Edwina, Jon, list, Edwina wrote:
1] With regard to 1ns being understood as 'quality' - well, 'quality', as a subjective rather than objective [and therefore, not amenable to empirical measurement] - fits in well with chance, spontaneity and freedom - all of which are subjective and not amenable to measurement. Somewhere Peirce refers to quality as, at best, "pre-conscious," which is to say that the color 'green' of a leaf on a tree in one's garden is what it is in every permutation which the changing sky, sun, clouds, wind, etc. offer to a consciousness. So is its shape. It 'may' become a subjective 'experience', but that is not its nature. So, how are "chance, spontaneity and freedoom" all subjective? Aren't the necessary for, for example, evolution? Why should a 'possible quality' (one of those permutations of 'green' above, say) not yet realized be "amenable to measurement"? (Btw, much of the English philosopher, Mary Midgley's, last book before her death, published just prior to it this year) argues against the modern obsession with "measurement" as if that were the be all end end all of scientific experience.) 2] I disagree with your insistence that "In my view, it is incontrovertible that when he discusses Form, Matter, and Entelechy as the three modes of being, he is quite obviously referring to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, respectively". I don't see that as 'incontrovertible or 'quite obvious' ..but don't see the point of engaging in any kind of debate with you over this perception. In my view too "it is incontrovertible that when he discusses Form, Matter, and Entelechy as the three modes of being, he is quite obviously referring to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns respectively." The quote Jon offered makes this clear enough. Form as 1ns is the 'possible' Form something *might* take when it 'takes a form' as a consequence of its being realized, requiring 2ns and 3ns. Again, evolution doesn't necessarily 'know' the form it will take in actuality when by chance (1ns), as the result of what Peirce calls 'sporting', it brings about, say, a structural change. Its possibilities for change are, of course, constrained in myriad ways, yet there isn't necessarily a way of predicting what chance 'sporting' will bring about (e.g., a particular species of dinosaur evolves to takes flight as a bird; its form is modified in a major way). 3] I am aware that Aristotelian 'matter' is not 'mass' [which can be measured] but is more akin to potential energy which can be formed into particular 'things'. This is a peculiar use of the idea of "potential energy" which Britannica (and the several other sources I just checked) gives as "stored energy that depends upon the relative position of various parts of a system." And I think it is dangerous to conflate modern notions in physics with Aristotle's. Throughout his career Peirce identifies 'quality' with 1ns. Here are a few from the *Commens Dictionary* selected merely for their brevity. 1899 | On Topical Geometry, in General (T) | CP 7.538 …a quality is merely something that *might* be realized, while an occurrence is something that *actually* takes place. [—] A quality […] has no individuality. Two qualities are different only so far as they are unlike. Individuality is an aggressive unity, arising from an absolute refusal to be in any degree responsible for anything else. This a quality cannot have since it is too utterly irrespective of anything else even to deny it. 1903 | CSP's Lowell Lectures of 1903. 2nd Part of 3rd Draught of Lecture III | Quality The mode of being of the quality is that of Firstness. That is to say, it is a possibility. It is related to the matter accidentally; and this relation does not change the quality at all, except that it imparts *existence*, that is to say, this very relation of inherence, to it. 1903 [c.] | Topics. Chapter I. Singular Systems | MS [R] 151 Elements of Firstness, or *Qualities*, are positive respects in each of which something might be determinate regardless of anything else, such as *being marketable*. 1904 | On the Foundations of Mathematics | MS [R] 8:1-2 A quality is whatever it is in itself. It has such mode of being as it has independently of any other quality, of existing in any subject, and of being represented. (I just read Jon's latest note and, it should be obvious from what I've just written, that I concur with him.) Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 4:09 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list > > We will, as usual, continue to disagree. > > 1] With regard to 1ns being understood as 'quality' - well, 'quality', as > a subjective rather than objective [and therefore, not amenable to > empirical measurement] - fits in well with chance, spontaneity and freedom > - all of which are subjective and not amenable to measurement. > > 2] I disagree with your insistence that > > "In my view, it is incontrovertible that when he discusses Form, Matter, > and Entelechy as the three modes of being, he is quite obviously referring > to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, respectively". I don't see that as 'incontrovertible > or 'quite obvious' ..but don't see the point of engaging in any kind of > debate with you over this perception. > > 3] I am aware that Aristotelian 'matter' is not 'mass' [which can be > measured] but is more akin to potential energy which can be formed into > particular 'things'. > > Edwina > > > > On Fri 14/12/18 3:50 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] sent: > > Edwina, List: > > As I have acknowledged before, there are passages in Peirce's writings > where he uses the term "form" in a way more consistent with 3ns than 1ns, > but the ones that I have quoted recently are not among them. In my view, > it is incontrovertible that when he discusses Form, Matter, and Entelechy > as the three modes of being, he is quite obviously referring to 1ns, 2ns, > and 3ns, respectively. Chance, spontaneity, and freedom do not exhaust the > scope of 1ns for Peirce; in fact, quality is the element of experience that > is its paradigmatic manifestation, "that which is what it is in itself, and > as prior to any embodiment." Gary F. has already pointed out that > Aristotelian Matter is not at all the same thing as physical matter in the > modern sense. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:16 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> List: >> >> I disagree that this section states that Form is associated with 1ns >> and Matter with 2ns. After all, that would suggest that Form is an >> action of chance, spontaneity and freedom. I consider that Form, which is >> not simply external appearance but 'how' matter is organized into its >> identity cannot function with such randomness. And - It is important, I >> think, not to confuse the three modes of Firstness, Secondness and >> Thirdness, with ordinality. That is, I consider it an error to think that >> the term 'Firstness' means - first in order of existence etc. >> >> Peirce writes "Form, as that which is what it is in itself, and as prior >> to any embodiment of it. It is looking upon being as created, and regards >> its evolution as having the mode of movement of practice" . This suggests >> instead to me, that Form is 3ns and its priority is akin to its nature, not >> of ordinality but of continuity. This does NOT mean that it is >> pre-existent! It simply means that Form or habits of organization are >> continuous rules rather than individual embodiments. And that matter, which >> is to say, the individual, or 'that which simply exists' is 2ns and exists >> within the constraints of continuous rules/habits. >> >> See also 'matter prior to form' 6.388 where he outlines but does not >> reject, Aristotle. >> >> As to what emerged, ordinally first in our cosmos - matter or form, >> Peirce's outline of cosmology suggests that 'bits of matter' [which are >> existent in 2ns] spontaneously [1ns] emerged first and the 'habits' of >> their interactions emerged gradually afterwards and became rules 3ns]. >> [1.412]. As to what 'matter' is, apart from its being constituted within >> discrete individual units, I'd suggest it's energy. >> >> Edwina >> > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
