Gary F., List: So far, this thread is confirming my suspicion from the outset that I do not really "get" phenomenology.
GF: Not all phenomena are semiosic, so talking about phenomena is not automatically talking about semiosis. Not all phenomena are semeiosic, but all thinking and talking *about *phenomena are semeiosic. Would you say, then, that we have a *semeiotica utens* that enables us to do the latter without any kind of formal Speculative Grammar? Did Peirce ever say something along those lines, beyond his references to a *logica utens*? GF: Peirce does not say there that we think *through *phenomena; he says we think *through* signs: Right, all thinking is in Signs--including the predicates that we prescind from the phenomena, the subjects that we abstract from those predicates, and the propositions that we formulate by connecting those subjects. How, then, can anything be "before the mind" that is *not *a Sign? According to Peirce, "a Percept is a Seme" (CP 4.539; 1906), although previously he had said that a percept or "image" in the *psychological *sense "makes no professions of any kind, essentially embodies no intentions of any kind, does not stand for anything" (CP 7.619; 1903).'' How should we reconcile these seemingly contradictory statements? GF: The phaneron contains everything that is or can be “before the mind” in any way, including objects and realities. Are objects and realities *themselves *before the mind, or only our Percepts of them as Signs? Is it not our Perceptual Judgments as Retroductive hypotheses that *posit *Objects determining those Percepts (cf. CP 5.181, EP 2:227; 1903), and Reality as that which is as it is regardless of how we think about it (cf. NEM 4:343; 1898)? Is Atkins right that "Since the phaneron is a collection, it has parts"? If so, then why did Peirce say that "The image has no parts," such that we must *create *predicates by means of precission (NEM 3:917; 1904)? GF: ... it is the task of phenomenology to recognize Secondness (and Thirdness and Firstness) as elements of the phaneron. My understanding is that we do this by first recognizing 3ns (representation/mediation)--which "pours in upon us through every avenue of sense" (CP 5.157, EP 2:211; 1903)--then prescinding 2ns (relation/reaction) from 3ns, and then prescinding 1ns (quality) from 2ns and 3ns. What am I missing or misunderstanding? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Mar 16, 2019 at 8:00 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Gary R, > > What Peirce himself says about phenomenology/phaneroscopy seem to me much > more clear and direct than the questions you are struggling with here, so > I’ll confine myself here to flagging instances where I think your usage of > Peircean terms is based on a misreading of Peirce (and/or Atkins). I think > the problems you are dealing with are likely to vanish if these misreadings > are cleared up. > > JAS: I still struggle to see how anyone can think or talk *about > *Phenomenology > *without *engaging in Semeiotic. After all, any fact is always expressed > in a *proposition*; but as soon as we think or say something *about *a > phenomenon using a proposition, we are going beyond merely *observing *that > phenomenon in itself--we are now *representing* it *with *something else, > and *relating* it *to *something else. > > GF: You can’t talk about anything without engaging in *semiosis*. But > you’re not engaging in *Semeiotic* unless you are talking about *semiosis*. > Not all phenomena are semiosic, so talking about phenomena is not > automatically talking about semiosis. > > JAS: Peirce seemingly used "object" as a synonym for "phenomenon" in 1903. > > GF: A phenomenon is an object *of attention*. It becomes the object *of a > sign* when the sign is uttered. > > GR: Hypostatic abstraction, continuous predicate, proposition, etc. are > terms of semeiotic, and what you've described above is, as I see it, a > posteriori work logic does upon the factual findings and principles of > phenomenology uncovered. > > JAS: I agree that all of those fall under Semeiotic as thinking *about *the > "facts of phenomenology," rather than observing the phenomena themselves > and thinking *through *them (cf. CP 4.549; 1906), which I currently see > as the scope of Phenomenology itself. > > GF: Peirce does not say there that we think *through* phenomena; he says > we think *through* signs: > > CSP: [[ That wonderful operation of hypostatic abstraction by which we > seem to create *entia rationis* that are, nevertheless, sometimes real, > furnishes us the means of turning predicates from being signs that we think > or think *through*, into being subjects thought of. We thus think of the > thought-sign itself, making it the object of another thought-sign. ]] > > GF: Signs are phenomena too, of course, but phenomena are not signs unless > they refer to *other* phenomena. > > JAS: the Phaneron contains no objects and no realities, only "images" (De > Tienne's term). > > GF: The phaneron contains everything that is or can be “before the mind” > in any way, including objects and realities. An object must first *appear* > in order to act as an object of attention or of a sign. A thing must > *appear,* must be present to the mind, in order to be recognized as *real*. > That recognition is logical and metaphysical, not phenomenology, but it is > the Secondness of the phenomenon (to the mind) which underwrites its > reality, and it is the task of phenomenology to recognize Secondness (and > Thirdness and Firstness) as elements of the phaneron. Those three terms > are, of course, hypostatic abstractions, but the objects of those signs are > not. They are “subjects thought of” which are more *elementary* than > anything we say or think about them. > > Gary f. >
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