Jon, list, For now, I'll respond briefly to clarify a few things and expand on at least one.
GR: I've argued that we can go "beyond merely observing" phenomena (the very first act of a phenomenologist but, in my view, certainly not the last) by employing a logica utens. JAS: Again, would you extend this to being a *semeiotica utens* that we can employ without a formal Speculative Grammar? A while back, in another thread, I suggested this very thing, that is: since a phenomenologist may be observing all sorts of phenomena including signific things, and yet he has no real need of a formal Semeiotic, logica utens really does mean something like semeiotica utens. But since every Peircean phenomenologist already knows that Peirce considered logic as semeiotic, there's no need for another term: logica utens really ought to do. And, as Gary F wrote re: the character of what be termed a semeiotica utens: GF: It’s called “language.” It’s the same *semeiotica utens* that physicists use when they talk about physical phenomena (without knowing anything about linguistics). The special difficulty of phaneroscopic language is that there is nothing special about the phaneron: it’s right there in everyone’s face *all the time*, and that makes it difficult to talk about. Continuing: GR: Peirce did not associate "suchness" exclusively with 1ns. See, for example: CSP: [. . .]. God and light are the subjects. The act of creation is to be regarded, not as any third object, but merely as the suchness of connection of God and light. The dyad is the fact. (CP 1.326-327; c. 1903) JAS. . Notice that the "suchness" is the *latter *aspect, which is "of monoidal character"; the "connection of God and light" that corresponds to the *syntax *of the proposition expressing the dyadic fact, rather than "any third object." I suggest accordingly that the "suchness" in this context is a 1ns of 2ns. I don't read it this way. But let's look at the other passage I quoted: CSP: A dyad consists of two subjects brought into oneness. [. . .] They are two, if not really, at least in aspect. There is also some sort of union of them. The dyad is not the subjects; it has the subjects as one element of it. It has, besides, a suchness of monoidal character; *and it has suchness, or suchnesses, peculiar to it as a dyad*. CP 1.326 Besides a monoidal suchness, the dyad "has suchness, or suchnesses, peculiar to it as a dyad." I take the plural form of suchness here to relate to Peirce's understanding that subject 'a' will relate to subject 'b' in a somewhat different way from which subject 'b' relates to subject 'a'. In any event, *the suchness is "peculiar to it as a dyad.*" GR: Btw, why do you think that in a discussion of phenomena that Peirce offers these examples (magenta, attar, love, etc.)? JAS: My guess is that he assumed his readers at the time would already be familiar with them from previous Collateral Experience--perhaps of an especially vivid nature--and hence could proceed to participate in the subsequent thought experiment (or "feeling experiment") of prescinding each quality *in itself* as a "may-be" from the *actual *experience of it. But then, say, if two people have collateral experiences of several qualities *in themselves* (which have been characterized by them through a logica/semeiotica utens), they can then discuss many matters, some of which may be of potential interest to phenomenology and to other sciences, for example and perhaps especially, to metaphysics. I mean this in the sense in which (and I use this only as a kind of shorthand for myriad comparisons, etc.) Atkins argues that there are ways in which seeing a scarlet red is like hearing a trumpet's blare. GR: I think one needs to do Phenomenology in order to appreciate it. JAS: Probably so, but I obviously still have trouble just figuring out *what it is* so that I might *attempt *to do it. Perhaps I simply lack the requisite faculties for engaging in that discipline as a *scientific * pursuit. As I mentioned in an earlier post, I think that strong logical minds may indeed find it difficult to engage in phenomenological research since they have a tendency to translate most everything they come upon in terms of logic as semeiotic. Still, as Gary F suggested, Peirce offers many hints on how to prepare oneself for phenenological inquiry while acknowledging that it is a difficult science which not all may be well suited to. The way I began my own phenomenological research was to engage in musement as Peirce describes it in the Neglected Argument. If one who had determined to make trial of Musement as a favorite recreation were to ask me for advice, I should reply as follows: The dawn and the gloaming most invite one to Musement; but I have found no watch of the nychthemeron that has not its own advantages for the pursuit. It begins passively enough with drinking in the impression of some nook in one of the three Universes. But impression soon passes into attentive observation, observation into musing, musing into a lively give and take of communion between self and self. If one’s observations and reflections are allowed to specialize themselves too much, the Play will be converted into scientific study; and that cannot be pursued in odd half hours. "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," 1908, CP 6.458-459 I'm not suggesting that musement itself is equivalent to phenomenological investigation. But I do recall that when, decades ago, I began to passively "[drink] in the impression of some nook in one of the three Universes," for me, after at least a month or two absorbing what I could of the first universe," the "very air-nothingness" of mere "Ideas" (in the Platonic sense) which may *possibly* be thought, I made some phenomenological discoveries. After moving on to 2ns (or, as you've been insisting, the 2nd universe) and 3ns, I began to move "[f]rom speculations on the homogeneities of each Universe, [passing] to the consideration of homogeneities and connections between two different Universes, or all three." Again, this is not phenomenology per se, but I think it constitutes an excellent propaedeutic to phenomenological inquiry. I think all logicians should try engaging in musement. Best, Gary R. *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Sun, Mar 17, 2019 at 5:17 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > At the risk of causing further frustration ... > > GR: I've argued that we can go "beyond merely observing" phenomena (the > very first act of a phenomenologist but, in my view, certainly not the > last) by employing a logica utens. > > > Again, would you extend this to being a *semeiotica utens* that we can > employ without a formal Speculative Grammar? > > GR: Peirce did not associate "suchness" exclusively with 1ns. See, for > example: > > > CSP: The dyad is not the subjects; it has the subjects as one element of > it. It has, besides, a suchness of monoidal character; and it has suchness, > or suchnesses, peculiar to it as a dyad ... God and light are the > subjects. The act of creation is to be regarded, not as any third object, > but merely as the suchness of connection of God and light. The dyad is the > fact. (CP 1.326-327; c. 1903) > > > This text seems to anticipate Peirce's late 1908 analysis of a proposition > into multiple subjects "married" by a single continuous predicate. Notice > that the "suchness" is the *latter *aspect, which is "of monoidal > character"; the "connection of God and light" that corresponds to the *syntax > *of the proposition expressing the dyadic fact, rather than "any third > object." I suggest accordingly that the "suchness" in this context is a > 1ns of 2ns. > > GR: Btw, why do you think that in a discussion of phenomena that Peirce > offers these examples (magenta, attar, love, etc.)? > > > My guess is that he assumed his readers at the time would already be > familiar with them from previous Collateral Experience--perhaps of an > especially vivid nature--and hence could proceed to participate in the > subsequent thought experiment (or "feeling experiment") of prescinding each > quality *in itself* as a "may-be" from the *actual *experience of it. In > my case, though, I am not aware of ever having smelled attar or tasted > quinine. > > GR: I think one needs to do Phenomenology in order to appreciate it. > > > Probably so, but I obviously still have trouble just figuring out *what > it is* so that I might *attempt *to do it. Perhaps I simply lack the > requisite faculties for engaging in that discipline as a *scientific * > pursuit. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> >> *Sent:* 16-Mar-19 16:55 >> *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> >> *Subject:* Re: Phenomenology: a "science-egg," was [PEIRCE-L] The >> Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism >> >> >> >> Jon, Gary F List, >> >> I think I've said about all I have to say for now and I certainly don't >> want to start repeating myself, although I may reiterate a point or two in >> this message. I would tend to agree with the thrust of Gary F's views >> (although I'd like him to unpack a bit further the final paragraph in the >> message he sent today). For now I will just offer a few comments regarding >> our (JAS's and Gary R's) disagreements regarding phenomenology. >> >> JAS: ". . .I still struggle to see how anyone can think or talk *about * >> Phenomenology *without *engaging in Semeiotic. After all, any fact is >> always expressed in a *proposition*; but as soon as we think or say >> something *about *a phenomenon using a proposition, we are going beyond >> merely *observing *that phenomenon in itself--we are now *representing* >> it *with *something else, and *relating* it *to *something else. >> >> I've argued that we can go "beyond merely observing" phenomena (the very >> first act of a phenomenologist but, in my view, certainly not the last) by >> employing a logica utens. Logica utens is NOT Semeiotic, while it is found >> quite essential for mathematicians and, as I've argued, for >> phenomenologists. To say that x is a 1ns or that y is a 3ns, or that w is a >> trichotomy-- >> >> (1ns) >> >> |> (3ns) >> >> (2ns) >> >> --does not require Semeiotic, just acts of ordinary logic. >> >> JAS: Peirce consistently associated "suchness" with 1ns, and that is >> only one irreducible element of the phenomena. >> >> I disagree. Peirce did not associate "suchness" exclusively with 1ns. >> See, for example: >> >> A dyad consists of two subjects brought into oneness. These subjects have >> their modes of being in themselves, and they also have their modes of >> being, as first and second, etc., in connection with each other. They are >> two, if not really, at least in aspect. There is also some sort of union of >> them. The dyad is not the subjects; it has the subjects as one element of >> it. It has, besides, a suchness of monoidal character; *and it has >> suchness, or suchnesses, peculiar to it as a dyad*. CP 1.326 >> >> As an example of a dyad take this: God said, Let there be light, and >> there was light. We must not think of this as a verse of Genesis, for >> Genesis would be a third thing. Neither must we think of it as proposed for >> our acceptance, or as held for true; for we are third parties. We must >> simply think of God creating light by fiat. Not that the fiat and the >> coming into being of the light were two facts; but that it is in one >> indivisible fact. God and light are the subjects. *The act of creation >> is to be regarded, not as any third object, but merely as the suchness of >> connection of God and light*. The dyad is the fact. CP 1.327 (See also >> 1.322) >> >> GR: But 'seme' is a term of logic as semeiotic, indeed a rather >> developed semeiotic. So are 'precission' and 'predicates' (and 'hypostatic >> abstraction' in the passage quoted below). >> >> JAS: So is "object," yet Peirce seemingly used it at a synonym for >> "phenomenon" in 1903. Hypostatic abstraction is what turns an observed >> phenomenon into an *object *of thought and discourse--i.e., an Object of >> Signs--without necessarily taking a position on its *reality*. >> >> You wrote, "So is "object," yet Peirce seemingly used it at a synonym for >> "phenomenon" in 1903." There appears to me to be an act equivalent to >> "hypostatic abstraction" in logica utens (that is not involve Semeiotic) >> once one has made ones phaneroscopic observation. But, be that as it may, >> as Gary F wrote: >> >> GF: A phenomenon is an object *of attention*. It becomes the object *of >> a sign* when the sign is uttered. >> >> Continuing: >> >> GR: Hypostatic abstraction, continuous predicate, proposition, etc. are >> terms of semeiotic, and what you've described above is, as I see it, a >> posteriori work logic does upon the factual findings and principles of >> phenomenology uncovered. >> >> JAS: I agree that all of those fall under Semeiotic as thinking *about *the >> "facts of phenomenology," rather than observing the phenomena themselves >> and thinking *through *them (cf. CP 4.549; 1906), which I currently see >> as the scope of Phenomenology itself. >> >> As Gary F recently wrote: >> >> GF: Peirce does not say there that we think *through* phenomena; he says >> we think *through *signs. . . >> >> I would add what I have repeatedly been trying to get across, namely, >> that the signs Phenomenologist think through are the ordinary ones of a >> logica utens. Should there be errors in their logic, a more developed >> semeiotic can retrospectively correct them. >> >> GR: Examples of 1ns would seem to be easier to describe than 2ns or 3ns. >> >> JAS: But what you went on to quote from Peirce are not *descriptions*; >> they can only be properly interpreted by those who are able to associate >> such concepts with previous Collateral Experience, whether direct or >> indirect. Someone not *already *acquainted with magenta, attar, railway >> whistles, quinine, mathematics, or love could understand and learn >> *nothing *from mere invocations of their color, odor, sound, taste, or >> emotional quality. >> >> You are quite right that these are not descriptions and that one needs >> collateral experience to discuss them which, however, doesn't require >> Semeiotic. Btw, why do you think that in a discussion of phenomena that >> Peirce offers these examples (magenta, attar, love, etc.)? Perhaps there's >> some philosophical value in contemplating such things as Adkins does in the >> final chapter of his book on phenomenology: "How seeing a scarlet red is >> like hearing a trumpet's blare." >> >> JAS: I am still not convinced that such *abstraction *properly falls >> within Phenomenology; the Phaneron contains no objects and no realities, >> only "images" (De Tienne's term). We *prescind *the red color in the >> Percept, which in itself has no parts, creating a *predicate*; then we >> *abstract *the quality of redness as an *object *capable of >> representation in a Perceptual Judgment, creating a *subject*; and then >> we *generalize *by positing a *real *character that is *really *embodied >> in something *external *to us--a *real *possibility that may be (and is) >> embodied in *other *things, as well. >> >> If one restricts the work of the phenomenologist to merely observing the >> phenomena, seemingly not permitting him even to offer examples of what he >> finds there for, say, another phenomenologist to observe in order to >> compare notes, his associating them with one or more of the categories, >> their finding trichotomies and vectors and strings of these, etc, then you >> have so eviscerated phenomenology that all that is seemingly left are >> internal, subjective observations by some individual of use to no one. What >> a puny non-science that would be! Must every phenomenologist immediately >> become a semeiotician even to report what he observes? I doubt that. I most >> certainly hope not! >> >> JAS: It seems to me that the issue boils down to where the lines are >> drawn between Phenomenology, Normative Science (especially Semeiotic), and >> Metaphysics; and it is at least arguable [. . .] that not much is >> ultimately riding on that particular determination, since such >> classifications are somewhat arbitrary. >> >> There may be some arbitrariness in "such classification," but I certainly >> do not agree "that not much is ultimately riding on that particular >> determination." Indeed, it seems to me that, for example, conflating >> Phenomenology and Semeiotic, or Semeiotic and Metaphysics is extremely >> risky, And proposing not drawing lines between all the sciences from >> Phenomenology through Metaphysics is certainly not Peircean, even though he >> thought that sciences higher in his classification ought offer principles >> to those lower. And even while you've reiterated that Peirce remarked that >> the principles of Semeiotic would, mutatis mutandis, become those of >> Metaphysics, there is plenty original, non-Semeiotic (qua the science) work >> to be done in Metaphysics. Semeioticians and Phenomenologists have their >> own discrete work to do. So I rather fully disagree with your suggestion >> that "not much is riding" on drawing lines between the several cenoscopic >> sciences. >> >> JAS: My own more abstract bent is presumably what attracts me to >> Semeiotic, and makes it difficult for me to appreciate Phenomenology as you >> clearly do. >> >> I think one needs to do Phenomenology in order to appreciate it. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > >
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