Jon, Gary R, What Peirce himself says about phenomenology/phaneroscopy seem to me much more clear and direct than the questions you are struggling with here, so I’ll confine myself here to flagging instances where I think your usage of Peircean terms is based on a misreading of Peirce (and/or Atkins). I think the problems you are dealing with are likely to vanish if these misreadings are cleared up.
JAS: I still struggle to see how anyone can think or talk about Phenomenology without engaging in Semeiotic. After all, any fact is always expressed in a proposition; but as soon as we think or say something about a phenomenon using a proposition, we are going beyond merely observing that phenomenon in itself--we are now representing it with something else, and relating it to something else. GF: You can’t talk about anything without engaging in semiosis. But you’re not engaging in Semeiotic unless you are talking about semiosis. Not all phenomena are semiosic, so talking about phenomena is not automatically talking about semiosis. JAS: Peirce seemingly used "object" as a synonym for "phenomenon" in 1903. GF: A phenomenon is an object of attention. It becomes the object of a sign when the sign is uttered. GR: Hypostatic abstraction, continuous predicate, proposition, etc. are terms of semeiotic, and what you've described above is, as I see it, a posteriori work logic does upon the factual findings and principles of phenomenology uncovered. JAS: I agree that all of those fall under Semeiotic as thinking about the "facts of phenomenology," rather than observing the phenomena themselves and thinking through them (cf. CP 4.549; 1906), which I currently see as the scope of Phenomenology itself. GF: Peirce does not say there that we think through phenomena; he says we think through signs: CSP: [[ That wonderful operation of hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to create entia rationis that are, nevertheless, sometimes real, furnishes us the means of turning predicates from being signs that we think or think through, into being subjects thought of. We thus think of the thought-sign itself, making it the object of another thought-sign. ]] GF: Signs are phenomena too, of course, but phenomena are not signs unless they refer to other phenomena. JAS: the Phaneron contains no objects and no realities, only "images" (De Tienne's term). GF: The phaneron contains everything that is or can be “before the mind” in any way, including objects and realities. An object must first appear in order to act as an object of attention or of a sign. A thing must appear, must be present to the mind, in order to be recognized as real. That recognition is logical and metaphysical, not phenomenology, but it is the Secondness of the phenomenon (to the mind) which underwrites its reality, and it is the task of phenomenology to recognize Secondness (and Thirdness and Firstness) as elements of the phaneron. Those three terms are, of course, hypostatic abstractions, but the objects of those signs are not. They are “subjects thought of” which are more elementary than anything we say or think about them. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: 15-Mar-19 22:06 To: [email protected] Subject: Re: Phenomenology: a "science-egg," was [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism Gary R., List: GR: Yet, if normative science is somehow to be 'guided' by phenomenology, how are the 'facts of phenomenology' to be expressed? That to me is the essential question. I agree, since I still struggle to see how anyone can think or talk about Phenomenology without engaging in Semeiotic. After all, any fact is always expressed in a proposition; but as soon as we think or say something about a phenomenon using a proposition, we are going beyond merely observing that phenomenon in itself--we are now representing it with something else, and relating it to something else. GR: So, how does a phenomenologist go about "describing the object, as a phenomenon" then abstracting its "suchness"? Neither "abstracting" nor "suchness" appears in what you quoted. Peirce consistently associated "suchness" with 1ns, and that is only one irreducible element of the phenomena. Moreover, my understanding is that we distinguish it from 2nd and 3ns by precission, rather than abstraction. GR: But 'seme' is a term of logic as semeiotic, indeed a rather developed semeiotic. So are 'precission' and 'predicates' (and 'hypostatic abstraction' in the passage quoted below). So is "object," yet Peirce seemingly used it at a synonym for "phenomenon" in 1903. Hypostatic abstraction is what turns an observed phenomenon into an object of thought and discourse--i.e., an Object of Signs--without necessarily taking a position on its reality. GR: Hypostatic abstraction, continuous predicate, proposition, etc. are terms of semeiotic, and what you've described above is, as I see it, a posteriori work logic does upon the factual findings and principles of phenomenology uncovered. I agree that all of those fall under Semeiotic as thinking about the "facts of phenomenology," rather than observing the phenomena themselves and thinking through them (cf. CP 4.549; 1906), which I currently see as the scope of Phenomenology itself. GR: Examples of 1ns would seem to be easier to describe than 2ns or 3ns. But what you went on to quote from Peirce are not descriptions; they can only be properly interpreted by those who are able to associate such concepts with previous Collateral Experience, whether direct or indirect. Someone not already acquainted with magenta, attar, railway whistles, quinine, mathematics, or love could understand and learn nothing from mere invocations of their color, odor, sound, taste, or emotional quality. GR: Thus, there is finally no little abstraction in coming to identify the "suchness" of, say, the quality 'red' as opposed to "seeing a red object." I am only saying that iconoscopy (involving a logica utens) strives to do just that: that is, for example, abstract 'redness' in this example. I am still not convinced that such abstraction properly falls within Phenomenology; the Phaneron contains no objects and no realities, only "images" (De Tienne's term). We prescind the red color in the Percept, which in itself has no parts, creating a predicate; then we abstract the quality of redness as an object capable of representation in a Perceptual Judgment, creating a subject; and then we generalize by positing a real character that is really embodied in something external to us--a real possibility that may be (and is) embodied in other things, as well. GR: Have they themselves even experimented with phenomenological observation through methods which yield such 'maybes' as those described above? It seems to me that the issue boils down to where the lines are drawn between Phenomenology, Normative Science (especially Semeiotic), and Metaphysics; and it is at least arguable--recent List debates notwithstanding--that not much is ultimately riding on that particular determination, since such classifications are somewhat arbitrary. My own more abstract bent is presumably what attracts me to Semeiotic, and makes it difficult for me to appreciate Phenomenology as you clearly do. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
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