“Whatever withstands us is real.” Of course, because reality is all. But the implication here must be that there is something that is unreal. I know the blunt truth argument. But I see Second as being Ethics and ethical matters of what is good, matters of conscience, seem distinctly lacking in discussions of philosophy once you get past Rawls or back to virtues. I reject the notion of a triad needing to contain resistance other than to values -- whether to accept them or not. The reason I have a fixed system of Reality Ethics Aesthetics is because the latter two categories are buried in Peirce through seen as normative. This triad can be applied to choices that have real world consciousness. It can issue in measurable acts and expressions. It can be taught to the person on the street. It is in short an advance of philosophy from the academy to the universe and I think Peirce imagined that heaven smiles on such an evolution. Did he achieve it? Implicitly yes. Explicitly clearly not.
On Sun, Mar 17, 2019 at 11:55 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, list, > > I’m not sure what needs to be “unpacked” in the final paragraph of my post > from yesterday, but I recently came across something that may illuminate my > remark that “it is the Secondness of the phenomenon (to the mind) which > underwrites its reality.” I meant that as an example of how Peirce’s > metaphysics (ontology) takes a principle from phaneroscopy via logic. I > think Peirce put that point most succinctly by saying “Whatever > withstands us is real.” > > The context of that statement is Peirce’s 1894 revision of “How to Make > Our Ideas Clear” (originally published in 1878). He wrote this with the > intention of turning that essay into a chapter of his 1894 book *How to > Reason* (which was never published). For this purpose he replaced the > original ending (EP1:140-1, CP 5.409-10) with the passage below. I consider > this an example of Peirce’s phenomenological thinking *avant la lettre*, > as he didn’t explicitly mention phenomenology as a science distinct from > logic until 1902, but some of his earlier writings are based on the kind of > observation he would later designate as phenomenological (and still later, > as phaneroscopic). This one is from R422: 15–19, as given in Cornelis de > Waal’s edition of *Illustrations of the Logic of Science*: > > [[ Observe that the conception we have developed is that the reality of > the real consists in a real unanimity being destined to be reached, that is > beyond human control. We are therefore assigning to ideas, to their > history, and to the agreement of many minds a reality more direct and > primary than the reality of any *thing*. Are we to say that the fact that > there is such a thing as an opinion consists in the fact that there is an > opinion that there is an opinion? We plainly must hold that the reality of > an idea is a reality *ipso facto*. If I see a red light, that light is > red to itself and by itself, and no appeal to any other person to say how > it looks to me can help the reality of its appearance one whit. There is > the light; I see it; it is over against me! We shall find, too, when we > come to examine the matter, that the reality of time is in part directly > perceived. That all time hangs consistently together, though I will be > sleeping or inattentive, I gather in various ways. But for a little I can > perceive a gradual change in the light before me. The color of the light > appears gradually to change, and as the light is nothing but appearance, > there seems little room to doubt that the appearance really does appear > gradually to change. I appear to perceive a direct appearance of change, > and so of time. That time is then directly real, like the light, or is real > by and in the light. If then various reasons lead me to think this time > connects appearances I do not directly perceive to be so connected, those > are reasons for thinking that time had a reality in the appearances quite > apart from any and all opinions that might be held about it. By > considerations such as this, we shall be step by step brought to admit that > ideas, their history in time, and their spread in space, have self-reality. > So that all that we have been saying comes to this that the reality of > things that are not *ideas* consists in the reality and permanence of the > ideas in which those things are represented. But if it can be shown that > the Great Pyramid, for example, whose reality we make to consist in the > persistence of it as an object of opinion, is itself at bottom a living > idea,— and not merely the *object* of an idea,— then, and then alone, it > may possess as idea a self-reality. It is the same with my own existence. I > have an instinctive idea of myself, but no direct perception of myself, > that is, of the living being behind (or before) my perceptions. I know > myself as I know another man, only much more familiarly. My reality is > quite distinct from the reality of the ideas I perceive; and unless it can > be shown that I am an idea or a real connection of ideas the only thing > that can be meant by my reality is the consistency of the final opinion > that I am what I am. But many psychologists would say that I am precisely a > coördination of ideas; just as many metaphysicians would hold that the > Great Pyramid is a living idea, and not merely the object of an idea. > > Let us further remark that it is the lower order of clearness to which the > higher is obliged to conform. If our abstract definition of the real, that > it is that whose characters are independent of what any individual or any > given individuals may think them to be, if this were in decided conflict > with the familiar use of the idea, it would be the abstract definition > which would have to be altered. And again, when we seek to make this more > clear by translating the whole into what is directly known to us, that is > ideas, if this translation did not fit the abstract definition, it is the > translation that would have to give way. If it does fit, it is because of > the intractable character of the destined final opinion which none of us > can in the least modify by any willful effort. Whatever withstands us is > real. Though we can only apprehend ideas, and to have a clear meaning must > mean something about ideas, yet it is a certain intractableness of certain > ideas which can make them representative of the real. Hence, the reality of > external things is a reality, because those things do not yield but > withstand us, that is to say, the idea of them does this, because they > persistently and consistently bear down every opinion to the contrary. ]] > > Peirce’s broad and liberal use of the word *idea* here might make it > sound like a form of idealism, and indeed it follows closely upon Peirce’s > *Monist* series of the early 1890s where he espoused an “objective > idealism” similar to Schelling’s (EP1:293, CP 6.25). Anyway, although > Peirce does not use the term “Secondness” here, I think that’s what he is > referring to when he says that “Whatever withstands us is real”; and I > take that ontological assertion to be based on logical inference from > phenomenological observation. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 16-Mar-19 16:55 > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: Phenomenology: a "science-egg," was [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock > Beneath Pragmaticism > > > > Jon, Gary F List, > > I think I've said about all I have to say for now and I certainly don't > want to start repeating myself, although I may reiterate a point or two in > this message. I would tend to agree with the thrust of Gary F's views > (although I'd like him to unpack a bit further the final paragraph in the > message he sent today). For now I will just offer a few comments regarding > our (JAS's and Gary R's) disagreements regarding phenomenology. > > JAS: ". . .I still struggle to see how anyone can think or talk *about * > Phenomenology *without *engaging in Semeiotic. After all, any fact is > always expressed in a *proposition*; but as soon as we think or say > something *about *a phenomenon using a proposition, we are going beyond > merely *observing *that phenomenon in itself--we are now *representing* > it *with *something else, and *relating* it *to *something else. > > I've argued that we can go "beyond merely observing" phenomena (the very > first act of a phenomenologist but, in my view, certainly not the last) by > employing a logica utens. Logica utens is NOT Semeiotic, while it is found > quite essential for mathematicians and, as I've argued, for > phenomenologists. To say that x is a 1ns or that y is a 3ns, or that w is a > trichotomy-- > > (1ns) > > |> (3ns) > > (2ns) > > --does not require Semeiotic, just acts of ordinary logic. > > JAS: Peirce consistently associated "suchness" with 1ns, and that is only > one irreducible element of the phenomena. > > I disagree. Peirce did not associate "suchness" exclusively with 1ns. See, > for example: > > A dyad consists of two subjects brought into oneness. These subjects have > their modes of being in themselves, and they also have their modes of > being, as first and second, etc., in connection with each other. They are > two, if not really, at least in aspect. There is also some sort of union of > them. The dyad is not the subjects; it has the subjects as one element of > it. It has, besides, a suchness of monoidal character; *and it has > suchness, or suchnesses, peculiar to it as a dyad*. CP 1.326 > > As an example of a dyad take this: God said, Let there be light, and there > was light. We must not think of this as a verse of Genesis, for Genesis > would be a third thing. Neither must we think of it as proposed for our > acceptance, or as held for true; for we are third parties. We must simply > think of God creating light by fiat. Not that the fiat and the coming into > being of the light were two facts; but that it is in one indivisible fact. > God and light are the subjects. *The act of creation is to be regarded, > not as any third object, but merely as the suchness of connection of God > and light*. The dyad is the fact. CP 1.327 (See also 1.322) > > GR: But 'seme' is a term of logic as semeiotic, indeed a rather developed > semeiotic. So are 'precission' and 'predicates' (and 'hypostatic > abstraction' in the passage quoted below). > > JAS: So is "object," yet Peirce seemingly used it at a synonym for > "phenomenon" in 1903. Hypostatic abstraction is what turns an observed > phenomenon into an *object *of thought and discourse--i.e., an Object of > Signs--without necessarily taking a position on its *reality*. > > You wrote, "So is "object," yet Peirce seemingly used it at a synonym for > "phenomenon" in 1903." There appears to me to be an act equivalent to > "hypostatic abstraction" in logica utens (that is not involve Semeiotic) > once one has made ones phaneroscopic observation. But, be that as it may, > as Gary F wrote: > > GF: A phenomenon is an object *of attention*. It becomes the object *of a > sign* when the sign is uttered. > > Continuing: > > GR: Hypostatic abstraction, continuous predicate, proposition, etc. are > terms of semeiotic, and what you've described above is, as I see it, a > posteriori work logic does upon the factual findings and principles of > phenomenology uncovered. > > JAS: I agree that all of those fall under Semeiotic as thinking *about *the > "facts of phenomenology," rather than observing the phenomena themselves > and thinking *through *them (cf. CP 4.549; 1906), which I currently see > as the scope of Phenomenology itself. > > As Gary F recently wrote: > > GF: Peirce does not say there that we think *through* phenomena; he says > we think *through *signs. . . > > I would add what I have repeatedly been trying to get across, namely, that > the signs Phenomenologist think through are the ordinary ones of a logica > utens. Should there be errors in their logic, a more developed semeiotic > can retrospectively correct them. > > GR: Examples of 1ns would seem to be easier to describe than 2ns or 3ns. > > JAS: But what you went on to quote from Peirce are not *descriptions*; > they can only be properly interpreted by those who are able to associate > such concepts with previous Collateral Experience, whether direct or > indirect. Someone not *already *acquainted with magenta, attar, railway > whistles, quinine, mathematics, or love could understand and learn > *nothing *from mere invocations of their color, odor, sound, taste, or > emotional quality. > > You are quite right that these are not descriptions and that one needs > collateral experience to discuss them which, however, doesn't require > Semeiotic. Btw, why do you think that in a discussion of phenomena that > Peirce offers these examples (magenta, attar, love, etc.)? Perhaps there's > some philosophical value in contemplating such things as Adkins does in the > final chapter of his book on phenomenology: "How seeing a scarlet red is > like hearing a trumpet's blare." > > JAS: I am still not convinced that such *abstraction *properly falls > within Phenomenology; the Phaneron contains no objects and no realities, > only "images" (De Tienne's term). We *prescind *the red color in the > Percept, which in itself has no parts, creating a *predicate*; then we > *abstract *the quality of redness as an *object *capable of > representation in a Perceptual Judgment, creating a *subject*; and then > we *generalize *by positing a *real *character that is *really *embodied > in something *external *to us--a *real *possibility that may be (and is) > embodied in *other *things, as well. > > If one restricts the work of the phenomenologist to merely observing the > phenomena, seemingly not permitting him even to offer examples of what he > finds there for, say, another phenomenologist to observe in order to > compare notes, his associating them with one or more of the categories, > their finding trichotomies and vectors and strings of these, etc, then you > have so eviscerated phenomenology that all that is seemingly left are > internal, subjective observations by some individual of use to no one. What > a puny non-science that would be! Must every phenomenologist immediately > become a semeiotician even to report what he observes? I doubt that. I most > certainly hope not! > > JAS: It seems to me that the issue boils down to where the lines are drawn > between Phenomenology, Normative Science (especially Semeiotic), and > Metaphysics; and it is at least arguable [. . .] that not much is > ultimately riding on that particular determination, since such > classifications are somewhat arbitrary. > > There may be some arbitrariness in "such classification," but I certainly > do not agree "that not much is ultimately riding on that particular > determination." Indeed, it seems to me that, for example, conflating > Phenomenology and Semeiotic, or Semeiotic and Metaphysics is extremely > risky, And proposing not drawing lines between all the sciences from > Phenomenology through Metaphysics is certainly not Peircean, even though he > thought that sciences higher in his classification ought offer principles > to those lower. And even while you've reiterated that Peirce remarked that > the principles of Semeiotic would, mutatis mutandis, become those of > Metaphysics, there is plenty original, non-Semeiotic (qua the science) work > to be done in Metaphysics. Semeioticians and Phenomenologists have their > own discrete work to do. So I rather fully disagree with your suggestion > that "not much is riding" on drawing lines between the several cenoscopic > sciences. > > JAS: My own more abstract bent is presumably what attracts me to > Semeiotic, and makes it difficult for me to appreciate Phenomenology as you > clearly do. > > I think one needs to do Phenomenology in order to appreciate it. > > Best, > > Gary R > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . 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