Jon, you seem determined to take a firm stand that for Peirce, “Form is first and Matter is second” — although Peirce does not explicitly mention the phaneroscopic categories either in the excerpt you’ve quoted or in “The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences” (MS 283), the article I’ve been quoting from. Insofar as this is a metaphysical issue, I agree with Peirce that the logician had better remain aloof from it, since metaphysics derives its principles from logic and not vice versa. As the excerpt I quoted shows, Peirce’s focus in this article is growth as a key concept in logic (the methodeutic of inquiry).
For purposes of clarifying the concepts of Matter and Form, though, I think the place to start would be Peirce’s entry on the subject in Baldwin’s Dictionary, http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Matter%20and%20Form, which I won’t quote here because it’s very long. By the way, concerning the scholastics, toward the end of that entry there’s a long section on “substantial form,” which Peirce does mention in MS 283 in his discussion of “the precise sense which we are to attach to the term determination” (EP2:392). Also in MS 283 (among the fragmentary drafts included in it) is that passage on “the perfect sign” which I continue to find fascinating. This was published in EP2:544, but with some ellipses in it, and I’ve often wondered what the EP2 editors chose to omit from it. Well, I finally tracked down images of that part of MS 283 and managed to fill in the gaps, except for a few words that were cut off in the images. (The pages are not numbered by Peirce.) So here’s a more complete transcription, which I find even more intriguing than the EP2 version. It is certainly relevant to the semiotic concepts of quasi-mind and of growth — and maybe even to the physics of “vibrations” which was discussed on the list recently. [[ Consider then the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries with it. This aggregate will itself be a sign; and we may call it a perfect sign, in the sense that it involves the present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of itself. Now no perfect sign is in a statical condition: you might as well suppose a portion of matter to remain at rest during a thousandth of a second, or any other long interval of time. The only signs which are tolerably fixed are non-existent abstractions. We cannot deny that such a sign is real; only its mode of reality is not that active kind which we call existence. The existent acts, and whatsoever acts changes. Perhaps the reader may demur to this, saying that the earth acts to press him against the floor, but does not thereby undergo any change. But the floor is elastic, and … [The image of this MS page is cut off at the top.] He vibrates up and down, and action and reaction being equal, the centre of gravity of the earth vibrates up and down. It is abstractly conceivable that a particle should remain at rest; but in fact, it never does so. Every real ingredient of the perfect sign is aging, its energy of action upon the interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, its outlines becoming more indefinite. On the other hand, the perfect sign is perpetually being acted upon by its object, from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new signs, which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it already had, but which had lain dormant. In addition, the perfect sign never ceases to undergo changes of the kind we rather drolly call spontaneous, that is, they happen sua sponte but not by its will. They are phenomena of growth. Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs. This description must remain, inadequate though it is, or we should throw open the doors at once to a jam of considerations, which must be taken into account, if at all, in … [another line cut off at the top of the MS page image]. This quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be examined, must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of susceptibility to determination. Moreover, the determinations come as events each one once for all and never again. Furthermore, it must have its rules or laws, the more special ones variable, others invariable. But we may ask, what is the nature of the action of the sign upon the quasi-mind when it determines the interpretant? The answer will be better understood if it is made disjunctive rather than general. ]] Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: 13-Dec-18 23:01 To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic Gary F., Helmut, List: GF: ... do you know of any text where Peirce actually said that “form” was first and “matter” second? I offered several representative quotes in a previous post to demonstrate that Peirce consistently associated Form with 1ns and Matter with 2ns, rather than the other way around. The following is the most relevant to your question as posed here, this time without any omissions. CSP: Aristotle's metaphysics undoubtedly belongs to the general type of evolutionary systems, as does for example, that of Hegel. As I understand it, he identifies the mode of the evolution of being with that of the evolution of theory, notwithstanding his incessant oppositions of πρότερον ούσίᾳ and πρότερον λόγῳ. Matter is, for him, that which is what it is in itself. Form is that which is only so far as it is embodied in matter, and is essentially dichotomic, as Plato made it. The scholastic metaphysics, on the other hand, looks upon the pure nature, or Form, as that which is what it is in itself, and as prior to any embodiment of it. It is looking upon being as created, and regards its evolution as having the mode of movement of practice. Scotus appears to look upon individuation as an unintelligible act of force. From this point of view, matter (it is always the Aristotelian matter I speak of, or that which simply exists) ought to be held to exist only by reaction, and so to be that which is what it is by force of another. It is not necessary for the logician to embrace either of these theories (of which I prefer the second.) He had better remain aloof. (R 517:92-93[18-19]; 1904) In the evolution of being, what comes first is "that which is what it is in itself," and what comes second is either "that which is only so far as it is embodied" or "that which is what it is by force of another." Hence for Aristotle, Matter is first and Form is second; but for the scholastics and Peirce, Form is first and Matter is second. It is Matter, not Form, that corresponds to force. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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