Gary R., List: At the risk of causing further frustration ...
GR: I've argued that we can go "beyond merely observing" phenomena (the very first act of a phenomenologist but, in my view, certainly not the last) by employing a logica utens. Again, would you extend this to being a *semeiotica utens* that we can employ without a formal Speculative Grammar? GR: Peirce did not associate "suchness" exclusively with 1ns. See, for example: CSP: The dyad is not the subjects; it has the subjects as one element of it. It has, besides, a suchness of monoidal character; and it has suchness, or suchnesses, peculiar to it as a dyad ... God and light are the subjects. The act of creation is to be regarded, not as any third object, but merely as the suchness of connection of God and light. The dyad is the fact. (CP 1.326-327; c. 1903) This text seems to anticipate Peirce's late 1908 analysis of a proposition into multiple subjects "married" by a single continuous predicate. Notice that the "suchness" is the *latter *aspect, which is "of monoidal character"; the "connection of God and light" that corresponds to the *syntax *of the proposition expressing the dyadic fact, rather than "any third object." I suggest accordingly that the "suchness" in this context is a 1ns of 2ns. GR: Btw, why do you think that in a discussion of phenomena that Peirce offers these examples (magenta, attar, love, etc.)? My guess is that he assumed his readers at the time would already be familiar with them from previous Collateral Experience--perhaps of an especially vivid nature--and hence could proceed to participate in the subsequent thought experiment (or "feeling experiment") of prescinding each quality *in itself* as a "may-be" from the *actual *experience of it. In my case, though, I am not aware of ever having smelled attar or tasted quinine. GR: I think one needs to do Phenomenology in order to appreciate it. Probably so, but I obviously still have trouble just figuring out *what it is* so that I might *attempt *to do it. Perhaps I simply lack the requisite faculties for engaging in that discipline as a *scientific * pursuit. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > > *Sent:* 16-Mar-19 16:55 > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: Phenomenology: a "science-egg," was [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock > Beneath Pragmaticism > > > > Jon, Gary F List, > > I think I've said about all I have to say for now and I certainly don't > want to start repeating myself, although I may reiterate a point or two in > this message. I would tend to agree with the thrust of Gary F's views > (although I'd like him to unpack a bit further the final paragraph in the > message he sent today). For now I will just offer a few comments regarding > our (JAS's and Gary R's) disagreements regarding phenomenology. > > JAS: ". . .I still struggle to see how anyone can think or talk *about * > Phenomenology *without *engaging in Semeiotic. After all, any fact is > always expressed in a *proposition*; but as soon as we think or say > something *about *a phenomenon using a proposition, we are going beyond > merely *observing *that phenomenon in itself--we are now *representing* > it *with *something else, and *relating* it *to *something else. > > I've argued that we can go "beyond merely observing" phenomena (the very > first act of a phenomenologist but, in my view, certainly not the last) by > employing a logica utens. Logica utens is NOT Semeiotic, while it is found > quite essential for mathematicians and, as I've argued, for > phenomenologists. To say that x is a 1ns or that y is a 3ns, or that w is a > trichotomy-- > > (1ns) > > |> (3ns) > > (2ns) > > --does not require Semeiotic, just acts of ordinary logic. > > JAS: Peirce consistently associated "suchness" with 1ns, and that is only > one irreducible element of the phenomena. > > I disagree. Peirce did not associate "suchness" exclusively with 1ns. See, > for example: > > A dyad consists of two subjects brought into oneness. These subjects have > their modes of being in themselves, and they also have their modes of > being, as first and second, etc., in connection with each other. They are > two, if not really, at least in aspect. There is also some sort of union of > them. The dyad is not the subjects; it has the subjects as one element of > it. It has, besides, a suchness of monoidal character; *and it has > suchness, or suchnesses, peculiar to it as a dyad*. CP 1.326 > > As an example of a dyad take this: God said, Let there be light, and there > was light. We must not think of this as a verse of Genesis, for Genesis > would be a third thing. Neither must we think of it as proposed for our > acceptance, or as held for true; for we are third parties. We must simply > think of God creating light by fiat. Not that the fiat and the coming into > being of the light were two facts; but that it is in one indivisible fact. > God and light are the subjects. *The act of creation is to be regarded, > not as any third object, but merely as the suchness of connection of God > and light*. The dyad is the fact. CP 1.327 (See also 1.322) > > GR: But 'seme' is a term of logic as semeiotic, indeed a rather developed > semeiotic. So are 'precission' and 'predicates' (and 'hypostatic > abstraction' in the passage quoted below). > > JAS: So is "object," yet Peirce seemingly used it at a synonym for > "phenomenon" in 1903. Hypostatic abstraction is what turns an observed > phenomenon into an *object *of thought and discourse--i.e., an Object of > Signs--without necessarily taking a position on its *reality*. > > You wrote, "So is "object," yet Peirce seemingly used it at a synonym for > "phenomenon" in 1903." There appears to me to be an act equivalent to > "hypostatic abstraction" in logica utens (that is not involve Semeiotic) > once one has made ones phaneroscopic observation. But, be that as it may, > as Gary F wrote: > > GF: A phenomenon is an object *of attention*. It becomes the object *of a > sign* when the sign is uttered. > > Continuing: > > GR: Hypostatic abstraction, continuous predicate, proposition, etc. are > terms of semeiotic, and what you've described above is, as I see it, a > posteriori work logic does upon the factual findings and principles of > phenomenology uncovered. > > JAS: I agree that all of those fall under Semeiotic as thinking *about *the > "facts of phenomenology," rather than observing the phenomena themselves > and thinking *through *them (cf. CP 4.549; 1906), which I currently see > as the scope of Phenomenology itself. > > As Gary F recently wrote: > > GF: Peirce does not say there that we think *through* phenomena; he says > we think *through *signs. . . > > I would add what I have repeatedly been trying to get across, namely, that > the signs Phenomenologist think through are the ordinary ones of a logica > utens. Should there be errors in their logic, a more developed semeiotic > can retrospectively correct them. > > GR: Examples of 1ns would seem to be easier to describe than 2ns or 3ns. > > JAS: But what you went on to quote from Peirce are not *descriptions*; > they can only be properly interpreted by those who are able to associate > such concepts with previous Collateral Experience, whether direct or > indirect. Someone not *already *acquainted with magenta, attar, railway > whistles, quinine, mathematics, or love could understand and learn > *nothing *from mere invocations of their color, odor, sound, taste, or > emotional quality. > > You are quite right that these are not descriptions and that one needs > collateral experience to discuss them which, however, doesn't require > Semeiotic. Btw, why do you think that in a discussion of phenomena that > Peirce offers these examples (magenta, attar, love, etc.)? Perhaps there's > some philosophical value in contemplating such things as Adkins does in the > final chapter of his book on phenomenology: "How seeing a scarlet red is > like hearing a trumpet's blare." > > JAS: I am still not convinced that such *abstraction *properly falls > within Phenomenology; the Phaneron contains no objects and no realities, > only "images" (De Tienne's term). We *prescind *the red color in the > Percept, which in itself has no parts, creating a *predicate*; then we > *abstract *the quality of redness as an *object *capable of > representation in a Perceptual Judgment, creating a *subject*; and then > we *generalize *by positing a *real *character that is *really *embodied > in something *external *to us--a *real *possibility that may be (and is) > embodied in *other *things, as well. > > If one restricts the work of the phenomenologist to merely observing the > phenomena, seemingly not permitting him even to offer examples of what he > finds there for, say, another phenomenologist to observe in order to > compare notes, his associating them with one or more of the categories, > their finding trichotomies and vectors and strings of these, etc, then you > have so eviscerated phenomenology that all that is seemingly left are > internal, subjective observations by some individual of use to no one. What > a puny non-science that would be! Must every phenomenologist immediately > become a semeiotician even to report what he observes? I doubt that. I most > certainly hope not! > > JAS: It seems to me that the issue boils down to where the lines are drawn > between Phenomenology, Normative Science (especially Semeiotic), and > Metaphysics; and it is at least arguable [. . .] that not much is > ultimately riding on that particular determination, since such > classifications are somewhat arbitrary. > > There may be some arbitrariness in "such classification," but I certainly > do not agree "that not much is ultimately riding on that particular > determination." Indeed, it seems to me that, for example, conflating > Phenomenology and Semeiotic, or Semeiotic and Metaphysics is extremely > risky, And proposing not drawing lines between all the sciences from > Phenomenology through Metaphysics is certainly not Peircean, even though he > thought that sciences higher in his classification ought offer principles > to those lower. And even while you've reiterated that Peirce remarked that > the principles of Semeiotic would, mutatis mutandis, become those of > Metaphysics, there is plenty original, non-Semeiotic (qua the science) work > to be done in Metaphysics. Semeioticians and Phenomenologists have their > own discrete work to do. So I rather fully disagree with your suggestion > that "not much is riding" on drawing lines between the several cenoscopic > sciences. > > JAS: My own more abstract bent is presumably what attracts me to > Semeiotic, and makes it difficult for me to appreciate Phenomenology as you > clearly do. > > I think one needs to do Phenomenology in order to appreciate it. > > Best, > > Gary R >
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