BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list
Again, I disagree with your interpretation. You are merging
'idealism' and 'objective idealism' and the two are not synonyms of
each other.
I disagree that Peirce sees 'Mind as more fundamental than Matter'.
You are rejecting his synechism [see 7.570] which "will not admit
that the physical and psychical phenomena are entirely
distinct...etc..
Furthermore, your pure idealism cannot function as a complex
adaptive system - and Peirce's semiosis is exactly that.
And I'm still waiting for your clarification of vol 2;322 - I can't
find that section, and certainly can't find where Peirce inserted the
categories in brackets .
As I've said before - you and I interpret Peirce quite differently
and I don't see that these continued back and forth statements are
going to convince either of us to change these interpretations.
Edwina
On Sat 03/08/19 1:03 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected]
sent:
Edwina, List:
ET: Peirce did write that "the physical law as derived and special,
the psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism" 6.24. BUT he
did NOT say that he accepted this - ie, with idealism alone as
primordial; and the physical as derived.
On the contrary, he plainly stated that he DID accept this.
According to the text, once dualism is dismissed in favor of monism,
there are three remaining options--neutralism, materialism, and
idealism. Three paragraphs follow; the first rejects materialism,
the second rejects neutralism, and the third endorses (objective)
idealism. Just previously (CP 6.23), Peirce had equated the mental
law or law of mind with the law of habit, and had contrasted it with
the absolute and exact nature of physical law. Therefore,
"inveterate habits becoming physical laws" is just another way of
characterizing "the physical law as derived and special, the
psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism."
ET: Please define 'objective idealism'. As a 'species of idealism'
[and I'm not sure what that means] - please explain the difference
between 'idealism' and 'objective idealism'.
The adjective "objective" distinguishes Peirce's
"Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere
specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102, EP 1:312; 1892)
from the subjective idealism of Berkeley and others, which holds
that there is only mind; i.e., there is no such thing as matter at
all. In other words, Peirce affirmed the reality of matter; however,
his statements that "matter is effete mind" and that matter is "mere
specialized and partially deadened mind" both entail that mind is
more fundamental than matter; i.e., "the physical law as derived and
special, the psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism."
Rejecting this requires embracing one of the other three
alternatives--dualism, with matter and mind as "two radically
different kinds of substance"; neutralism, with matter and mind "both
primordial"; or materialism, with "the psychical law as derived and
special, the physical law alone as primordial." Deacon's subtitle
suggests that unlike Peirce, he adheres to the last of these.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 10:49 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
JAS, list
Please define 'objective idealism'. As a 'species of idealism' [and
I'm not sure what that means] - please explain the difference between
'idealism' and 'objective idealism'. I don't object to the term of
'idealism' in the phrase of 'objective idealism' - but I DO object to
any notion that this term means that either Mind or Matter is
primordial.
Peirce did write that "the physical law as derived and special, the
psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism" 6.24. BUT he
did NOT say that he accepted this - ie, with idealism alone as
primordial; and the physical as derived.
Instead, he wrote" the one intelligible theory of the universe is
that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate
bits becoming physical laws". This is absolutely not the same as
idealism; there is no mention of primordial and no mention of mind as
privileged.
And - you haven't referenced 2.322 as I asked. I can't find that
section and certainly, Peirce didn't insert the categories in
brackets.
As for whether or not my views are 'absurd' - I don't think I need
such terms applied to me. My interpretation of Peirce is different
from yours. Period.
Edwina
On Sat 03/08/19 11:38 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected]
[2] sent:
Edwina, List:
ET: I feel that your view of Peirce, with its 'idealism' rather
than 'objective idealism' is in line with your own personal theism.
I feel that your view of Peirce, with its absurd claim that
objective idealism is somehow not a species of idealism, is in line
with your own personal atheism.
ET: Now - whether these views are also similar to those of Peirce -
is a matter for debate.
No, again, Peirce's position is quite plainly stated in the text of
CP 6.24-25--not dualism, neutralism, or materialism, but idealism;
specifically, objective idealism, which holds "the psychical law
alone as primordial" and "that matter is effete mind."
Regards,
Jon S.
On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 10:27 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
JAS, list
I cannot find that section in 2.322 where Peirce inserts, in
brackets that, eg, 'consciousness' is [1ns]...etc - and I disagree
with such an insertion. Firstness is feeling, without consciousness -
which requires a separation of the experience such that one can be
conscious of it. A paramecium 'feels', i.e., is in a state of 1ns,
but is not conscious of it.
I also disagree that 'pure mind' is 3ns. Thirdness is a specific
aspect of time and space and habit-formation. It is not a
pre-existent [prior to space and time, ie, material embodiment] set
of laws or mind.
The more I read your comments and your inserts - I feel that your
view of Peirce, with its 'idealism' rather than 'objective idealism'
is in line with your own personal theism. Now - whether these views
are also similar to those of Peirce - is a matter for debate. You, of
course, consider them similar. I consider them very dissimilar. So-
that's where it's at.
Edwina
On Sat 03/08/19 11:00 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt
[email protected] sent:
Helmut, List:
On the contrary, according to Peirce, the necessary being of pure
mind (3ns) does not require time, space, or matter.
CSP: If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there
was in the beginning a state of things in which there was nothing, no
reaction [2ns] and no quality [1ns], no matter [2ns], no consciousness
[1ns], no space and no time, but just nothing at all. Not
determinately nothing. For that which is determinately not A
supposes the being of A in some mode. Utter indetermination. But a
symbol alone is indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate
of the absolute beginning, is a symbol [3ns]. That is the way in
which the beginning of things can alone be understood. (EP 2:322;
1904)
CSP: Thus, He [God] is so much like a mind [3ns], and so little
like a singular Existent (meaning by an Existent, or object that
Exists, a thing subject to brute constraints, and reacting with all
other Existents [2ns],) and so opposed in His Nature to an ideal
possibility [1ns], that we may loosely say that He is a Spirit, or
Mind [3ns]. (R 843:27[5]; 1908)
CSP: A full exposition of the pragmaticistic definition of Ens
necessarium would require many pages; but some hints toward it may be
given. A disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time,
since all that it is destined to think is fully in its being at any
and every previous time. (CP 6.490; 1908)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer,
Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran
Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4]
On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 5:32 PM Helmut Raulien wrote:
List, I think, Edwina is right, because anything that happens,
like an action of a mind, requires time, and time needs a scale, and
a scale needs boundary conditions. These may be a standstill on one
side, and light velocity, or something else, maybe infinity, on the
other. So i guess, there cannot be a mind at work (at some certain,
or any, speed) without the concept of standstill or effeteness, which
would be matter. Also, a mind does not only require time, but space
too, and space and matter are two things that, according to Einstein,
are prerequisites for each other, as you, I forgot who, already have
mentioned. Best, Helmut
Links:
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[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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