Gary F., List: This is probably another case where we get into trouble by switching among different manuscripts, which Peirce may have intentionally written from different points of view. Below I was referring specifically to his use of "entelechy" in "New Elements," which I quoted accordingly. There the term explicitly designates "the ideal sign which should be quite perfect," which is "the ultimate interpretant of every sign," the *end *at which all semiosis is aiming. I would say that in R 283, as quoted at EP 2:545n25, "the perfect sign" is something that is *undergoing *a process--still not that process itself.
As I argued on the List back in March, I believe that what Peirce had in mind as "the perfect sign" in both passages is *the Universe*. Its Object is its Utterer--God, Who is perpetually acting upon it--and its Final Interpretant is "the absolute Truth," everything that *would be* known in the state of Substantial Knowledge after infinite inquiry by an infinite community. Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 11:50 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, you wrote that “As for Entelechy, Peirce quite explicitly associated > that term (as well as the perfect sign) with the *ideal end* of > semiosis--that toward which growth is proceeding, not the process of growth > itself.” > > I can’t agree with you there. For one thing, I don’t see how *entelechy* > can be an “ideal end” if it is *also* “mediation” as you say. > > As for the “perfect sign” Peirce describes in MS 283, it is most > emphatically a ‘work in progress,’ or even an active agency, and not a > finished product: “no perfect sign is in a statical condition: you might > as well suppose a portion of matter to remain at rest during a thousandth > of a second, or any other long interval of time.” (Note that in this > comparison Peirce is referring to physical matter, not Aristotelian > matter.) > > [[ Every real ingredient of the perfect sign is aging, its energy of > action upon the interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing > down, its outlines becoming more indefinite. > > On the other hand, the perfect sign is perpetually being acted upon by its > object, from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new signs, > which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it already had, > but which had lain dormant. > > In addition, the perfect sign never ceases to undergo changes of the kind > we rather drolly call spontaneous, that is, they happen *sua sponte* but > not by its will. They are phenomena of growth. ]] > > I don’t see how such an ever-changing entity can be identified with “the > *ideal > end* of semiosis.” It’s true that “perfect” in the vernacular usually > implies something like an ideal end of a “perfecting” process, but that is > certainly not the case here. (Perhaps Peirce rejected this draft-fragment > because it violated ordinary usage in this respect.) > > Also in MS 283, the sign’s “being acted upon by its object” — and *not* > vice versa — is absolutely crucial for the normative science of logic. > “There must be an action of the object upon the sign to render the latter > true. Without that, the object is not the representamen's object. … So, > then, a sign, in order to fulfill its office, to actualize its potency, > must be compelled by its object. This is evidently the reason of the > dichotomy of the true and the false” (EP2:380). In other words, there must > be a genuine dyadic relation, a Secondness, between object and sign, in > order for a sign (i.e. a proposition) to be *true*. The actuality of that > dyadic relation is the “rude τύπος” which Peirce also calls “experience” > and “the entrance of the element of *Form*” (EP2:374). You describe this > “rude” or “brute” aspect of things as “the "outward clash" that confronts > us with unpleasant surprises when our beliefs are in error” — but not all > surprises are unpleasant, and according to Peirce “‘it is by surprises that > experience teaches all she deigns to teach us’ (EP2:154).” > > By the way, Peirce says near the end of “New Elements” that “A sign cannot > even be false without being a sign and so far as it is a sign it must be > true” (EP2:324). This sounds paradoxical, even “mystical” as he says on the > same page; but I think it is clarified by Peirce’s statement (quoted above) > that “a sign, in order to fulfill its office, to actualize its potency, > must be compelled by its object” and without this compulsion, “the object > is not the representamen's object.” The element of compulsion, i.e. > secondness, has to be genuine in order for Thirdness to be genuine. > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 16-Dec-18 16:27 > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic > > > > Gary F., List: > > GF: My suggestion is that Peirce’s three categories or “elements” can be > regarded as elements of Aristotelian Form: Quality is the Firstness of > Form, Actuality is the Secondness of Form, and Growth is the Thirdness of > Form. > > If Aristotelian Form is a logical and/or metaphysical manifestation of > 1ns, as I tend to think, then there is no "2ns of Form" or "3ns of Form." > On the other hand, if Form is what we study in Phaneroscopy, then my > objection is that Peirce identified its three irreducible elements as > quality, reaction, and mediation--not quality, actuality, and growth. As > for Entelechy, Peirce quite explicitly associated that term (as well as the > perfect sign) with the *ideal end* of semiosis--that toward which growth > is proceeding, not the process of growth itself. > > CSP: We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign > which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in such identity as a > sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with the very form > signified by it. The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe > *qua > *fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of > being. The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the > ultimate interpretant of every sign. (EP 2:304; 1904) > > All of that said, I agree with you that it would be a mistake to *equate > *Form/Matter/Entelechy with > 1ns/2ns/3ns. As you have observed, Peirce often wrote from different > points of view, and the use of metaphysical terminology to discuss logical > (and phenomenological) concepts--as in "New Elements"--is only one of them. > > CSP: The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still > less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to > express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind > ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such > as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were > substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904) > > Peirce was evidently adopting a *different *point of view in R 283, which > is perhaps why he cautioned the reader about recognizing what it was before > proceeding beyond his statement about Aristotle's various concepts. Since > I am still having trouble doing so, I am basically stuck on that sentence. > As for our off-List discussion ... > > GF (off-List): If you search the Peirce texts for “experience”, I think > you’ll see how consistently he associates it with Brute Actuality. It’s > quite explicit in ms 283, but that’s only one of many examples. The > “Universes of Experience” phrase is exceptional in this respect, so > naturally it will confuse you if you make it your benchmark. > > I agree that there is a sense in which all Experience is Brute--the > "outward clash" that confronts us with unpleasant surprises when our > beliefs are in error. Peirce even defined it that way in "A Neglected > Argument." > > CSP: An "Experience" is a brutally produced conscious effect that > contributes to a habit, self-controlled, yet so satisfying, on > deliberation, as to be destructible by no positive exercise of internal > vigor ... A compulsion is "Brute" whose immediate efficacy nowise consists > in conformity to rule or reason. (CP 6.454, EP 2:435; 1908) > > However, the fact that he went on to describe *three *Universes of > Experience in the very next paragraph--whose constituents are Ideas, Brute > Actuality, and Signs--suggests that all three Categories are elements of > such Experience, not just 2ns. For example, we lack self-control over not > only our Percepts (1ns and 2ns), but also our subsequent Perceptual > Judgments (3ns). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 11:10 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > > Jon, list, > > You’ve been pointing out an apparent discrepancy between “New Elements” > (and other 1904 texts) and MS 283 of 1906 (selection 27 in EP2), which I’ve > been quoting in this thread. The question is whether Aristotelian *matter* > and *form* correspond to Peircean *firstness* and *secondness* > respectively, or the other way round. I’ve argued that this is a > metaphysical question and it’s better for a logician to “remain aloof” from > it, as Peirce said, rather than try to settle on a definitive answer — > especially considering the fact that Peirce does not explicitly mention > “firstness” or “secondness” in *either* “New Elements” or MS 283. Now I’d > like to suggest an alternative to the question. > > In his defining phaneroscopy at CP 1.284 (1905), Peirce says that “So far > as I have developed this science of phaneroscopy, it is occupied with the > *formal* elements of the phaneron” (my italics). My suggestion is that > Peirce’s three categories or “elements” can be regarded as elements of > Aristotelian Form: Quality is the Firstness of Form, Actuality is the > Secondness of Form, and Growth is the Thirdness of Form. As for > Aristotelian Matter, it is simply indeterminate substance, or the capacity > to be determined (by Form), thus gaining embodied individuality or > determinate existence. > > We could use *entelechy* instead of Growth for Thirdness, with the > understanding that it is a process (“perfecting growth” as Peirce says in > MS 283) rather than the completed (or ideal) form at the end of the growth > process, which is what Aristotle seems to mean by ἐντελέχεια. That could > also explain the difference between a sufficiently *complete* sign — well > defined, I think, in your response to Jerry (below) — and the *perfect* > sign which Peirce describes in MS 283. The *perfect* sign is never > *complete* but always in a process of becoming; the *complete* sign which > comprises both denotation and signification is a kind of hypostatic > abstraction, conceived as an entity which plays a key role in semiosis. > > We had a brief discussion offlist in which you raised some other important > points, but I’ll have to leave that to you, as I’m being called away right > now … > > Gary f. > >
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