John, you wrote: “The categories of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns are ways of classifying experiences in the phaneron, not the physical things that caused the experiences.” I think this calls for some clarification.
The idea that physical things cause experiences is a metaphysical one, and in phaneroscopy, which is logically prior to metaphysics, there no distinction between the physical and the psychical. There is also no subject/object distinction, no difference between a phenomenon and the experience of a phenomenon. The phaneron’s esse is its percipi (EP2:364). It would be more accurate to say that 1ns, 2ns, 3ns are ways of analyzing an experience (or a phenomenon, an appearing) into its irreducible elements, all three of which are involved in any experience or phenomenon intelligible enough to be analyzed at all. Phaneroscopy does not “classify experience” in the sense of grouping them into types, does not say “these are firsts, these others are seconds, and these others are thirds” etc. There is a branch of psychology which classifies “experiences” in that way, but even metaphysics is logically prior to that, and of course that kind of categorization requires far more than three “categories.” Possibly what I’m saying here is not much different from what you meant, but I thought the clarification of terms might be worthwhile for those unfamiliar with phanroscopy. Gary f. -----Original Message----- From: John F Sowa <[email protected]> Sent: 16-Dec-18 23:04 To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic Gary F, Edwina, Jon AS GF > My suggestion is that Peirce’s three categories or “elements” can be > regarded as elements of Aristotelian Form: Quality is the Firstness of > Form, Actuality is the Secondness of Form, and Growth is the Thirdness > of Form. As for Aristotelian Matter, it is simply indeterminate > substance, or the capacity to be determined (by Form), thus gaining > embodied individuality or determinate existence. ET > I fully agree with your outline. I partly agree. The categories of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns are ways of classifying experiences in the phaneron, not the physical things that caused the experiences. GF > Peirce says in the excerpt Jon quoted, “it is always the Aristotelian > matter I speak of” — not physical matter in the modern sense. That is the critical issue. Any physical entity may be classified in an open-ended variety of ways. Aristotle's word is a symbol that he used in formulating his theory. But the symbols of any theory are related to the physical world by criteria proper to that theory. Theories as different as Aristotle's, Newton's, Einstein's, Heisenberg's, Dirac's... have theoretical terms with different mappings to what people call "reality". Some of those terms may have approximate overlaps, but the differences are critical. JAS > As for Entelechy, Peirce quite explicitly associated that term (as > well as the perfect sign) with the ideal end of semiosis--that toward > which growth is proceeding, not the process of growth itself. > > CSP: We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal > sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in such > identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with > the very form signified by it. I agree. But as Peirce emphasized, every so-called "law of science" is fallible. We can't assume that any fact is an ideal, perfect sign that is identical with some aspect of reality. I also agree with the following point: GF > And of course Peirce was not talking about sexuality in the physical > sense either... Yes. He was using a "sexy" metaphor, which could be a distraction. The Chinese yinyang sign may be interpreted in an open-ended variety of ways, one of which happens to be sex. For that reason, it would closer to the ideal, but not perfect. (See the attached yinyang.png) John
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