Gary F., List: GF: I agree, and apparently my post was no help to you — so this reply probably won’t help either, but …
Both have helped me recognize the extent of my ignorance/confusion. GF: Those statements are contradictory only if you think that it’s impossible to see, or hear, or touch anything *without thinking or talking* about it. Do you really think that? If I see, hear, or touch something without thinking about it, is it accurate to say that it is present to my mind? In any case, the apparent contradiction was between saying that a percept "does not stand for anything" (1903) and saying that "a Percept is a Seme" (1906). Perhaps the capitalization in the latter case signals a subtle difference in meaning? GF: As for “mind,” in phaneroscopy you have to cleanse your mind of any preconceived meaning that word has, except that it’s that “before” which, or “to” which, anything and everything appears. You also have to cleanse the term “appear” of any traces of the appearance/reality dualism that might be clinging to it. Likewise the subject/object dualism has to drop away from “object.” That sounds suspiciously like doubting everything for the sake of a maxim. GF: All sorts of things can be “before the mind” that are not percepts. Could you please provide some examples, other than products of the imagination (including dreams)? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Mar 17, 2019 at 5:33 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, a couple of responses inserted … > > Gary f. > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 17-Mar-19 17:03 > > Gary F., List: > > So far, this thread is confirming my suspicion from the outset that I do > not really "get" phenomenology. > > GF: I agree, and apparently my post was no help to you — so this reply > probably won’t help either, but … > > GF: Not all phenomena are semiosic, so talking about phenomena is not > automatically talking about semiosis. > > Not all phenomena are semeiosic, but all thinking and talking *about > *phenomena > are semeiosic. Would you say, then, that we have a *semeiotica utens* > that enables us to do the latter without any kind of formal Speculative > Grammar? > > GF: Of course we do. It’s called “language.” It’s the same *semeiotica > utens* that physicists use when they talk about physical phenomena > (without knowing anything about linguistics). The special difficulty of > phaneroscopic language is that there is nothing special about the phaneron: > it’s right there in everyone’s face *all the time*, and that makes it > difficult to talk about. (As Wittgenstein also noticed.) > > Did Peirce ever say something along those lines, beyond his references to > a *logica utens*? > > GF: Peirce would not say anything so obvious. > > GF: Peirce does not say there that we think *through *phenomena; he says > we think *through* signs: > > Right, all thinking is in Signs--including the predicates that we prescind > from the phenomena, the subjects that we abstract from those predicates, > and the propositions that we formulate by connecting those subjects. How, > then, can anything be "before the mind" that is *not *a Sign? According > to Peirce, "a Percept is a Seme" (CP 4.539; 1906), although previously he > had said that a percept or "image" in the *psychological *sense "makes no > professions of any kind, essentially embodies no intentions of any kind, > does not stand for anything" (CP 7.619; 1903).'' How should we reconcile > these seemingly contradictory statements? > > GF: Those statements are contradictory only if you think that it’s > impossible to see, or hear, or touch anything *without thinking or > talking* about it. Do you really think that? > > It’s true that terms like “mind” and “percept” don’t fit comfortably as > phaneroscopic terms; like “person,” they are sops to Cerberus. That’s why > he invented the “prebit” to occupy that niche in the phaneroscopic > ecosystem. As for “mind,” in phaneroscopy you have to cleanse your mind of > any preconceived meaning that word has, except that it’s that “before” > which, or “to” which, anything and everything *appears*. You also have to > cleanse the term “appear” of any traces of the appearance/reality dualism > that might be clinging to it. Likewise the subject/object dualism has to > drop away from “object.” (As for “categories,” you might better forget the > term altogether in this context.) > > GF: The phaneron contains everything that is or can be “before the mind” > in any way, including objects and realities. > > Are objects and realities *themselves *before the mind, or only our > Percepts of them as Signs? > > GF: You seem to be assuming that phenomenology is limited to analysis of > *perception*. All sorts of things can be “before the mind” that are not > percepts. Phenomenology claims only that those appearances *really appear*. > Whether they turn out to be objects or realities or feelings or > hallucinations is for logic to decide. > > Is it not our Perceptual Judgments as Retroductive hypotheses that > *posit *Objects determining those Percepts (cf. CP 5.181, EP 2:227; > 1903), and Reality as that which is as it is regardless of how we think > about it (cf. NEM 4:343; 1898)? Is Atkins right that "Since the phaneron > is a collection, it has parts"? If so, then why did Peirce say that "The > image has no parts," such that we must *create *predicates by means of > precission (NEM 3:917; 1904)? > > GF: ... it is the task of phenomenology to recognize Secondness (and > Thirdness and Firstness) as elements of the phaneron. > > My understanding is that we do this by first recognizing 3ns > (representation/mediation)--which "pours in upon us through every avenue of > sense" (CP 5.157, EP 2:211; 1903)--then prescinding 2ns (relation/reaction) > from 3ns, and then prescinding 1ns (quality) from 2ns and 3ns. What am I > missing or misunderstanding? > > GF: We prescind the elements of the phaneron from the phaneron, not from > each other. Once you have the *concept* of 3ns, then you can prescind the > *concept* of 2ns from it, and so on. But the concepts are not the > elements, any more than the map is the territory. As for what you’re > missing, I agree with Gary R: you have to *practice* phenomenology before > you can understand it. Peirce gives some pretty good pointers on how to do > that, and that’s what you need to study before you try to derive a concept > of phenomenology from Peirce’s writings on logic as semeiotic. >
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