost to absurdity the central
importance of the Universal Categories not only to semeiotics but, in my
opinion, almost all the sciences which follow it. While it seems clear
enough that the triad possibles/existents/necessitants is itself
tricategorial.
JAS concluded: Nevertheless, again, the science that *studies *Signs is not
part of phenomenology, but of Normative Science
Regarding this there seems to be, for good reason as I see it, more
agreement than disagreement.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*
On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 5:29 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> John S., List:
>
> I am still puzzled. Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in
> connection with phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a
> Normative Science?
>
> Also, in what sense are his Categories "central to semiotic"? His
> trichotomies for Sign classification are divisions into the *Universes *of
> Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants, rather than the *Categories* of
> 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns.
>
> What Peirce *did *say on various occasions is that Signs are the
> paradigmatic exemplars of the phenomenological Category of 3ns, which is
> the element of representation or (more generally) mediation. Nevertheless,
> again, the science that *studies *Signs is not part of phenomenology, but
> of Normative Science.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 3:55 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:
>
>> Auke, Francesco, Frances, Gary F, and Jon AS,
>>
>> I agree with your points, but none of them explain one important
>> issue: Peirce's categories of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns are central to
>> semiotic, and they are usually called *phenomenological* categories.
>>
>> But in that classification of 1903, he did not mention semiotic
>> in connection with phenomenology. At the end of this note, I
>> include a copy of every paragraph from the 1903 classification
>> that mentions the word 'phenomenology'.
>>
>> AvB
>>
>>> Speculative rhetoric the first branch of non-mathematical logic is
>>> an alias for semiotics. There is no reason at all to look elsewhere
>>> in the classification of the science.
>>>
>>
>> In the middle of CP 1.191, where Peirce is talking about normative
>> science, he wrote "All thought being performed by means of signs,
>> logic may be regarded as the science of the general laws of signs."
>>
>> That sentence mentions logic and signs in connection with normative
>> science. But why didn't he mention a connection between phenomenology
>> and signs in paragraph 186 or 190?
>>
>> FB
>>
>>> I take seriously his claim that "logic is semiotics" and use "semiotics"
>>> as equivalent to "logic" (in the broad sense). If this identification
>>> is made, every problem about semiotics' collocation in the scheme
>>> disappears
>>>
>>
>> I agree. But that does not explain why he did not mention either
>> word 'logic' or 'semiotic' in his discussion of phenomenology.
>>
>> FK
>>
>>> it could be that only "formal" semiotics was intended to be the
>>> new thrust for logics, but not a new label for logics.
>>>
>>
>> That is probably what Peirce intended, since he continued to use
>> both words. In fact, his ethics of terminology would prevent him
>> from dropping the word 'logic', which had a long history of usage.
>>
>> GF
>>
>>> I’m guessing that you don’t want to include semiotics with logic,
>>> as Peirce did in the Syllabus classification of 1903 (without using
>>> the word “semiotic”)
>>>
>>
>> I *definitely* want to include semiotic with logic. But that
>> is not the question I was asking.
>>
>> GF
>>
>>> I think Peirce’s 1903 solution to the problem was to trichotomize
>>> logic as Speculative Grammar, Critic and Methodeutic.
>>>
>>
>> But that sentence is in the middle of a discussion of normative
>> science. It doesn't explain why he didn't mention either word
>> 'logic' or 'semiotic' in connection with phenomenology.
>>
>> JAS
>>
>>> I agree with Gary F. and Francesco, and share Auke's puzzlement
>>> that there is any question about this. CSP: Normative Science has
>>> three widely separated divisions:
>>> (i) Esthetics; (ii) Ethics; (iii) Logic.
>>>
>>
>> I certainly wasn't puzzled about that. My question was about
>> the absence of any mention of semiotic in Peirce's discussion
>> of phenomenology.
>>
>> My guess: Peirce started to write a brief summary of his
>> classification. Note the one sentence paragraph 190 below,
>> but the much longer paragraphs 191.
>>
>> I suspect that Peirce continued to get many new ideas as he
>> wrote. Therefore, his omission of any mention of semiotic in
>> his discussion of phenomenology was accidental, not deliberate.
>>
>> That conclusion is supported by the fact that his lengthy discussion
>> about logic in a paragraph about the normative sciences seems to be
>> out of place. As Peirce was writing, he seemed to get sidetracked
>> by new ideas that came to mind. He probably wrote them down as
>> they came to him, and he never went back to edit the earlier parts.
>>
>> John
>> ____________________________________________________________________
>>
>> CP 1.186
>> Philosophy is divided into a. Phenomenology; b. Normative Science;
>> c. Metaphysics. Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of
>> elements universally present in the phenomenon; meaning by the
>> phenomenon, whatever is present at any time to the mind in any way.
>> Normative science distinguishes what ought to be from what ought not
>> to be, and makes many other divisions and arrangements subservient to
>> its primary dualistic distinction. Metaphysics seeks to give an account
>> of the universe of mind and matter. Normative science rests largely on
>> phenomenology and on mathematics; metaphysics on phenomenology and on
>> normative science.
>>
>> 189
>> The Psychical Sciences are: a. Nomological Psychics or Psychology;
>> b. Classificatory Psychics, or Ethnology; c. Descriptive Psychics,
>> or History. Nomological psychics discovers the general elements and
>> laws of mental phenomena. It is greatly influenced by phenomenology,
>> by logic, by metaphysics, and by biology (a branch of classificatory
>> physics). Classificatory psychics classifies products of mind and
>> endeavors to explain them on psychological principles. At present it
>> is far too much in its infancy (except linguistics, to which reference
>> will be made below) to approach very closely to psychology. It borrows
>> from psychology and from physics. Descriptive psychics endeavors in
>> the first place to describe individual manifestations of mind, whether
>> they be permanent works or actions; and to that task it joins that of
>> endeavoring to explain them on the principles of psychology and
>> ethnology. It borrows from geography (a branch of descriptive physics),
>> from astronomy (another branch) and from other branches of physical
>> and psychical science.
>>
>> 190
>> Phenomenology is, at present, a single study.
>>
>> 191
>> Normative science has three widely separated divisions: i. Esthetics; ii.
>> Ethics; iii. Logic.
>> Esthetics is the science of ideals, or of that which is objectively
>> admirable without any ulterior reason. I am not well acquainted with this
>> science; but it ought to repose on phenomenology. Ethics, or the science of
>> right and wrong, must appeal to Esthetics for aid in determining the summum
>> bonum. It is the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, conduct. Logic
>> is the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, thought; and as such, must
>> appeal to ethics for its principles. It also depends upon phenomenology and
>> upon mathematics.
>> All thought being performed by means of signs, logic may be regarded
>> as the science of the general laws of signs. It has three branches:
>> 1, Speculative Grammar, or the general theory of the nature and meanings
>> of signs, whether they be icons, indices, or symbols; 2, Critic, which
>> classifies arguments and determines the validity and degree of force of
>> each kind; 3, Methodeutic, which studies the methods that ought to be
>>
>> pursued in the investigation, in the exposition, and in the application
>> of truth. Each division depends on that which precedes it.
>>
>
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